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Abstract
The investigation of financial networks has been given more attention over the
recent years and is generating even greater interest. This dissertation pertains
to the research activities with focus on the analysis and modeling of financial
network dynamics and complex relationships between financial institutions,
central banks and other participants of the financial markets. We develop a
simulation-based financial network model, reproducing a stylized financial sys-
tem, which is affected by strong idiosyncratic or systematic external shocks.
We use this model to analyze the interaction between banks, different eco-
nomic sectors, and the central bank.
The distinctive character of the presented model is that banks are affected
by the initial distress depending on their individual asset structure, due to the
fact that banks, real economy segments and the central bank are connected
by various credit and investment links building a multi-layer network struc-
ture. In comparison to existing models and scientific contributions in this area,
iv
our model merges many different facets and characteristics of financial net-
work into one single comprehensive model. Besides common borrower-lender
relations, the so-called asset based financial network model includes the se-
curitization of debts distinguishing between covered bonds and collateralized
debt obligations, allowing us to analyze various network structures. Moreover,
the model takes account of the regulatory capital and liquidity requirements,
as well as the risk of deposit withdrawals, interbank trading and possible sup-
portive activities by the central bank.
Besides the effect of capitalization on banking system stability, we analyze
the impact of risk preferences of the banking sector with respect to its invest-
ments. In view of the initial shock, we focus on its intensity and concentration.
We look at the effect of degree of connectivity and heterogeneity within bank-
ing systems. Furthermore, we analyze effects of size of interbank networks and
their heterogeneity on vulnerability of whole networks and their single areas.
In this context, a core-periphery network structures are studied. We explore
effects of the loss of confidence in the banking system, connected to deposit
withdrawals. Furthermore, we analyze the influence of certain properties con-
nected to the regulatory framework. In this context, we look at the impacts of
tightening regulatory capital restrictions and disparate capital requirements.
Thereby we consider the case that all banks are treated equally, and the case
of required capital assuming that systemically important banks faced the cap-
ital surcharge. Furthermore we look at the risk adjusted capital requirements
compared to the ’flat’ capital adequacy. Analyzing liquidity effects, we focus
on initial liquidity endowment within banking systems and liquidity provided
by central banks during financial crises.
The simulation experiments and results presented in this thesis show how
diverse characteristics of the network itself and its environment as well as the
properties of the systemic event exert influences on the dynamics within the
network and thus on systemic risk. The tangible results often depend on a
broad spectrum of factors.
The results of this work underline that an effective monitoring and regulating
of banking systems have to be based on a deep understanding of financial
products and current developments in the financial markets, transparency of
bank books to the greatest possible extent and a continuous development of
sophisticated models using this knowledge and data.
”The truth is rarely pure and never simple.”
— Oscar Wilde, The Importance of Being Earnest
To my sons. . .
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Introduction
0.1 Motivation
The term ’financial crisis’ is often defined a situation in which some financial institutions
or assets rapidly lose their value. Until recently, financial crises were associated with bank
runs, stock market crashes, bursting of bubbles or currency crises. The financial crisis
that started in 2007 in the USA real estate market opened up entirely new dimensions.
Many banks that had contributed to the excessive mortgage lending to customers of low
credit standing went bankrupt within a short period of time. The so-called sub prime
crisis spread rapidly due to the refinancing of the loans by pooling and securitization
of receivables as well as by the short term liquidity traded on the interbank markets.
Soon after the start of the crisis the interbank market had almost completely dried up,
activating a further spiral of liquidity problems. Cost-intensive interventions of a large
number of central banks and governments, taken to rescue distressed banks, seemed to
be necessary to prevent a deepening global financial crisis. Consequently, the substantial
over-indebtedness of individual countries caused several economic and government crises.
However, the impacts of the last financial crisis and of the associated monetary policies
are still not completely clear.
One question that has arisen during the crisis is: Could the financial crisis that started in
August 2007 and the subsequent contagion effects have been predicted by modern macroe-
4 Introduction
conomic models and early warning systems ? Davis et al. (2008), for example, worked on
similar questions in order to evaluate the power of early warning systems. They found
that the US sub-prime crisis was only partly foreseen and that some of the consequences
like the risk of contagion and the subsequent negative externalities for financial stability
had been overlooked. One of the results of their work is that the latest financial crisis
had some features that were rather atypical for the average banking crisis. This finding
can explain, at least in part, the failure of the macroeconomic models and early warning
systems which were used at the central banks and other institutions before and during
the crisis. In particular, the role of financial intermediaries has long been neglected in
macroeconomic models, which considered banks and broker-dealers as passive players, see
Brunnermeier(2009). Similarly, the financial sector has played only a very rudimentary
role in the prevailing macroeconomic models. Phenomena like speculative bubbles, over-
investment, the effects of balance sheet changes, as well as liquidity and the domino effects
of bank bankruptcies haver been excluded a priori, as emphasized by Lux(2016).
The other often discussed question is whether the ensuing domino effect could have been
restricted or even avoided by better regulation. One of the problems in this context is
that it is often fairly uncertain whether the implementation of concrete policies, proposals
and activities in order to make financial systems more resistant would lead to satisfactory
results. The effectiveness of such efforts will depend on the number of factors, not at least
because of the complexity of financial systems, interdependencies within them and many
conceivable externalities.
A number of studies in recent years have shown that network structures play an impor-
tant role for financial system stability. But interbank networks and their effects have been
neither sufficiently investigated nor adequately included in further analyses, as underlined
by Lux(2009). However, in recent years the role of financial networks in economic research
has been growing in importance. The research activities mainly move in two principal
directions: empirical studies of interbank markets and network modeling, which is either
analytical or simulation-based. However, attempts are often made to combine the find-
0.1 Motivation 5
ings of both research activities. The simulation-based models, for example, often apply
network topologies characterized by empirically discovered properties.
One of the first theoretical works dealing with financial networks is the research of Eisen-
berg and Noe (2001), which presented an abstract approach for the modeling of financial
systems. The authors developed a clearing financial network model which meets the
usual requirements on clearing vectors imposed by bankruptcy law: proportional repay-
ments of liabilities in default, limited liability, and absolute priority. In this context, the
endogenously-determined clearing vectors represent a specification of the payments made
by each of the nodes in the network. The model clears the financial system and provides
the systemic risk information solving a static clearing problem. Some years before, Shel-
don and Maurer (1998) estimated a matrix of interbank loans for Switzerland based on
the principle of entropy maximization. Closely related to this research, Upper and Worms
(2002) estimated the bilateral credit relationships for the German banking system by using
the same approach. Using the techniques developed in these papers, Elsinger, Lehar and
Sommer (2002) suggested a new approach to risk assessment for banks by using standard
risk management techniques in combination with a network model of interbank exposures
and individual bank data usually collected at the central bank. Cifuentes (2002) analyzed
the link between banking concentration and systemic risk. Cifuentes et al. (2005) en-
gaged in intensive follow-up work on liquidity risk in a system of interconnected financial
institutions when these are subject to regulatory solvency constraints and are forced to
sell their assets to meet the requirements.
During the financial crisis that began back in August 2007 and in the face of the increas-
ing linkages between banks, it became clearer that the risk assessment of banking system
stability should be at the level of the system rather than at the level of individual insti-
tutions. There seems to have been rising interest in understanding the risk of contagion
and its consequences over the last decade. The use of network models for this purpose has
grown in popularity. Their methodology and technology are being developed in several
directions, one of which is the model family explicitly including the highly simplified bal-
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ance sheets of banks. Such models differ from one another by design of the network and
its topology, definition of the initial shock, contagion mechanisms and further dynamic
processes. In particular, Nier et al. (2007) simulated effects of a shock to the system
resulting from the failure of one or more randomly chosen financial institutions. May and
Arinaminpathy (2010) explored a mathematical model of a simplified banking system
and studied the interplay between the properties of individual banks and the dynamical
processes in the system. They discussed results in relation to potential regulations aimed
at reducing systemic risk.
There has been a large amount of literature related to the scope of the present dis-
sertation over the past few years. The overview on the most closely related literature will
be presented in section 0.3 after introducing the scope of the dissertation. Furthermore,
the most important single subjects related to the present work will be discussed in the
appropriate places in subsequent chapters.
As much as has already been covered over recent years, many more open questions remain
in order to understand the interaction of banks and other actors of the financial systems
and its consequences.
0.2 Scope of the dissertation
The focus of this dissertation is on the simulation-based financial network analyses. Here
we try to move forward in a new direction, developing the dynamic asset based network
model (ABN-model). In the financial network models that we know, the exogenous shock
mostly directly affects one or more banks. Normally, the source of the shock is then either
not specified or given by a failure of the external (non-financial) sector without further
specification. Initially affected banks are chosen randomly or on the basis of their specific
properties such as balance sheet totals. The asset structure of individual banks with
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respect to the priority of their assets and portfolio diversification or risk is not usually
considered.
In contrast to previous work, we consider a diversified real sector (here termed ’external
sector’) as a part of the network, characterized by the heterogeneous risk and financing
structures of individual segments including the heterogeneous securitization techniques.
Furthermore, the segment-specific degrees of diversification, in terms of the number of
banks sharing the financing of any segment, implies a heterogeneous structure of the
banking sector in the model. These properties allow a more differentiated analysis of the
systemic risk, in particular regarding the characteristics of the initial shock.
For the construction of the ABN-model we found the inspiration in the network model
presented by Nier et al.(2007) in [53]. However, we refined the central properties of the
financial network and introduced further dynamics. Like Nier et al. and many others,
we identify the external sector as the source of the initial shock and determine the in-
tensity of the initial shock as the (unexpected) default rate of external loans. However,
the ABN-model’s specificity is found in the differential treatment of external segments
concerning the stress scenarios and thus in the distribution of defaults across external
segments. Moreover, because of the heterogeneous asset structure of the banking system,
the affectedness of a single bank does not primarily depend on its properties such as
size or interconnectivity, but on its asset structure. Banks holding non-performing assets
will be directly affected. Thereby, the degree of the initial affectedness for a single bank
depends on its share of non-performing assets and on the risk degree of its investments.
Furthermore, banks may be also affected by the loss transfer via interbank credit links
or by the withdrawal of deposits. Moreover, they may be forced to sell their assets at
fire-sale prices in the case of liquidity shortage and thus face further losses from fire-sales.
Further, the ABN-model includes the securitization of debts using two classes of debt
securities: covered bonds (CB) and collateralized debt obligations (CDO). Moreover, it
takes account of the risk adjusted capital requirements and liquidity reserve deposits, and
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Figure 1: Graphical representation of the scope of the dissertation.
comprises the central bank with its supporting role.
The scope of the analyses is illustrated in the Fig.1 and will be briefly described here.
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The focus of the analysis is the systemic risk according to the definition of O. de Bandt
and P. Hartmann (2000) in the ”narrow” sense (please refer to section 1.1.1), implying
the failures of one or many financial institutions caused by strong idiosyncratic or limited
systematic shocks, being accompanied by the subsequent shock transmission processes
and further dynamics within the network. Consequently, bank defaults can be triggered
directly or indirectly, as a result of contagion and the subsequent dynamic processes like
withdrawals of deposits. The wide systematic shocks, leading to wide systemic events by
affecting many markets and financial institutions simultaneously and causing the systemic
crisis, are not the focus of this research.
We consider the real economy as trigger of such initial shocks, which subsequently lead to
loan losses to banks concerning one or more banks initially to various degrees. Thereby
we study two main network dynamics triggered by such unexpected loan losses: solvency
and liquidity chain reactions. These dynamics are designed as iterative processes, which
may take very different forms depending on the network properties and the environment
in which the network is situated. To analyze the environmental impact we take a look at
the regulatory requirements like capital adequacy and liquidity requirements, as well as
at depositor and investor confidence in the banking system and the stabilizing support
for troubled financial institutions by the central bank.
We do not limit ourselves to the banking systems, but consider the financial system
as a whole. The economy we deal with consists of three elements: firstly the real econ-
omy including a number of different sectors, secondly the banking system regarded as a
dynamic network, and thirdly the central bank. Analyzing the impact of the shocks and
processes that follow, we primarily focus on the resilience of the banking system, but we
also consider the losses in the economy as costs of the systemic risk including both, losses
to banks and non-banks (externals). We consider expected credit losses to banks as oper-
ating losses that will be normally covered by margin requirements and the default fund.
The main purpose of bank equity is to cover losses that are greater than expected. From
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this perspective, shocks regarded here are connected only to unexpected losses. We regard
the losses of bank capital besides the losses to non-banks as costs of systemic risk for the
following reasons: since the stockholders of financial institutions are often representatives
from a variety of industries, private persons or even public authorities, a drastic reduction
of the equity value may be able to trigger further shocks in the economy. Furthermore,
banks that experience distress are required to reinforce their capital to meet the regu-
latory solvency ratios. In case of doubt, banks may be obliged to heavily reduce their
lending to the real economy or even to cease lending altogether because of capital shortage.
The main objective of the present work is to show that simulation experiments could
provide a general guide to developments in complex networks like a financial system.
However, the tangible results often depend on a broad spectrum of factors like network
topology and dynamic processes, properties of nodes and, not least, shock specification.
Furthermore, the specific asset structures of banks and their interconnectedness are of
great importance for the reliability of the results and have to be included in the network
modeling. The asset based approach for the financial network modeling should allow us
to analyze the stability of the financial system and other consequences due to the various
economic developments related to certain industrial branches or countries. Furthermore,
by using the proposed approach, the effects of regulatory requirements and monetary poli-
cies can be evaluated taking into account various characteristics of the banking system as
well as of the potential shocks. Moreover, we believe that the impact of macro-economic
shocks on the stability of the banking system can be appreciated in a feasible and realistic
way by combining the asset based network approach and the real data. However, even
with a lack of concrete data, some interesting and stable observations in terms of the
systemic risk could be made by using the ABN-model for various simulation experiments.
We will observe, for example, that the support by the central bank, providing additional
liquidity during the crises, can reduce bank losses and their defaults and even the losses
transmitted from banks to externals, while an increasing liquidity reserve of banks could
deepen the contagion process and raise losses to both: banks and externals, particularly
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if withdrawals of deposits are triggered by a loss of confidence and are solvency based.
Furthermore, we will see that the increasing heterogeneity of better capitalized banking
systems tends to have negative effects on their resilience, while the increasing heterogene-
ity in less well capitalized systems shows rather stabilizing effects. Moreover, differences
between core and periphery have mostly clear opposing effects on the core and periphery
banks. Further, we will observe that an equal increase in the equity ratio for all banks
tends to stabilize the banking system more effectively than capital surcharges for system-
ically important financial institutions only, even if the total increase of banking capital in
the system occurs to the same extent.
In the present PhD-project we concentrate on developing the mentioned asset based net-
work approach, the implementation of the according simulation-based model in the pro-
gramming language C++, as well as the simulation analyses of a number of characteristics
of the financial network and its environment in terms of systemic risk. The dissertation
is organized as follows. Chapter 1 deals with the systemic risk in financial systems from a
theoretical perspective. The asset-based approach and the derived model are the integral
part of the dissertation and will be presented in detail in chapter 2. Chapter 3 describes
the methodology of simulation experiments used in the following analyses. Chapters 4 to 9
are dedicated to the analysis of various properties of the financial networks and individual
banks, as well as to the regulatory environment. We will first address the question of how
system stability would be affected by the increasing intensity and concentration of the
initial event in chapter 4 and show that the resistance of a banking system is connected to
two opposite effects: the positive one related to the sharing of losses across banks, and the
negative effect caused by growing contagion. Thus, the answer to the question of whether
the banking system is more resistant against idiosyncratic events than against broader
distributed shocks depends on the magnitude of the initial shock and capitalization level
of the banking system, among others. Chapter 5 investigates the risk-taking capability
of banking systems. In this context we will look at the capitalization level of banks and
their risk appetite. We will see that increasing the equity of banks has a positive impact
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on their resilience against systemic events, in general. However, we will recognize that
for low levels of capital, slightly increasing capital can worsen contagion. Further, we
will analyze the impact of risk preferences of the banking sector with regard to the risk
of their investments and show that this impact is not unique. Moreover, the effects of
risk appetite of banks depend, inter alia, on the capital requirements and properties of
systemic events. Chapter 6 deals with the relationship between systemic risk and some
properties of the network structure from different points of view. In particular, we will
look at the degree of connectivity and the heterogeneity of the banking system. We will
observe that higher connectivity can be positive or negative for system resilience, depend-
ing on the capitalization level of banks, magnitude of the initial shock, and even on the
level of the interbank connectivity degree. Moreover, the effect of the size of interbank
networks will be analyzed. We will see two contrary effects, related to the increasing
granularity and sharing of losses. Furthermore, we will study the impact of increasing
heterogeneity, considering three-tiered core-periphery networks. Chapter 7 has a focus
on the liquidity risk, related to the loss of confidence in a banking system. Here we
will discover that under some circumstances, a marginal loss of confidence would lead to
heavy losses for banks and externals and substantially destabilize the banking system.
Chapter 8 explores the implications of the risk adjusted capital requirements and of a
capital surcharge for systemically important banks. With regard to risk adjusted capital
requirements, we will show that such requirements could make the banking system more
vulnerable to unexpected shocks, compared to flat capital requirements. This would be
the case if capital relief for lower risk banks given by risk adjusted capital adequacy in
relation to flat capital requirements is larger than the real risk difference, which implies
the underestimation of risk by banks or by regulatory capital requirements. We will turn
to liquidity management instruments in Chapter 9. In particular, we will look at how the
system stability will be affected by increasing liquidity buffers or reserve and how it will be
influenced by the willingness of the central bank to support the banking system in order
to prevent a further mounting financial turmoil. We will observe the rather destabilizing
effects of increasing liquidity endowment of banks, while the supportive role of the central
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bank tends to stabilize the system, especially if it is quite well capitalized as a whole.
Chapter 10 concludes and underlines the importance of the discussed results for further
research and regulatory activities.
0.3 Related literature
The presented work contributes to some strands of literature related to the systemic risk
in financial systems and financial network modeling, which are presented in the tabular
overview below. The emphasis is placed on the most relevant aspects concern the scope
of this dissertation.
Key elements of the systemic risk
references subject results
De Bandt and
Hartmann (2000)
proposed a concept of systemic
risk regarding the ”strong” systemic
event as the key element in the def-
inition of systemic risk which in-
cludes shocks and propagation mech-
anisms itself
besides the various forms of exter-
nal effects also the contagion effects
are being treated as the core of the
systemic risk
Upper (2011) reviewed the methodologies behind
simulation methods to test for con-
tagion in interbank markets restrict-
ing his attention to papers pub-
lished until 2011 dealing with conta-
gion driven by defaults on interbank
lending.
underlined the shortcomings in the
financial contagion modeling: com-
mon assumption that banks do not
react after a shock has occurred, fo-
cus on the failure of an individual
bank rather than common shocks
and absence of behavioural founda-
tions
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Topology of banking systems
references subject results
Sheldon and
Maurer (1998)
estimated a matrix of interbank
loans for Switzerland based on
known marginal loan distributions
and the principle of entropy maxi-
mization.
domestic interbank lending is not
the foremost threat to financial mar-
ket stability in Switzerland – the do-
mestic interbank loans are quantita-
tively less important in Switzerland
than cross-border interbank loans
Upper and
Worms (2002)
estimated the bilateral credit rela-
tionships for the German banking
system
contagion risk depends on the topol-
ogy of the interbank linkages
Mu¨ller (2006) analyzed the Swiss interbank mar-
ket with respect to the contagion
potential using data on bilateral
bank exposures and credit lines,
considered the effect on solvency
and liquidity of a complete unwind-
ing of interbank lending
there is substantial potential for
contagion via exposure and credit
lines in the market; a lender of last
resort intervention could remark-
ably reduce the negative spill-over
effects on the liquidity and solvency;
the structure of the interbank mar-
ket is substantial for its resilience:
centralized markets are more vul-
nerable to contagion
Fricke and Lux
(2015 a,b), Fin-
ger, Fricke and
Lux (2013)
analyzed data for the Italian inter-
bank network based on overnight
loans collected by the e-MID trad-
ing platform during 1999-2010 and
explored the network topology
networks appear to be random on
a daily base, but contain significant
non-random structure on a higher
aggregation level; core-periphery
structure provides a better fit for
analyzed interbank data; the iden-
tified core is quite stable over time
with the majority of core banks can
be classified as intermediaries; the
data are best described by negative
binomial distributions
Iman van
Lelyveld and
Daan in ’t Veld
(2012)
investigated the network structure
of interbank markets using data for
the Netherlands
found a significant core periphery
structure
Tellez (2013) analyzed the network of expo-
sures between Australian authorized
deposit-taking institutions
despite of the network complexity
and core periphery structure, the
author underlined the low density of
the banking network
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Financial network modelling
references subject results
Eisenberg and
Noe (2001)
developed an algorithm that clears
the financial system and provides in-
formation on the systemic risk
abstract approach for banking net-
works solving a static clearing prob-
lem
Nier et al. (2007) modeled the contagion mecha-
nisms as a simulation model and
analyzed the risk of knock-on
defaults triggered by the initial
bank default depending on some
bank properties and the financial
network structure
M-shaped graph describes the non-
linear relationship between conta-
gion and the level of interconnectiv-
ity of banks reflecting the interplay
of two opposite effects of increas-
ing connectivity: increasing number
of channels for shock transmission
and increasing resistance to conta-
gion by sharing losses across a larger
number of counterparts
May and Arinam-
inpathy (2010)
explored a mathematical model of a
simplified banking system and stud-
ied the interplay between the prop-
erties of individual banks and the
overall dynamical behaviour of the
system, using analytic mean-field
approximations for the network
provided a mathematical explana-
tion for simple dynamics in ’banking
ecosystems
Montagna and
Kok (2013)
developed an agent-based multi-
layered interbank network model
based on a sample of large EU banks
offering a holistic approach to inter-
bank contagion and proposed a sys-
temic importance measure based on
a multi-layered network model
taking into account that banks are
related to each other in various mar-
ket segments, the contagion effects
can be substantially larger than the
sum of the contagion-induced losses
when considering the market seg-
ments individually
Lengnick, Krug
and Wohltmann
(2013)
explored an agent-based and stock
flow consistent model of a monetary
economy and analyzed the impact
of interbank lending on the financial
stability
interbank lending stabilizes the
economy, normally, but amplifies
systemic instability during crises;
even with no interbank market, in-
direct contagion can lead to propa-
gation of bankruptcies
Montagna and
Lux (2016)
introduced a probabilistic model
combining such important known
quantities like the size of the banks
with a realistic network structure
the approach enables to analyze im-
pacts of idiosyncratic shocks and
contagion for banking networks with
only some key statistics and statis-
tical regularities are known
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Scientific publications emphasized below reflect useful insights from the financial network
analyses with a focus on various aspects considered in this dissertation.
Degree of interconnectedness within the banking systems
references subjects statements
Allen and Gale
(2000); Freixas
et al. (2000);
Haldane and May
(2011); Acemoglu
et al. (2015)
analyzed the financial contagion in
banking systems and the resilience
of the system to the insolvency of
any individual bank depending on
the interconnectivity degree
at a low magnitude and a low num-
ber of negative shocks, a more equal
distribution of interbank liabilities
leads to a less fragile financial sys-
tem
Cifuentes et al.
(2002, 2005)
intensive follow-up work on liquid-
ity risk in a interconnected banking
network, when banks are forced to
sell their assets to meet the solvency
and liquidity requirements
systemic resilience and bank inter-
connections are non-monotonically
related – more interconnected sys-
tems may be riskier than less con-
nected systems; liquidity buffers
play a similar role as capital buffers
and can be more effective
Nier et al. (2007) studied the impact of connectivity
as well as the interplay between con-
nectivity and net worth
negative nonlinear relationship be-
tween contagion and capital: in un-
dercapitalized networks, a further
increase of connectivity increases
the contagion; in better capitalized
networks systemic risk increases or
decreases with increase of connectiv-
ity, depending on the initial level
Battiston et al.
(2009)
investigated the effect of the net-
work connectivity
the relationship between connectiv-
ity and systemic risk is decreasing
if the degree of connectivity is (rel-
atively) low and increasing when it
becomes high
Cont and Moussa
(2010)
studied a specific case of powerlaw
network based on a scalefree simu-
lation
increasing connectivity may signif-
icantly increase contagion; conta-
gion is very sensitive to the net-
work structure properties, especially
to the level of connectivity and con-
centration; more heterogeneous net-
works in degrees and exposures are
more resilient to contagion
0.3 Related literature 17
Systemic event properties
references subjects statements
Furfine (2003 ) looked at the role of liquidity in the
contagion process, considering the
case where the largest lender in the
federal funds market is unable to
lend
illiquidity may not only amplify con-
tagion but also cause it
Gai and Kapadia
(2010)
examined the effects of initial shocks
with various magnitude in a finan-
cial network model
similar shocks could have very dif-
ferent consequences for the financial
system depending on whether or not
the shock hits at a particular pres-
sure point in the network structure.
Moreover, when capital buffers have
been eroded to critical levels, the
level of contagion risk could increase
extremely rapidly
Acemoglu et al.
(2015)
studied the relationship between the
financial network architecture and
the likelihood of systemic failures
due to counterparty risk.
as the magnitude or the number
of negative shocks crosses certain
thresholds, more financial intercon-
nections are no longer a guarantee
for stability
Heterogeneity of the banking structure
references subjects statements
Haldane and May
(2011) ; Haldane
and Kapadia
(2011)
studied the impact of heterogeneity that homogeneous banking systems
clearly make each individual bank
safer but amplify the systemic risk.
Battiston et al.
(2012)
investigated how the size of the de-
fault cascade is affected by the ini-
tial distribution of robustness and
by the level of risk diversification in
the network
the effect of diversification is not
unique, but depends crucially on
the allocation of assets and liabili-
ties across agents and the exposure
structure
Hofmann de
Quadros et al.
(2014)
analyzed various types of interbank
network
more connected networks with high
concentration of credits are more re-
silient to contagion
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Systemic importance of banks
references subjects statements
Brownlees and
Engle (2012)
privided a systemic risk measure,
defined as a banks contribution to
the deterioration of the capitaliza-
tion of the financial system as a
whole during a crisis
bank size and especially organiza-
tional complexity are significant for
systemic risk of financial institu-
tions
Laeven, Rat-
novski and Tong
(2014)
provide an economic foundation for
the debate on bank size, as well as
on activities and complexity of large
banks, using data of 52 countries.
large banks, on average, create more
individual and systemic risk, espe-
cially if having insufficient capital
or unstable funding, engaging more
in market activities or being more
complex.
Varotto and Zhao
(2014)
analyzed systemic risk for US and
European banks from 2004 to 2012
common systemic risk indicators are
primarily driven by bank size and
focused on the fact that smaller
banks may still pose considerable
systemic threats; banks balance
sheet characteristics can help to
forecast its systemic importance;
the systemic risk of different finan-
cial networks appears to be driven
by different factors
Confidence in banking systems
references subject results
Feijen and Perotti
(2005)
devoted to the issue of investor pro-
tection
under weak regulatory institutions,
financial liberalization is often fol-
lowed by financial crises; industry
exit rates and profit margins after
banking crises are higher in the most
corrupt countries
Galindo and
Micco (2007)
studied relationship between credi-
tor protection and the response of
credit to external shocks by using
a panel constructed gathering infor-
mation (1990-2004) for a broad set
of countries
detected the empirical support for
the idea that weak creditor pro-
tection makes credit markets more
volatile
Dailami and Mas-
son (2009)
considered ways of measuring in-
vestor and consumer confidence; an-
alyzed and explained the evolution
of confidence
underlined the connection between
the willingness of investors to allo-
cate assets to equities, and their risk
appetite and confidence; postulated
four dimensions of investor confi-
dence: market volatility, market
performance, macroeconomic news,
and government responses
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Regulatory requirements and crisis prevention
references subjects statements
Elsinger, Lehar
and Sommer
(2002)
suggested a new approach to risk as-
sessment for banks by using stan-
dard risk management techniques in
combination with a network model
of interbank exposures and individ-
ual bank data usually collected at
the central bank; applied the model
to Austrian bank data set
correlated exposures of banks are
the main source of systemic risk
and contagion is of secondary im-
portance if bankruptcy costs are low
and an effective strategy to tackle
the crisis exist; funds for a lender of
last resort that are needed to stop
contagion can be surprisingly small
Heid, Porath and
Stolz(2003)
examined the impact of capital re-
quirements on capital and risk levels
of German savings banks
found evidence that banks response
to regulatory requirement adjust-
ment depends on the amount of cap-
ital buffer, defined by capital the
bank holds in excess of the regula-
tory minimum
Cont and Moussa
(2010)
studied the impact of capital re-
quirements in limiting the extent of
systemic risk and default contagion
in a network context
targeting the creditors of the most
contagious institutions is a more
effective procedure than increasing
capital ratios for all institutions in
the network equally
Brei and Gamba-
corta (2014)
analyzed, how the risk-weighted reg-
ulatory capital ratio and the Basel
III leverage ratio behave over the cy-
cle, using a large data set for the pe-
riod 1995-2012
both ratios are countercyclical with
a tighter constraint for banks in
booms and a looser constraint in re-
cessions; the leverage ratio is sig-
nificantly more countercyclical than
the risk-weighted regulatory capital
ratio; exposure measures, total and
risk wighted assets are positively
correlated with cycle indicators; cor-
relation is lower during the crisis be-
cause of a sharp lending and invest-
ment reduction during the crisis
Krug, Lengnick
and Wohltmann
(2014)
analyzed the impact of Basel III’s
components on financial stability by
using a stock-flow consistent agent-
based model
positive impact of the synergistic in-
teraction of microprudential instru-
ments is considerably larger than
the sum of the individual contribu-
tions to stability, but surcharges on
SIBs contribute to complexity of the
regulatory framework without im-
proving the resilience of the system
Chapter 1
Systemic risk in financial systems
1.1 Definition of systemic risk
Before the financial crisis which began in 2007, there was widespread belief that the sta-
bility of the financial systems would be ensured if banks and financial institutions did
not take excessive risk. Hence, the focus of the banking regulators and the supervisory
authorities and institutions was on microprudential regulation, that primarily tried to
ensure that no individual bank or other financial institution took on risks that were too
large. On the basis of the experience, scientific findings and discussions over the last years,
it could be said that the financial regulation bodies failed to prevent a financial crisis not
least by ignoring systemic risk. There must be no doubt that examining vulnerabilities of
the financial system as a whole should be a necessary amendment of the microprudential
regulation and supervision.
Despite the growing popularity of the term ’systemic risk’, there is no clear definition
of what is meant by it. One explanation is that systemic risk is a broader term and does
not relate solely to economics or the financial markets. According to Kambhu, Weidman
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and Krishnan (2007), systemic risk can be regarded as a generic problem and one of high
importance to many environmental and engineering sciences. For example, ”atmospheric
scientists examine such questions in the context of climate change, as do fishery man-
agers concerned with the sudden collapse of certain economically important fish stocks”
(see [40], p.6). However, even within the limitation of financial systems, systemic risk is
a multifaceted phenomenon and difficult to define precisely. In particular, this expression
comprises financial institutions being affected by sufficiently adverse shocks, which may
simultaneously take a significant part of them down and have a negative impact on the
supply of credit to the real sector, see Martinez (2012). This consideration represents
the ”. . . traditional view of systemic risk, assuming that systemic risks are exogenous in
the sense that as long as financial institutions and firms are responsible in their choice of
investments, captures the effects of exogenous shocks, the financial system will be stable”,
as stated by Franklin Allen in the INQUIRE Conference (November 4, 2014). However,
while some triggers of systemic risk are exogenous, many are endogenous depending on
the financial network structures as well as on the government and central bank policies.
”Developments in the financial system can cause a seizing-up or breakdown of this sys-
tem and trigger massive damages to the real economy. Such developments can stem from
the failure of large and interconnected institutions, from endogenous imbalances that add
up over time, or from a sizable unexpected event....”(e.g. Clare Distinguished Lecture in
Economics and Public Policy by Jean-Claude Trichet, organized by the Clare College,
University of Cambridge, Cambridge, 10 December 2009). For example, lowering interest
rates as endogenous effect at a time when property prices are rising rapidly can lead to
a real estate bubble, the bursting of which could initiate a deep financial crisis with very
serious consequences for the entire economy.
In accordance to the European Central Bank (2010), systemic risk can be defined as ”a
risk of financial instability so widespread that it impairs the functioning of a financial
system to the point where economic growth and welfare suffer materially”.
According to de Bandt et al. (2009), the systemic risk with regard to financial systems can
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be considered as a result of market imperfections, namely, as ”the likelihood of multiple
failures of financial institutions that poses significant problems to the financial stability”,
see [19]. This definition has been further clarified in O. de Bandt and P. Hartmann
(2000), where the authors presented a concept of systemic risk as basic economic concept
for the understanding of financial crises. Thereby, they are regarding the ’strong’ systemic
event as the key element in the definition of systemic risk which includes two important
elements itself, shocks and propagation mechanisms. This approach, besides considering
the various forms of external effects, takes into account the contagion effects as being core
to systematic risk.
This definition of the systemic risk is in line with the scope of the present work. Therefore,
the mentioned concept and, in particular, the key elements of the systemic event (shock
and shock propagation mechanisms) will be treated in the following sections in accordance
with O. de Bandt and P. Hartmann (2000).
1.1.1 Systemic event
The first element of a (strong) systemic event is either an idiosyncratic or a systematic
initial shock which leads to the failures of one or many institutions or crashes of one or
many markets. O. de Bandt and P. Hartmann define the strong systemic event being
’idiosyncratic’ that concerns one institution, market or system independently from others
and spreads to the others via contagion (domino effect), while widespread ’systematic
shocks’ affect many institutions or markets at the same time. In our opinion, it depends
on the perspective of the observer, what kind of systemic event one is facing or speaking
about, especially with regard to the definition of the system or to the source or trigger
of the initial shock. For example, the financial crisis had been triggered by a particular
problem in only one - say real estate - market, strongly affecting several banks simultane-
ously which were able to transmit the losses to the financial markets themselves. From the
perspective of the entire economy, we would see a single segment (real estate in this case)
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Figure 1.1: Systemic events. Graphic reproduced from De Bandt and Hartmann (2000)
getting into trouble due to the initial shock independently of other markets and speak
of an idiosyncratic shock. But from the perspective of the financial market we would
consider the fact that several banks have been affected by the turmoil in the real estate
market, propagating the shock to the entire economy, and speak of a limited systematic
shock. Defining the real estate market as the system we would take the turmoil into
consideration and come to the conclusion that many regions are affected.
The work of O. De Bandt and P. Hartmann provides the concept of systemic risk based on
the definition of systemic events in the ’narrow’ and ’broad’ senses, respectively. Systemic
events in the broad sense include wide systematic shocks leading to systemic crisis in ad-
dition to the characteristics of the systemic events in the narrow sense, as it can be seen in
Fig.1.1. Such negative shocks are often ’uninsurable’ or not diversifiable. This distinction
is important with respect to the crisis management instruments, which might be different.
According to Kambhu, Weidman and Krishnan (2007), ”a detailed understanding of what
constitutes systemic risk is important to forming a regulatory regime that balances costs
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and benefits. Indeed, in all the roles policymakers fill in preventing systemic events and
mitigating systemic risk, a proper analytical framework is crucial for defining the correct
scope and mode of action. For central bankers in particular, a clear method for identifying
systemic risk and the onset of systemic events is critical for decision making on whether
and how to intervene” (see [40], p.10). O. De Bandt and P. Hartmann (2000) explain
that, ”bank crises emerging from contagion could be stopped at an early stage at the indi-
vidual bank level through emergency liquidity assistance if identified in a timely manner,
whereas macro problems would normally be addressed through more standard stabilization
policies, such as open market operations”(see [18], p.6). Not least for this reason, bank
contagion as a substantial part of systemic risk is an important issue in our research and
is discussed extensively in the next section.
1.1.2 Contagion
The focus of this research is on the financial contagion in terms of the process described
by the failure of a financial institution which triggers at least one further failure within
the financial system.
The importance of the contagion risk for financial stability has been raised on more than
once in the discussion above and in the broad spectrum of the relevant literature. For
instance, Upper (2011) underlines that ”if contagion takes place, then it could lead to the
breakdown of a substantial fraction of the banking system, thus imposing high costs to soci-
ety. [. . . ] Knowing whether the failure of a particular institution could trigger the failure
of others is important not only for crisis management but also for crisis prevention.” (see
[63]).
Contagion in the sense of the (financial) systemic risk component can stem from vari-
ous sources and exists in a variety of dynamics and intensities. Domino effects through
settlement and payment systems or interbank markets, assets with similar or correlated
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risks and also uncertainty about possible market developments because of absent or am-
biguous data and information or even a lack of precedent shall be mentioned as the most
important types of financial contagion.
However, the contagion from one financial institution to another originates from the ex-
istence of a network of financial contracts primarily created in three types of systems:
the settlement and payment systems, the interbank market which is used by banks for
short term financing as well as the ’off-exchange-trading’ market (OTC) for derivatives,
as described by Freixas et al. (2000) in [28]. Nevertheless, the role of direct and indi-
rect medium-to long-term interbank exposures must not be underestimated. Not only a
bankruptcy but even a decline in the credit rating of the debtor bank and associated inter-
ruptions in payment or potential insolvency could force the lender bank to increase loan
loss provisions substantially. Thus worsening the return on regulatory capital, defined
as the ratio between operating profit after risk provisions and average employed equity
capital. Which in turn would cause more restrictive lending policies due to the capital
requirements or even a sale of liquid assets at fire-sale prices.
While the contagion effects have been an important aspect in other scientific disciplines
for several decades, this issue is relatively young in economic and financial sciences. As
pioneering works, the studies by Allen and Gale (2000) in [4] and Freixas, Parigi, and Ro-
chet (2000) in [28], shall be mentioned here, their research analyzed the financial contagion
in banking systems and the resilience of the system to the insolvency of any individual
bank depending on the degree of interconnectivity. Furfine (2003 ) in [31] and Mu¨ller
(2006) analyzed in [52] the role of liquidity in the contagion process. Thereby, Furfine
(2003) considered the federal funds market, focusing on the case that the largest lender
withdraws from the market, forcing then its counterparties to seek a new lender or to
reduce their own lending. Mu¨ller (2006), considered the effect on solvency and liquidity
of a complete unwinding of all interbank lending.
Nier, Yang, Yorulmazer and Alentorn (2007) in [53] modeled the contagion mechanisms
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as a simulation model and analyzed the risk of knock-on defaults triggered by the initial
bank default depending on various bank properties and the financial network structure.
Haldane and May (2011) summarized in [35] three important contagion mechanisms,
which are often applied in financial network models, and the impact of connectivity on
system stability when such particular processes occur. According to Haldane and May
(2011), the first and one of the mostly applied contagion processes is a propagation of
shocks within the financial system via knock-on effects of a single bank failure. The sec-
ond mechanism of the shock propagation which arises from losses in the value of a banks
external assets is denoted by Haldane and May (2011) as an ”almost surely more impor-
tant source of shock propagation”. The devaluation of assets may be caused by a fall in
market prices, a rise in credit default risks or by the fire sale actions of troubled banks.
Thereby, Haldane and May proposed to distinguish between strong liquidity shocks, asso-
ciated with depreciation of specific asset classes, and weak liquidity shocks, resulting from
the expectation of further defaults or a more general loss of confidence. The third mecha-
nism of shock propagation, described by Haldane and May, is the diminished availability
of interbank liquidity on the financial markets called funding liquidity shocks and is the
kind associated with the interbank market collapse of 2007 - 08. This has often taken the
form of liquidity hoarding in interbank funding markets as long as one bank calls in or
shortens the term of its interbank loans and affected banks tend, in turn, to do the same.
In this way the funding contagion may spread widely through interbank linkages.
A considerable number of theoretical studies over the last couple of years have now directly
addressed the issue of bank contagion. However, empirical literature on bank contagion
mechanisms remain scarce due to the poor availability of data and the rarity of systemic
events from a statistical perspective. For instance bank equity returns, debt risk premi-
ums, deposit flows or physical interbank and further credit risk exposures for emerging
market countries as well as for a high number of developed countries cannot be collected
in full or are virtually non-existent. Moreover, the substantial differences in country-
1.2 Financial system and network 27
specific features of banking systems and safety nets make the available information less
transparent and difficult to interpret.
Because of the importance of contagion, more research about the formation and develop-
ment as well as about the impact of bank contagion is needed, which can be underlined
by the following statements formulated by C. Upper (2011) in [63]: ” . . . vast majority of
banking crises followed shocks that hit several banks simultaneously rather than domino
effects from idiosyncratic failures. Common shocks may weaken the resiliency of the re-
maining banks and thus increase the risk of contagion. Perhaps surprisingly, the number
of papers analyzing such common shocks is much lower than those considering single bank
defaults. There is also a small set of papers focusing on contagion due to illiquidity”.
Thus, even though research activities and models in the field of (financial) contagion risks
and processes have moved forward significantly during the last couple of years, there are
still considerable gaps in them. Moreover, the current state of uncertainty about the
formation and dynamics of contagion and thus of systemic risk is reflected in particularly
conflicting views in the relative literature, especially in terms of the relationship between
the structure of the financial network and the contagion processes and their impact on
the stability of the financial systems.
The contagion processes is one of the important issues in the network analysis and mod-
eling of financial systems and has also a prominent role in the present work.
1.2 Financial system and network
There is no distinct definition of the term ’financial system’. According to Franklin
Allen and Douglas Gale (2001) in [3]: ”Financial systems channel household savings to
the corporate sector and allocate investment funds among firms; they allow intertempo-
ral smoothing of consumption by households and expenditures by firms; and they enable
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households and firms to share risks.”
By the External Relations Department of International Monetary Fond: ”A country’s fi-
nancial system includes its banks, securities markets, pension and mutual funds, insurers,
market infrastructures, central bank, as well as regulatory and supervisory authorities.
These institutions and markets provide a framework for carrying out economic transac-
tions and monetary policy, and help to efficiently channel savings into investment, thereby
supporting economic growth. ” (IMF, External Relations Department, Fact Sheet ”Finan-
cial System Soundness”)
Jean-Claude Trichet clarified in his lecture in Cambridge (December 2009): ”The finan-
cial system is composed of intermediaries, markets and the infrastructure of payment,
settlement and trading mechanisms that support them.” This description is in accordance
with European Central Bank (ECB), that defined the financial system on its web site,
http://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/fsr/html/index.en.html (accessed 10/1/2017) (Research
& Publications/Financial Stability Review), by its three parts as follows. The first part
is represented by the financial intermediaries, consolidating funds and transforming them
into loans. The second part is constituted by financial markets, where lenders and bor-
rowers meet, like money markets and stock exchanges. Financial market infrastructures,
like payment systems and security settlement systems, which are used to settle financial
transactions through the transfer of money and financial assets between buyers and sell-
ers, represent the third part of a financial system.
We provide the following definition for the purpose of this work:
Definition 1.2.1 The financial system is a set of complex and closely interconnected
financial institutions, markets, settlement and payment systems and trading mechanisms
and other market infrastructures supporting the trading and liquidity providing activities,
as well as central bank, regulatory and supervisory authorities.
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The individual components of the financial systems are connected with each other through
direct transactions, as in interbank markets, as well as indirect - through strongly corre-
lated credit and investment contracts with third parties. Thus they form a complex and
multidimensional financial network. Such financial networks are not independent of each
other. They are connected with each other by trading activities of financial intermediaries
and investors. Financial networks are extended through the savings and financing needs
of all sectors of the real economy, households and the government. Thus by financial
intermediation the financial system is crucial to the allocation of resources in the entire
economy.
The general characteristics described above are common to most financial systems, yet
the financial systems even in the developed countries reveal a varied picture.
1.3 Systemic risk in financial systems
Financial systems seem to be more vulnerable to systemic risk than other sectors of the
economy. O. DeBandt and P.Hartmann (2000) identify three interrelated characteristics
that explain this high susceptibility of the financial systems: the structure of bank balance
sheets, the complex network of exposures among financial institutions and the intertem-
poral character of financial contracts and related credibility problems, see [18]. Moreover,
systemic risk in the financial system relates to the risk that direct and indirect intercon-
nections increase instability within the financial system. In a broader sense, systemic risk
relates to the risk that propagated instabilities within the financial system evolve towards
adverse effects on growth and welfare in the entire economy. This is because troubles
within financial systems could not only disrupt financial intermediation and thus reallo-
cation of funds, but the collapse of the financial system could plunge the real economy
into a severe recession, exacerbating economic downturns and destroying the effectiveness
of monetary policy. Moreover, the capital flight, the exchange rate pressures as well as
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the high costs linked to salvaging the troubled financial institutions have to be mentioned
in this context. Furthermore, with increasing connectivity among financial systems, dis-
ruptions in one system can rapidly spill over across many financial systems and national
borders.
Chapter 2
Financial network modeling
This chapter presents the asset-based approach and its implementation as a simulation
based network model. The first section presents the motivation and premise that led to
its development. It especially draws attention to the differences from other tools and
highlights the special features of the model. The second section focuses on the basic
structure of the model and deals with the design of the financial system, the network
structure, characteristics of the initial shock, its absorption, and the loss transmission
mechanism. The construction of the model and its implementation as a simulation engine
will be discussed. Section three presents the transformation from the basic to advanced
model by including the central bank as a further node in the economy, adding cash reserves
according to the minimum reserve requirements and other central bank positions, inserting
risk adjusted capital requirements and diversification of the initial shock, as well as the
mechanism of deposit withdrawals and the subsequent dynamic processes. At the end,
the implementation of the core-periphery network structure will be explained.
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2.1 Asset-based approach
The studies of the determinants of systemic failures and of the structures and interdepen-
dencies within financial networks have made great progress in recent years. But because
of the complexity and great diversity of the causes of failures, it can be said in the main
that scientific research in this field has only just begun, and there is still a long way to
go. Despite encouraging development in the financial and economical research areas with
respect to systemic risk issues, ”... much work remains to be done understanding and
controlling systemic risk and the effect it has on financial stability and the real economy
- network analysis has a significant role to play in this”, as Franklin Allen highlighted in
his speech at the INQUIRE Conference (4 November, 2014).
The interdependence within a financial system exhibits a complex structure and is cre-
ated via multiple channels. Interbank markets, where financial institutions are directly
connected via mutual exposure, are the most commonly considered area. Such links rep-
resent a big part of direct connectivity between banks. The interbank markets play a
crucial role, primarily for the short-term liquidity management of banks, allowing for an
efficient liquidity allocation. Insolvency of one bank can propagate through credit links
from borrower to lender banks leading to insolvency of other banks and to market failures,
which can cause a liquidity shortage for many banks. Furthermore, financial institutions
are also indirectly interconnected by holding similar assets sharing the pool of depositors,
as well as holding assets which include credit risks from other banks.
The focus of the present research is on simulation based financial network models with
the objective of reproduction and improving understanding of interactions between banks
and other areas of the economy and their impacts on the stability of the financial system.
In the related work and network models, the shocks result mostly from the failure of one
or more randomly chosen financial institutions as in Nier et al. [53].
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In contrast, we develop the dynamic asset based network model, the distinctive char-
acter of which lies in the dependency between the degree of affectedness of the individual
banks through the initial shock and their asset structures.
Given that the main task of the financial system is to channel household savings to the
corporate sector and allocate investment funds among firms, this intermediation function
is in the core of the financial network modeling according to the asset-based approach.
The foundation of the network is based on the borrower-lender relations between banks
and the real-economy segments characterized by the different risks and other properties.
Furthermore, the financial intermediaries in the model manage their risks by diversifica-
tion and securitization of debts. Therefore, the asset based approach relates to building
up and managing credit assets. However, the initial shocks are triggered by disruptions in
the real economy with various levels of affectedness of the real sector. Furthermore, the
initial affectedness of financial intermediaries depends on the direct and indirect relations
between them and the troubled part of the real economy sectors as well as on their own
risk appetite.
The work of Nier et al. [53] had a major impact on the development of the presented
network model. However, we have completely redesigned and substantially developed the
original model. Central to our conceptual approach has been the focus on the diversi-
fied financing of non-financial (external) segments, which we have distinguished by such
properties as diversification of sector-bank relationships, risk-distribution, credit volume
and credit securitization ratio. We have inserted in the model the securitization of debts,
not least because of the large increase of such finance shortly before the financial crisis,
in particular in the real estate finance between 2000-2006. Furthermore, we have taken
into account risk adjusted capital requirements, minimum reserve, possible withdrawals of
deposits as well as support by the central bank and further model supplements, detailed
in section 2.3.
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2.2 Basic asset based network model
Because of the complexity of the final model we present the ’basic’ model here and then
the extended ’advanced’ model in the next section. We begin with the basic structure of
the model and look at it from a theoretical perspective, initially. Then, we go into details
and present the model more formally.
2.2.1 Financial system
The basic model consists of two groups of nodes: banks and other segments of the econ-
omy (externals), which are interconnected via credit and investment links. We distinguish
between several external segments, which are characterized by the individual parameters
(see 2.2.5).
The model is designed for any asset class. These classes are different in order to connect
the credit default risk with the subordination of debts. With respect to the subordination,
we distinguish between secured, normal, subordinated debts and equity. As secured we
consider such assets as Pfandbrief (German covered bonds). For ease of presentation, we
will simply call them ’covered bonds’. Covered bonds (CB) are debt securities backed by
cash flows normally from mortgages or public sector loans, but also from other sectors like
shipping or aircraft. For an investor, one major advantage of covered bonds is that the
underlying asset pool remains on the issuer’s balance sheet, and the issuer must ensure
that the pool consistently backs the covered bond. Non-performing loans or prematurely
paid debt must be replaced in the pool. In the event of default, the investor has recourse
to both the pool and the issuer. This property typically results in very good credit ratings
of covered bonds. Hence, the origination of covered bonds is often a very good opportunity
for the bank to fund liquidity on easy terms. Subordinated debt is debt which ranks after
other debts, in our case after secured and normal (senior) debts. Subordinated debts,
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such as asset-backed securities, collateralized mortgage obligations or collateralized debt
obligations, are usually issued in tranches connected with seniority of payments. We con-
sider three different tranches in our model: Tranche A (Senior) is typically rated higher
as it is ranked first in the priority of payments of the tranches; Tranche B (Mezzanine) is
lower in priority to the Senior Tranche, and Tranche C (Equity) which generally remains
after paying the liabilities such as miscellaneous expenses and interest of the Senior and
Mezzanine Tranches.
The basic idea in the model is that different external segments finance their projects
or even consumption using financial intermediation of banks. Additionally, banks can
invest in liquid (risk-free) assets. We distinguish external segments by their credit weight,
diversification of bank-connections, credit securitization degree and, last but not least, by
the creditworthiness structure. The number of segments and segment properties can vary
in the model in order to design different scenarios for further analyses. Banks securitize
one part of external debts and channel them by true sale in the financial system in form
of tranched securities as for example the collateralized debt obligations (CDO). The re-
maining non securitized part of loans should be refinanced. We implement the following
liquidity funding channels. External credit assets of higher quality build the asset pool
for covered bonds, which are used to provide the liquidity from other banks or external
segments. The rest of the externals debts must be refinanced by external and interbank
deposits and by the net worth of the bank.
However, in designing the financial network with the properties mentioned above, it must
be ensured that all banks balances are accurately composed and the predefined ratios
like the equity ratio or the percentage of external loans refinanced through the interbank
deposits stay in compliance with the predefined model parameter. The construction of
such network is not a simple task and will be demonstrated below in more detail.
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2.2.2 Network structure
The financial system model is a network of nodes, where each node represents one subject
like a bank or an external segment. The nodes are linked by risky assets like debts or
securities. At each link we have two nodes. We look on one node as on a “risk taker”
and on the other as a “risk causer”. For example, in the case of the credit relationship
we consider the borrower as the causer of risk and the lender as the risk taker.
It should be mentioned here with regard to the securitization process that, traditionally,
banks physically sell the assets which build the collateral pool to a special purpose vehicle
(SPV). The SPV in turn issues several classes of securities against the collateral pool and
markets them to investors in form of tranched securities. For simplicity, we dispense with
the view of the SPV as a further network node, and assume that banks originate and
market their securities to investors directly.
To design the basic model we have to define the possible relationships between banks and
externals and banks among each another.
External lending and investment:
• Externals lend to banks in form of normal debt.
• Externals invest in secured assets like CB and true sale CDO with different
subordinated tranches.
External financing:
• Externals borrow money from bank.
• Another part of external financing are bank investments in assets, originated
by externals.
Bank lending and investment:
• Banks lend to externals in form of normal debt.
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• Banks invest in assets originated by externals.
• Banks lend to other banks in form of subordinated debt.
• Along with externals, banks also invest in CB originated by other banks and
CDO.
Bank financing:
• One part of bank activities should be financed by equity.1
• Banks borrow money from externals in form of normal debt.
• Banks borrow money from other banks in form of subordinated debt.
• Banks originate secured assets like CB.
• Banks securitize one part of external loans and sale them “true” to other fi-
nancial market agents.
It may be helpful to look at the bank balance sheet structure (see Table 2.1).
Table 2.1 demonstrates the structure of assets in the order of their safety or subordination
according to the contagion rules. Investments in external assets (external investments),
assumed as risk-free and very liquid, can be considered as liquidity buffer of banks. Bank
investments mean investments in CBs and CDOs originated by other banks. The latter
consist of various subordinated classes (tranches A, B, C). The latest two positions are
represented by loans to externals (external claims) and interbank loans (bank claims).
While the left-hand side of the balance sheet shows the assets belonging to the bank, the
right-hand side demonstrates how these are financed. The first and the second positions
are built from capital of (CB) bondholder which belongs to other banks and externals
(secured debt). The third position consists of external deposits (senior debt). The other
banks’ deposits build the next subordinated position (subordinated debt). However, the
last and most risky position is the net worth or equity.
1We assume, for simplicity, that no bank and no external holds the bank-shares and hence nobody in
the financial system would be affected through the reduction of bank equity.
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Assets Liability
external investments iei bondholder capital (externals) b
e
i
bank investments ibi bondholder capital (banks) b
b
i
external claims cei external deposits d
e
i
bank claims cbi bank deposits d
b
i
net worth ei
Table 2.1: Balance sheet structure for any bank i.
2.2.3 Initial shock
We identify external loans as the source of the initial shock. In the basic model a certain
percentage of external debts of some given sector is allowed to default. This initial default
(idiosyncratic event) impacts on one hand the loans to the affected sector in the balance
sheet of banks. On the other hand it affects the CDOs which include defaulted loans in
their collateral pool. Because of the different risk classes of these securities, not all CDO
tranches will be affected at the same time. At first tranche C will absorb the shock, then
tranche B and finally tranche A. Because CDOs can be held by externals and by banks,
both may be affected by the initial default.
2.2.4 Shock absorption and contagion
Subordination of assets is important to the construction of the shock absorption and
the contagion processes. Losses arisen through the initial shock could lead one or more
banks to initially default if the net worth is not sufficient to absorb this initial shock.
In this case the rest of default will be transmitted to creditor banks through interbank
liabilities. In the case that these liabilities are not large enough, some of the losses could
be absorbed by external depositors. Only in the case that this loss exceeds the amount
of the external deposits would the holder of CB be affected. Because the bondholders
are at least partially represented by other banks, we would see the next step of default
transmission in the bank system. This contagion process is an iterative process and will
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continue until no further shock transmission is possible.
2.2.5 Modeling and implementation
Determination of the network structure
In the construction of our model we were inspired by the network model of Nier et al.[53].
However our model deviates from it in many respects. As far as possible and appropriate
we try to maintain the notation of [53] for the purpose of comparability. To construct
a coherent financial network with the help of the simulation engine by using random
matrices, it is necessary to define some rules and give some specifications.
At first we define the parameters that should be given and then describe the rules to
compute the remaining parameters with help of the specified exogenous parameters and
random graphs constructed by the simulation engine.
Exogenous parameters: N denotes the number of banks building the financial sys-
tem and S the number of external sectors. The interbank relationship structure is built
by random graphs with prescribed interbank network densities. The exogenous parameter
pc gives us the probability that any bank i has lent money to another bank; pi is defined
as the probability that any bank i has invested in covered bonds and CDOs originated by
another bank. To construct the random graphs we assume in general2 that the interbank
lending probability pc and the interbank investment probability pi, respectively, are equal
for all ordered pairs (i, j): P (cbi,j > 0) = p
c and P (ibi,j > 0) = p
i, ∀i 6= j and i, j ∈ 1, ..., N ,
with cbi,j as interbank credit exposure of (lender) bank i given to (borrower) bank j, and
ibi,j as interbank investments of (investor) bank i into the assets originated by (origina-
tor) bank j, Further, we construct our model and the simulation engine so that all debt
2However, in specific cases, as by the implementation of the core periphery network structure, this
assumption will be modified through specific probabilities for different bank groups.
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and investment contracts between any two banks are initially netted, which means that
cbi,j = 0 if c
b
j,i > 0. Furthermore, the investment relationship between any two banks is
unidirectional too: ibi,j = 0 if i
b
j,i > 0. Hence, the following restrictions must be applied:
0 < pc ≤ 1
2
and 0 < pi ≤ 1
2
.
The next exogenous parameter Ce give us the total external credit exposure. To construct
the credit matrix which describes the external-bank credit relationships, we need to define
for each external segment s ∈ {1, ..., S} the following properties. The probability of bank
credit connections ps ∈ [0, 1] determines the probability that an external segment s is
connected to the bank i ∈ {1, ..., N} via credit relationship. The credit weight wcs denotes
the percentage of loans to sector s from all external loans, and the securitization ratio qs
is the percentage of debts securitized as covered bonds or CDO.
The allocation of securitized credit volume to CB and CDO tranches relate to the indi-
vidual risk degree distributions of the underlying credit exposure for each sector. These
individual distributions are determined by beta distributions defined on the interval [0, 1]
and parameterized by two positive shape parameters αs and βs for each s ∈ {1, ..., S}.
Furthermore, we define the upper borders for the maximum permissible risk degree for
the underlying assets of CB and collateral pools for each CDO tranche, denoted by uCB
and uCDOt with t ∈ {A,B,C}, which are unique for all segments.
To calculate the interbank loans we determine the percentage of (non securitized) external
loans which must be refinanced through interbank loans for any bank i denoted by ηi ∈
[0, 1]. We assume that ηi is equal for any bank connecting other banks via credit links,
ηi = η with η ∈ (0, 1]. ηi = 0 if no interbank credit links exist, which is in fact unusual but
possible for quite small networks, in particular, because of the usage of random matrices.
To fix the total sum of interbank investments we determine βCDOt ∈ [0, 1] as percentage
of interbank investments to the total volume of CDO for any CDO tranche t ∈ {A,B,C}
and analogously the βCB ∈ [0, 1] for bank investments in covered bonds.
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The volume of external investments iei , i.e liquid assets, is determined by the exogenous
parameter ζ as a percentage of the external loans for any bank i.
The last exogenous parameter is γ ∈ [0, 1], which denotes the equity ratio of banks. We
assume that all banks initially have the same equity ratio measured as percentage of
individual bank capital from total credit volume, that the bank has loaned out to other
banks or externals, γi = γ ∀i ∈ {1, ..., N}.
To build the financial network and construct balance sheets for individual banks we run the
simulation engine to set up the initial random graphs for credit and investment relation-
ships according to the given parameters and calculate all the remaining initial quantities
as follows below.
Basic network structure via random matrices: The simulation engine delivers two
N × N random matrices Rcb and Rib for interbank credit and investment relationships
respectively, and one N × S matrix Rs for the sector-bank connections with realizations
0 and 1 according to probabilities 0 < pc ≤ 0.5, 0 < pi ≤ 0.5 and 0 < ps ≤ 1. Formally,
Rcb, R
i
b ∈ {0, 1}N×N and Rs ∈ {0, 1}N×S with Rcb[i, i] = Rib[i, i] = 0. Thereby, the following
equalities for number of realized interbank links Zcb for loans and Z
i
b for investments and
sector-bank links Zs hold.
Zcb ≡
N∑
j=1
N∑
i=1
Rcb[i, j] ≈ (N2 −N)pc, E[Zcb ] = (N2 −N)pc (2.1)
Zib ≡
N∑
j=1
N∑
i=1
Rib[i, j] ≈ (N2 −N)pi, E[Zib] = (N2 −N)pi (2.2)
Zs ≡
N∑
i=1
Rs[i, s] ≈ Nps, E[Zs] = Nps ∀s ∈ {1, ..., S} (2.3)
External credit structure before securitization: Now we construct the credit matrix
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of sector-bank credit relationships. We calculate the credit volume for each sector by
C˜es = C
ewcs, (2.4)
where wcs is the percentage of loans to sector s from the total external credit C
e. We
assume, that C˜es is equally distributed between the lender banks of sector s. Hence, for
each lender i we can compute the external credit volume before securitization by
c˜ei,s = C˜
e
s/Zs (2.5)
Securitization of external loans: We distinguish between two different classes of debt
securitization: covered bonds (CB) and collateralized debt obligations (CDO). The latter
are a type of structured asset-backed securities (ABS). Even though CB tend also to be
associated with ABS, there are fundamental differences. Firstly, whereas the underlying
cover assets for CB remain on the bank’s balance sheet, ABS are typically off-balance-sheet
transactions. Secondly, cover pools of covered bonds are dynamic. Their composition, by
definition, usually change in time, depending on the maturities and on the newly registered
cover assets. An independent cover pool contains cover assets and asset replacements. In
the event of the issuer’s insolvency, CB investors have a preferential claim on the cover
assets in the cover register, given that cover pool assets are not included in insolvency
proceedings. CDO securities are split into different risk classes, or tranches, whereby
’senior’ tranches are considered as the safest securities, as described in 2.2.1.
The total credit volume in our model and its securitization ratio for each segment are
known for each segment. Because of the differences described above, we have to build
different underlying pools for CBs and CDOs. Now we get the volume of securitized
loans for each segment by Ĉes = C˜
e
sqs, where qs denotes the segment specific securitization
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degree. We distribute this volume between the covered bonds pool and CDO-Tranches A,
B and C using the cumulative risk distribution functions of credit assets and thresholds
(upper boarders) for the collateral pools, respectively. We compute now the following
collateral pools: PCBs for the CBs and P
t
s for each tranche of the CDOs ∀t ∈ T with
T = {A,B,C}.
We assume that all lenders consider the same segment-specific risk distributions of the
external claims. Moreover, all lenders securitize assets with the same properties in the
same way. For example,
PCBs
C˜es
=
pCBi,s
c˜ei,s
, (2.6)
where PCBs are total credit to sector s securitized as covered bonds, and p
CB
i,s only bank’s
i loans to sector s securitized as covered bonds by this bank. We calculate the collateral
pools for each originator bank and external segment as follows:
pCBi,s =
PCBs
C˜es
c˜ei,s (2.7)
pti,s =
P ts
C˜es
c˜ei,s ∀t ∈ T (2.8)
Interbank investments: We use the random matrices Rib and Rs and the given quota
of interbank investments βCDOt ∈ [0, 1] ∀t ∈ T and βCB for covered bonds to distribute
the securities between external investors and other banks. This allows us to calculate
the balance positions for each bank: bank investments in covered bonds and CDO ibi ,
bondholder capital of banks bbi and external bondholder capital b
e
i .
External credit structure after securitization: Because of true sale of loans building
44 CHAPTER 2. FINANCIAL NETWORK MODELING
CDO collateral pools, we reduce the external credit volume balanced by banks accord-
ingly, while the CB underlying assets still stay in the banks balances and don’t reduce
the external loans:
cei = c˜
e
i −
∑
t∈T
pti, (2.9)
where c˜ei =
∑S
s=1 c˜
e
i,s and p
t
i =
∑S
s=1 p
t
i,s. Nevertheless we have to change the bonds origi-
nators balances by bondholder capital at the liability side. The bondholder balances must
be adjusted by bank investments, which are equal to covered bonds, held now by this bank.
Interbank credit structure: We compute for each bank the volume of external debts
which should be financed by other banks’ deposits. We distribute it equally between all
depositor banks of the bank i. Thus, the amount of money one bank j lends to the bank
i , if Rcb[j, i] = 1, is given by:
wcj,i =
η(cei − pCBi )
zci
, (2.10)
where zci =
∑N
k=1R
c
b[k, i] is the number of banks giving money to bank i.
All these (weighted) interbank credit links can be represented in a matrix W c ∈ RN×N ,
and namely W c = (wci,j)1≤i≤N , determining the total interbank loans and deposits for
each bank:
cbi =
N∑
j=1
wci,j (row sum) (2.11)
dbi =
N∑
j=1
wcj,i (column sum) (2.12)
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Bank net worth, investments into external assets and external deposits: Now
we can calculate the initial net worth for each bank i as its total (credit) risk assets RAi
multiplied by the equity rate γ.
ei = γRAi = γ(0.5c
b
i + c
e
i + i
b
i − ib(CB)i ) (2.13)
with equity ratio γ, (inter)bank claims cbi , external loans c
e
i and CDO-investments i
b
i −
i
b(CB)
i , where i
b(CB)
i denotes CB-investments. For bank claims a risk weight of 50% is
applied, while other claims are weighted by 100%. 3 The latter are excluded being
assumed to be risk free. Note that the underlying credit assets are included in the external
credit amount of the originator bank and will be backed up by its equity capital. We
calculate the bank investments into ’liquid’ and free of ’credit risk’ external assets like
special corporate or sovereign bonds, stocks etc. as percentage of the external credit
exposure by
iei = ζc
e
i (2.14)
The volume of external (liquid) assets is thus proportional to the external debts by as-
sumption.
External deposits take up the remainder to meet the bank’s balance sheet identity
dei = c
b
i + c
e
i + i
b
i + i
e
i − bbi − bei − dbi − ei (2.15)
3The idea that investments into external assets are free from credit risk implies that such investments
are irrelevant for the calculation of bank capital. Note, that market price risks are not contained in the
model.
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Thus, we get the balance sheet structure. Thereby, the assets ai include external claims
cei , bank claims c
b
i , external investments i
e
i and bank investments i
b
i :
ai = c
e
i + c
b
i + i
e
i + i
b
i (2.16)
Bank liabilities, denoted by li, are composed of net worth (capital) ei, external deposits
dei , bank deposits d
b
i , capital from external bondholder b
e
i and bonds holden by other banks
bbi
li = ei + d
e
i + d
b
i + b
e
i + b
b
i (2.17)
for each of i = 1, ..., N . As a balance sheet identity, we get ai = li for i = 1, ..., N due to
(2.13).
Modeling of the initial shock and contagion
Shock and shock transmission: We construct the initial default by wiping out a
percentage λ of loans to any given sector s. The total initial default Dinitialcredit includes the
losses of assets in CDO collateral pools and of external loans, held by banks. Thus we
have the following definition:
Dinitial = λC˜es = D
initial
credit +D
initial
CDO , (2.18)
where Dinitialcredit = λ(C
e
s ) and D
initial
CDO = λ
∑
t∈T P
t
s .
We assume that the losses are distributed proportionally to the volume for all assetholders.
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Hence, we have to reduce the credit assets by λcei,s for each bank. Regarding CDO
collateral pools, the assets are not equally reduced because of different risk classes. We
implement the following mechanism for losses in the different subordination classes of
CDO:
LC = min{PCs , DinitialCDO } (2.19)
LB = min{PBs , DinitialCDO − LC} (2.20)
LA = min{PAs , DinitialCDO − LC − LB}. (2.21)
Collateral pool losses lead to the changes in the investments of CDO holders, accordingly.
Reduction at the asset side of bank balances affects the bank net worth. If the net worth
of any bank is not sufficient to absorb the initial losses ei < D
initial
i , the bank will go
bankrupt and contagion may take place: the rest of the loss will be transmitted via
lending channels in the financial market.
Contagion: We model a contagion as an iterative process. In each iteration we identify
banks which get into financial troubles and trigger the knock-on effects as described below.
The rest of the default Dresti = D
initial
i −ei would be transmitted at first to creditor banks
through interbank liabilities.4
Let i be the bank getting into trouble because of the wiping out of external loans. Hence,
if ei < D
initial
i , creditor banks receive the loss L
b
i = min{Dresti , dbi}, where the sum of
bank’s deposits by the bank i is dbi , initially given by (2.12). Let j be a lender bank of
bank i. Bank j receives a loss lbi,j = (d
b
i,j/d
b
i)L
b
i , where d
b
i,j = c
b
j,i is money that bank i has
borrowed from bank j.
4Remember, that because of subordination assumptions in this paper, we require priority of external
deposits and (covered) bond holder capital over bank deposits which in turn take priority over equity.
48 CHAPTER 2. FINANCIAL NETWORK MODELING
In the case that all bank liabilities are not enough to cover the losses, some of the losses
should be absorbed by external depositors. Formally, ifDresti > d
b
i then external depositors
receives the loss, limited by their deposit amount. Thereby, the external loss will be given
by Lei = min{Dresti − dbi , dei}.
If the external deposits of the defaulted bank are not sufficient, the losses become absorbed
by bondholders (banks and externals), analogous to bank liabilities. Formally, if Lei <
Dresti −dbi , then Lbondholderi = Dresti −dbi −dei . If bank j is one of the bondholders of bank i.
Then bank j would receive the partial loss M lbi,j = (bbi,j/(bbi + bei ))Lbondholderi , where bbi,j is
money that bank j has invested in bonds, originated by bank i, bbi bond amount of bank
i held by all banks, and bei amount of bank’s i bonds held by externals. External losses
are given by M Lei = bei/(bbi + bei )Lbondholderi .
This process will continue until no further transmission is necessary or possible.
2.3 Advanced asset based network model (ABN-Model)
The financial system in the advanced model includes the central bank as well as the bank
sector with N banks and the external sector. All these objects are nodes of the financial
network, which are interconnected via credit and investment links.5
Similar to the basic model, the advanced model is designed for any number of exter-
nal segments and several asset classes. The latter have to be different in the order of
subordination of debts. The model includes the credit default risk as before and is ex-
tended by the liquidity risk in the form of withdrawal of deposits. Furthermore, the
advanced model includes extra liquidity reserve (minimum reserve) mi and two central
bank positions: central bank deposits dcbi and central bank claims c
cb
i . The latter two
5Because of the integration of the central bank in the model, the transmission of bank losses via
lending links to the central bank is now also possible. We determine loans of the central bank being the
safest.
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balance sheet items contains deposits with or loans from the central bank, respectively.
These positions are created throughout dynamics of deposits described in section 2.3.4.
The items trade result and liquidity gap are ancillary balance sheet items and are used for
the dynamic processes during the simulations. A (temporary) liquidity gap ∆li is created
when deposits are being withdrawn. The item trade result rti contains profits or losses
resulting from the purchase or sale of assets at fire sale prices. Both balance sheet items
are equal to zero at the beginning of simulations.
Moreover, in contrast to the basic model, we implement now the risk adjusted capital
requirements using more differentiated risk-weighted assets (RWA) for the calculation of
the initial and the required regulatory bank capital. The latter will be used for some new
dynamics in the model like withdrawal of deposits and fire-sale processes. In addition, we
adjust the definition of the initial shock, so that many of the external segments can cause
credit defaults simultaneously and to a varying degree. In the following subsections we
describe these modifications in more detail.
However, the initialisation process of the simulation engine will be adjusted according to
the new specification to ensure that all bank balances are accurately composed and the
ratios like the equity ratio or the percentage of external loans, refinanced through the
interbank deposits, stay in compliance with the predefined model parameter. The new
balance sheet structure is pictured in Tab. 2.2.
Assets ai Liability li
external investments iei bondholder capital (externals) b
e
i
bank investments ibi bondholder capital (banks) b
b
i
external claims cei external deposits d
e
i
bank claims cbi bank deposits d
b
i
central bank claims ccbi central bank deposits d
cb
i
trade result rti liquidy gap ∆li
minimum reserve mi net worth ei
Table 2.2: New bank balance sheet structure.
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2.3.1 Minimum reserve
Minimum reserve is a minimum value of cash that a commercial bank must hold in rela-
tion to customer deposits and notes (reserve base). In order to determine an institution’s
reserve requirement, the reserve base is multiplied by the reserve ratio. The minimum
reserve is generally stored physically in a bank vault in the form of cash or deposits on
account with the central bank. This reserve requirement is an instrument of central bank
regulation and can be used for monetary policy. The higher the required liquidity ratio
is set, the less credit money can be created by depository institutions. The absence of a
minimum reserve requirement means that banks could loan out their funds retaining zero
reserves and create an infinite amount of credit, theoretically.
Not all financial systems require a minimum reserve. The Bank of England for exam-
ple uses a voluntary reserve ratio system. But also countries requiring the minimum
reserve ratio use such an instrument in a number of different ways. In some countries
like China, India, Russia and Brazil the reserve requirements are frequently altered. The
People’s Bank of China, for example, uses changes in reserve requirements as a tool to
keep inflation under control and is ready to alter reserve requirements quite frequently to
implement a certain monetary policy. But others, especially the western central banks
prefer open market operations as a tool of monetary policy. The reserve requirements
do not change frequently, in order to avoid liquidity problems for banks and associated
short-time disruptions in financial markets. The key functions of the minimum reserve
system, in the Eurozone for example, are to stabilize money market interest rates and to
enlarge the structural liquidity shortage of the banking system, see [25]. The reserve ratio
required by the ECB is 1% from 18 January 2012.
We extend the model by including liquidity reserve mi in each bank balance so that
mi/(d
b
i + d
e
i ) = ν, where ν is the required reserve ratio and d
b
i , d
e
i are deposits of other
banks and externals, respectively, represented in sum the reserve base.
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2.3.2 Risk adjusted capital requirements
Capital requirement is the required amount of capital a bank or other financial institution
has to hold to limit credit risks or leverage. Capital requirements govern the ratio of equity
to debt, in other words the structure of the liabilities and equity side, while minimum
reserve requirements govern the assets side, as described in the previous section.
Capital requirements are mostly determined by a capital adequacy ratio of equity (CAR)
that must be held to cover credit risk usually expressed as risk-weighted assets (RWA).
RWA are bank’s assets, weighted according to their credit risk, which entail different
allocations of risk-bearing capital for different claims and investments.
Thus, in the context of the current model, CAR must be viewed for any bank i by CARi =
ei
RWAi
, where ei is the equity capital of the bank. The level of capital requirements is
given by the regulatory capital ratio γr:
CAR =
ei
RWAi
≥ γr
The specifics of CAR and RWA calculation, respectively, vary from country to country.
For countries that apply the Basel Accords, the general approaches tend to be similar.
Our intention is to implement principal ideas of Basel Accords very generally and be able
to vary the key parameters in the simulation engine.
We calculate RWA as
RWAi = c˜bi + c˜
e
i + i˜
b
i ,
with risk-weighted interbank claims c˜bi , risk-weighted claims to externals c˜
e
i and risk-
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weighted CDO-investments i˜bi .
Moreover, for the initial capital we assume instead of (2.13)
ei = γRWAi = γ(c˜bi + c˜
e
i + i˜
b
i)
Interbank credit risk: The calculation of RWA for interbank claims is very simple:
c˜bi = ω
bcbi ,
where ωb is a risk weight for interbank claims which is equal for all banks and exogenous
given.
Thereby we assume that interbank credit must be backed up by less equity capital than
the average assets which are based on external debts. To argue this assumption, we have
followed the idea of the standardized approach. It is the simplest of the three broad
approaches to credit risk according to the Basel Capital Accord (II and III). The risk
weighted assets in the standardized approach are calculated as the product of the amount
of exposures and discrete risk weights (0, 10, 20, 50, 100, 150 %), determined by the
category of the borrower such as sovereign, bank, or corporate and ratings from External
Credit Rating Agencies. Even if the risk weights for claims on banks in the standardized
approach are not lower than for claims on corporates in general, the required capital for
interbank credit risk portfolios tends to be substantially lower than for loans to corpo-
rates because of the better creditworthiness of banks in terms of the rating distribution.
Moreover, claims on an unrated bank may receive a risk weight of 50 %, while those on an
unrated corporate will be assigned a 100 % risk weight. In addition, banks face essentially
lower risk weights for bank claims with an original maturity of three months or less, which
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are very typical for the interbank market.
Because ratings from External Credit Rating Agencies have not been incorporated into
the model, we will simply assume the 50 % risk weight for claims on banks (ωb = 0, 5)
and 100% risk weight for external claims in general (ωe = 1), which is also in line with
Principle I of the Deutsche Bundesbank, which covered equity of institutions before the
Basel Capital Accord II.
External credit risk: We implement the following calculation of risk weighted external
credit assets:
c˜ei = c
e
i − pCBi (1− ωCB),
where pCBi is the credit portfolio securized by bank i as covered bonds and ω
c is the av-
erage credit risk weight. Note that the average risk weight for external claims is equal to
1 by assumption. Because the underlying credit assets of CB stay in the bank balance of
the originator bank and have lower risk than the average of the external credit portfolio,
we will reduce the external credit amount by the CB underlying value, firstly, and add the
risk adjusted CB-underlying afterwards. The calculation of the CB specific risk weight
ωCB is presented below.
Risk of credit investments: We determine risk weights for CB and for each CDO
tranche based on each sub-portfolio and use these weights for the calculation of RWA for
each bank i in accordance to their portfolio. The calculation of RWA which relate to the
investments in CB and CDO i˜bi is somewhat tedious as the investment portfolios of banks
are heterogeneous. Thereby, the risk of investments mainly depends on the risk content of
the underlying debts and the risk appetite of banks. At first we determine the risk weights
for the underlying assets for CB and each CDO tranche, simultaneously. Eventually, we
use these weights for the calculation of the individual RWA for each bank.
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Remember that we used the assumption that the risk factor Xs, which is not further spec-
ified here, in each segment credit portfolio C˜es is distributed according to sector specific
beta distributions. We implement the process for credit securitization using maximum
risk factor thresholds (upper boundaries) for covered bonds uCB and each tranche of the
CDO uCDOt with t ∈ {A,B,C}, see section 2.2.5. Using these properties we calculate
the relative risk weights for each tranche and apply them for the calculation of RWA.
First, we determine segment specific expected risk factors for each tranche applying the
following algorithm. The conditional expectation of Xs ∈ [a, b] is
E(Xs|Xs ∈ [a, b]) =
∫ b
a
ϕs(x)x dx∫ b
a
ϕs(x) dx
, (2.22)
given a segment specific beta probability function ϕs(x) and a and b - boundaries of a
tranche. For example, for the tranche A we will calculate Es(X|X ∈ [uCB+ε, uCDOA ]) with
the lower boundary for tranche A derived from the upper boundary for covered bonds
uCB +ε, where ε→ 0, and the upper boundary for tranche A, denoted by uCDOA . Since no
analytical form of the primitive of the β-function ϕ exists, the integral can not be solved
by an explicit expression and has to be treated numerically.
Therefore, we apply for the integrals in (2.22) quadrature formulas as an approximation
∫ b
a
f(t) dt =
M−1∑
i=0
∫ h
0
f(xi + t) dt ≈
M−1∑
i=0
h
K∑
k=1
ωkf(xi + ξk)
with xi = a + ih, h = (b − a)/M and integration weights ω1, . . . , ωK > 0,
∑K
k=1 ωk = 1.
The corresponding integration weights ωi and integration nodes ξi can be obtained from
a numerical database according to the specific quadrature rule. In order to reduce the
quadrature error as much as possible, one should chose a large enough value of M and
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quadrature rules of high order. Therefore, we we chose in our simulations always he Gauss
rule with K = 8 and M = 100.
Hence, knowing the expected risk factors x¯CBs = Es(X|X ∈ [0, uCB]), x¯As = Es(X|X ∈
[uCB, uCDOA ]) and by analogy for tranches B and C for each sector s ∈ S, we can determine
the relative risk weights by
ω˜t =
∑
s∈S x¯
t
sP
t
s
P t
, ∀t ∈ T (2.23)
ω˜CB =
∑
s∈S x¯
CB
s P
CB
s
PCB
(2.24)
Note that PCB =
∑
s∈S P
CB
s and P
t =
∑
s∈S P
t
s ∀t ∈ T are the cover (underlying) asset
pools for CBs and each tranche of CDOs, respectively.
Now, we have to normalize the risk weights so that with respect to regulatory capital it
would be equivalent for each credit portfolio whether it is securitized or not 6, because of
the credit risk of the entire (external) credit portfolio still remaining the same.
Remember the assumption regarding the risk distribution of credit pools. We assumed
the same risk distribution for securitized loans as for the total credit pool.
Therefore, we correct the risk weights ω˜t and ω˜CB, determined above, by an adjustment
factor ω∗, so that total RWA of the secured portfolio would be equal to the RWA of the
underlying credit pool, calculated by the average risk weight of external claims ωe:
ωeP = ωCBPCB +
∑
t∈T
ωtP t, (2.25)
with total securized credit portfolio P = PCB +
∑
t∈T P
t.
6provided that banks are the only asset holder, no purchase of investments by externals exist
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We calculate the final risk weights by adjusting the weights ω˜t and ω˜CB satisfying the
condition 2.25.
ωCB = ω˜CBω∗
ωt = ω˜tω∗ ∀ t ∈ T ,
where
ω∗ =
ωe(PCB +
∑
t∈T P
t)
ω˜CBPCB +
∑
t∈T ω˜
tP t
.
Determining the risk weights in this way we ensure that total RWA of the secured portfolio
would be equal to the RWA of the underlying credit pool. Remember that the average
risk weight of external loans ωe = 1 corresponds to the risk weight of 100%.
To determine the bank specific investment RWA i˜bi we summarize all risk weighted CDO
bank investments. Because of the low risk specification of CBs, we suppose that no equity
is necessary to cover the CBs for the investment bank. But the credit risk of the underlying
pool should be considered in the capital requirement by the originator bank as described
above.
i˜bi =
∑
t∈T
ωtP ti
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2.3.3 Diversification of defaults
Until now we always considered the case in which only one sector can be the source of the
initial shock. Now, we expand the initial shocks across the real sector in a variable manner.
Thus, several external segments can induce credit defaults at the same time and at various
levels. To make simulation results for multiple segment defaults comparable to the case
with an idiosyncratic shock as before, we change the definition of the variable λ. Now it
gives the percentage of the total credit default with respect to the total external credit
exposure. To specify the defaults for each sector we introduce further segment specific
parameters δs ∀s ∈ {1, . . . , S} defining the individual part on the total credit default for
each external segment. Hence, the initial default for each segment s is calculated by δsλC
e
and λCe =
∑
s δsλC
e. Note that in the case of δs = 1 for only one segment while other
parts are equal to zero, we would deal with an idyosyncratic shock analogous to the basic
model.
2.3.4 Dynamic of deposits and liquidity risk
In this section we will extend the network by modeling the capital movements like with-
drawal of external and interbank deposits. We determine withdrawal of interbank deposits
as a reaction of depositors to the deterioration in the capital base of banks in relation
to the credit risks involved. The starting point of the dynamic is the identification of
such “weak” banks which become objects of withdrawal. So we introduce an auxiliary
attribute τ ∈ {0, 1} denoting the tolerance limit for the deviation of the capital ratio of
banks from the required capitalization level permitted by depositors. We identify “weak”
banks by the following condition
γi < τγ
r (2.26)
58 CHAPTER 2. FINANCIAL NETWORK MODELING
with regulatory equity ratio γr and current equity ratio γi.
Firstly, we introduce the regulatory requirements for the minimum risk adjusted bank
capital. Thereby we assume the possibility that a bank equity rate falls under the reg-
ulatory level in the short term without the need of the bank being liquidated. It is an
appropriate assumption because of the short term consideration of the dynamics in the
model. Even in the real world it is possible that there are capital shortfalls below the
regulatory requirements. Banks have to report such a circumstance to the supervisor
immediately. It would take time to meet the appropriate measures to stabilize or to liq-
uidate the bank. We assume that depositors can react immediately withdrawing their
deposits. To trigger such event we suppose that depositors would tolerate a capital gap
up to a certain threshold value. This threshold is determined through the tolerance level
of depositors τ ∈ [0, 1]. The next step is to calculate the volume of deposits dwi for each
“weak” bank i that will be withdrawn at once. We define this volume as the difference
between the current risk assets of the bank RAi and the maximum risk assets that con-
form to the regulatory framework: dwi = RAi− eiγr. We assume that external depositors
and other banks will get their money back from the weak bank in proportion to their
respective deposits at this bank so that dwi = d
wb
i + d
we
i , where d
wb
i and d
we
i denote the
withdrawal of deposits of banks and externals, respectively, with dwbi =
∑N
j=1 d
wb
i,j∆
w and
dwei = d
e
i∆
w. Thereby, ∆w denotes the withdrawal ratio, calculated in the way that the
withdrawal deposits are equal to the amount of excessive risk assets in each iteration.
Any change of balance items requires updating the network because of the balance con-
straints for each bank, so that all banks are well balanced. Hence, withdrawals of de-
posits may produce two kinds of problems: refinancing problem (liquidity gap) of the
weak banks subjected to the withdrawals, and liquidity surplus of the banks withdrawing
their deposits. Therefore, the liquidity chain reaction may be triggered. Furthermore,
the withdrawal of deposits may have led to bank losses because of the possible need of
fire-sales of assets below their purchase value. This effect may lead to further solvency
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chain reactions such as the case of losses of external loans.
Refinancing problem: Reduction of interbank deposits will open the refinancing gap,
which has to be closed by funding of fresh liquidity or by reduction of assets. We assume
very limited opportunities for refinancing in the short term. First of all, the minimum
reserve and liquidity surplus will be used. Which means that a weak bank, with funds
parked in a central bank account, will try to bridge the liquidity gap by recovering this
money. If the central bank is prepared to support banks with liquidity, one part of the
liquidity gap 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1 will be covered by (new) central bank loans. In further steps
assets will be reduced:
1. external assets whose eligibility as high-quality liquid assets are assumed in the
model,
2. bank loans because of their short term nature,
3. covered bonds and CDO, which are easier and faster to be placed on the market
than (external) loans,
4. external loans.
Further, we assume that the external assets will be acquired by externals. So, the balances
of other banks in the network may not be affected. Other assets will be generally bought
up by well capitalized banks. Only if the bank system is no more able to do this because
of the capital restrictions, the central bank may be forced to acquire remaining assets.
The reaction of weak banks in terms of withdrawing their own funds to cover the liquidity
gap has an impact on the liquidity situation of their borrower banks now facing the
refinancing problem. Such (new) refinancing problems will be treated analogously as
above. Furthermore, we consider the price decrease as an important effect of ’fire sales’ of
assets. It can be considered as a purchaser gain, while the seller suffers a loss. We assume
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that the price of assets depends on the equity base of the banking system. Hence, if banks
have sufficient equity to buy all excess assets, the price for unit of asset value pa = 1. If the
equity base is not enough to cover the excess assets, the price will be reduced according
to the available equity base. In order to prevent the total (or very high) price crash for
excess assets in the case of the banking system not being able to absorb them entirely,
the central bank will intervene. We assume that if the price of assets deteriorates below a
certain threshold 0 < β < 1 the central bank buys the excess assets at the threshold-price
β. Hence, for fire-sale prices there is a following convention:
β ≤ pa ≤ 1 (2.27)
The refinancing of buying banks is achieved through excess liquidity if available, otherwise
through loans of the central bank for simplicity.
Liquidity surplus: Banks build excess liquidity by withdrawing their money from weak
banks. This liquidity will be used to repay the central bank money at first. The rest
of the excess liquidity will be parked in the central bank accounts and can be used for
buying assets in the next step or to close the liquidity gaps as they occur.
Linkage between solvency and liquidity: We model the solvency chain reaction as
an iterative process. In each iteration we identify banks which get into financial troubles
and trigger the solvency chain reaction, as described above. Furthermore, withdrawal of
deposits disturbs the bank balances. Liquidity problems will be iteratively solved. We
call this process liquidity chain reaction which may cause additional bank losses because
of fire-sales of assets. This effect may lead to further solvency chain reaction like in the
case of losses of external loans. Thereafter, new withdrawals may be possible again. This
process continues until all bank losses are covered by equity or transmitted, and no more
withdrawals happen.
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2.3.5 Core-periphery network structure
For the analyses of the network structure effects, the asset-based model has been extended
in the following way: The network structure has been modified by the division of banks
into three groups: core, periphery and semi-periphery, which are different in the average
bank size and the interbank linkage structure. The core includes banks with larger balance
sheet totals on average, while the periphery contains much smaller banks on average.
Semi-periphery comprises banks which are smaller than the banks of the core, but larger
than the periphery banks on average. With regard to the interbank relations the core-
periphery formation is characterized by restrictions of the out-degree and in-degree links
for banks of the same group. More formal definitions of the discussed bank groups can
be expressed as follows.
Definition 2.3.1 Core banks are characterized by the higher external exposure than pe-
riphery and semi-periphery banks. Core banks possess also higher interbank exposure be-
cause of the higher in- and out-degrees and higher external exposure. They are extremely
interconnected, highly connected with periphery and also linked to the semi-periphery
banks.
Definition 2.3.2 Periphery banks have the smallest external exposure on average. They
are nearly disconnected within the periphery, but highly connected with core banks. Fur-
thermore, they are moderately linked to the semi-periphery banks.
Definition 2.3.3 Semi-periphery banks are connected with banks of the network with
equal frequency and are medium-sized with respect to the external exposure.
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Core-periphery formation procedure
To keep the core formation simple but flexible, we implement the following concept. After
a random initialization of network links we intervene in the network structure. Firstly,
we redistribute the external credit assets between the banks in the network to get bank
groups with different average sizes. The linkages between banks and external segments
stay unchanged in terms of their structure and so the number of links Zs for each segment
s. However, the weight of links will be adjusted. This is a suitable method here because
of the random distribution of the assets between banks in the model initially. Secondly, to
determinate the relationships between the banks, we adjust the initial random matrices
for credit and investment linkages, Rcb and R
i
b, according to the new requirements (see
definitions above). To adopt this procedure further exogenous parameters will be used
here: percentages of the banking system ψ1 and ψ2 included in the core and the periphery
respectively, and the percentage of the external assets ξ to be reallocated from banks of
the periphery to the core.
Note the following notation will be used here. Bank i is included in the core i ∈ NC , if
i < i with i = ψ1N . Bank i is included in the periphery i ∈ NP , if i > i¯ with i¯ = N−ψ2N .
Bank i belongs to the semi-periphery i ∈ NSP , if i ∈ [i, i¯].
Reallocating external loans: The aim of this procedure is to implement three bank
groups with different average sizes, especially with regard to the external assets.
Remember the credit volume for each sector given by C˜es = C
ewcs, where w
c
s is a percentage
of loans to sector s from total external debts. We assumed until now, that C˜es is equally
distributed between the lender banks of sector s. Hence, for each lender i we compute
the credit volume before securitization given by c˜ei,s = C˜
e
s/Zs, where Zs is the number
of banks connected to sector s, see 2.2.5. Now, we have to redistribute the external
credit volume without changing the basic network structure Rs ∈ {0, 1}N×S, so that
Zs =
∑N
i=1Rs[i, s] ≈ Nps,∀s ∈ {1, , S}. Using the exogenous parameter ξ the external
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credit volume to be reallocated to core banks from the periphery is given by ξ
∑
i∈NC2 c˜
e
i,s
for each s. We recalculate the new external debts by scaling the loans to each sector
according to
c˜ei,s(new) =

c˜ei,s(1 +
ξ
∑
i∈NP c˜
e
i,s∑
i∈NC c˜
e
i,s
), ∀i ∈ NC
c˜ei,s(1− ξ), ∀i ∈ NP
c˜ei,s, ∀i ∈ NSP
Note that the semi-periphery remains unchanged. Furthermore the presented redistribu-
tion ensures
∑
i∈N c˜
e
i,s(new) =
∑
i∈N c˜
e
i,s
Updating the relationship between cores: Remember, we determine the existence
of the interbank links via the simulation engine delivering two N × N random matrices
Rcb and R
i
b for interbank credit and investment relationships with realizations 0 and 1
accordingly to probabilities pc and pi, respectively. Formally, Rcb, R
i
b ∈ {0, 1}N×N with
Rcb[i, i] = R
i
b[i, i] = 0.
Our aim is to ensure the validity of the following equations for a sufficiently large number
of banks N as in the original model (see 2.2.5):
Zcb =
N∑
j=1
N∑
i=1
Rcb[i, j] ≈ (N2 −N)pc, (2.28)
Zib =
N∑
j=1
N∑
i=1
Rib[i, j] ≈ (N2 −N)pi, (2.29)
with the number of realized interbank credit and investment links Zcb and Z
i
b, respectively.
For this purpose we implement a network structure adjustment procedure applying a two-
stage iteration process, where i is a maximum bank index of the core and i¯ is a minimum
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bank index of the periphery as defined above.
Firstly, for each pair of core banks it should be checked whether they are interconnected.
Otherwise, we have to search for an existing connection within non-core banks, beginning
with a periphery bank with highest index and a semi-periphery bank with a lowest index.
If the connection has been found, it will be transferred to the pair of core banks, which has
not been interlinked until now. The procedure has to be done until the core is completely
interconnected or the transfer of links is no longer possible.
Secondly, it should be examined, for each of the periphery banks, whether a core bank
exists which is not linked to this periphery bank. In such case, we seek for an existing
connection between the examined periphery bank and another bank of the periphery and
to transfer the detected connection to the unlinked core bank. This loop has to be followed
until the described link transfer is no longer necessary or possible for each pair of the core
and the periphery banks.
1. Complete the interconnectedness within the core: For each pair of core banks
which are not interconnected an exchange connection has to be found and trans-
ferred:
For each pair of core banks i < i and j < i : If Rcb[i, j] =0, then search for the
max{k} and max{l} , with k > i, l > i and Rcb[k, l] = 1 or Rcb[l, k] = 1. If such a
pair (k, l) exists, modify the matrix Rcb by R
c
b[i, j] = 1 and R
c
b[k, l] = 0, respectively
Rcb[j, i] = 1 and R
c
b[l, k] = 0. The same procedure will be applied for the investment
links matrix Rib.
2. Complete the interconnectedness between the periphery and the core: For
each pair of core and periphery banks which are not interconnected an exchange con-
nection has to be found and transferred:
For each pair of banks (core and periphery) i < i and j < i¯: If Rcb[i, j] =0, then
search for the max{k} and max{l} , with k > i¯, l > i¯ and Rcb[k, l] = 1 or Rcb[l, k] = 1.
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If such pair k, l exists, modify the matrix Rcb by R
c
b[i, j] = 1 and R
c
b[k, l] = 0, re-
spectively Rcb[j, i] = 1 and R
c
b[l, k] = 0. The same procedure will be applied for the
investment links matrix Rib.
Because the described iteration process is primarily based on the reallocation of links
interconnected the periphery banks from periphery to core banks, no further adjustment
process is generally required to disconnect the periphery within itself. 7
7Only if the core is very small with respect to the connectivity degree of the network, which should
be sufficiently high, the interconnected periphery banks will still remain after the described procedure.
We will ignore this possibility.
Chapter 3
Methodology of simulation analyses
The complexity of banking systems and a lack of availability of complete bank credit risk
data explain why the most commonly chosen methods of analyzing their stability involves
high levels of simplification. However, we believe that a deep understanding of finan-
cial products and of actual developments in the financial markets, transparency of bank
books to the greatest possible extent, and a continuous developing of the most sophisti-
cated models using this knowledge and data are essential for monitoring and regulating
the banking systems.
According to the ECB the following conditions should apply to characterize the financial
system as stable: Firstly, the financial system should be able to efficiently and smoothly
transfer resources from savers to investors. Secondly, financial risks have to be assessed
and priced reasonably accurately and should be relatively well managed. Thirdly, the
financial system must be able to comfortably absorb financial and real economic sur-
prises and shocks. As that ECB underlines on their official website,”... the safeguarding
of financial stability requires identifying the main sources of risk and vulnerability such
as inefficiencies in the allocation of financial resources from savers to investors and the
mis-pricing or mis-management of financial risks. This identification of risks and vulner-
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abilities is necessary because the monitoring of financial stability must be forward looking:
inefficiencies in the allocation of capital or shortcomings in the pricing and management
of risk can, if they lay the foundations for vulnerabilities, compromise future financial
system stability and therefore economic stability.”
It is obvious, that the mentioned macro- and micro-prudential considerations are es-
sential to safeguard the stability of the financial system. Nevertheless, a constant search
for fresh approaches and further characteristics of the financial system, its components
and environments which are relevant for the financial stability is also crucial due to the
fact that the world is constantly changing. Furthermore, the manner in which these fur-
ther potential factors could affect the systemic stability must be continually examined,
particularly from the systemic risk perspective.
We try to contribute to more clarity and understanding of these complex matters by
using the ABN-model described in the previous chapter. In this context we consider the
individual banks’ properties, network characteristics, as well as the environment of the
financial network. We study the impact of them depending on the initial shock properties
like intensity and concentration, as well as on the dynamic processes including or exclud-
ing liquidity risk in connection with an unexpected withdrawal of bank deposits.
From the characteristics of the financial system stability given by the ECB as above
it follows that banks may be considered as the most important financial intermediaries.
Banks are crucial for the economic systems because of their role of allocating financial
resources and transforming risks and maturities, as already mentioned by Diamond and
Dybvig (1983) in [20]. The ability of the individual banks and of the banking system as a
whole to assess, price and manage the financial risks and take appropriate precautions at
all times determines the capability of the financial system to absorb and withstand shocks.
Hence, we will consider the resilience of the banking system defined by the default rate
of banks as the first important measure for systemic risk in the following analysis. Fur-
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thermore, the costs of the systemic events, such as absorption of shocks by the banking
system and transmission of losses to the external segments, will be examined. Thereby,
we are in line with the definition of financial stability, provided by the European Central
Bank (ECB) on their official website, as ”...a condition in which the financial system -
intermediaries, markets and market infrastructures can withstand shocks without major
disruption in financial intermediation and in the effective allocation of savings to produc-
tive investment.”
This chapter deals with the methodology of the simulations which we use for several
analyses presented in the next chapters. In particular, the simulation engine and the gen-
eral construction of the applied scenarios and the initial events will be set out in section
3.1. Subsequently, the simulation analyses in general form will be presented in section
3.2.
3.1 Simulation engine
The heart of the model application is the simulation engine which is used to create nu-
merous scenarios, execute the developed (advanced) ABN-model for these scenarios and
collect results in terms of preprocessing, aggregation, and storage of simulated data in
a local file system. The methodology and implementation of the ABN-Model has been
already described in the previous chapter, particularly in section 2.2.5. One or any two
of the existent exogenous parameters can be simultaneously stressed in the engine. The
stress scenarios can be repeated several times for a number of networks defined in a ran-
dom way. The results, based on the initial and final states of the stressed networks will
be calculated and stored as the 25% quantile, 50% quantile (median), 75% quantile and
the mean value for each parameter setting.
The simulation engine is programmed completely in the open ISO-standardized language
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C++. For statistical computation and some graphics, the free software environment R has
been used. For visualization of the data the free data plotting program Gnuplot has been
preferred.
The focus of the simulation analysis presented in the following chapters is the systemic
risk as described in section 0.2, implying the failures of financial institutions caused by
strong idiosyncratic or limited systematic shocks, accompanied by the subsequent shock
transmission processes and further dynamics within the network.
3.2 Simulation analyses
In the following chapters we will present and discuss the results of simulation experiments
designed with regard to the particular problems. To be able to compare the results,
we generally use four baseline simulation scenarios, which will be appropriately adjusted
depending on the question to be answered. However, the baseline scenarios seek to capture
very different constellations with respect to the concentration of the initial shock and
existence of the liquidity risk.
The majority of the simulation experiments presented here are based on the baseline
scenarios and work as follows: Initially, 100 different networks will be simulated by a
random generator and stressed then by the initial shock (100 runs), varying one (two-
dimensional analysis) or two (three-dimensional analysis) parameters simultaneously in
each simulation iteration. All other parameters remain at the same value. The default
parameter settings (baseline scenarios) and the intervals for the variation of the parameters
are stated in the appendix (A.1.1) in Tables A.1 to A.3. Table 3.1 pictures the general
differences between the baseline scenarios 1, which will be described in the following.
1The letters NW denote a network (scenario) and the numbers refer to the identifier of the baseline
parameter setting.
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Scenario Withdrawal Concentration
of deposits of the initial shock
NW 01 yes high
NW 02 no high
NW 03 yes low
NW 04 no low
Table 3.1: Parameter settings characterizing the main kinds of simulation experiments.
Withdrawal of deposits in the table means the existence of deposit withdrawals or liquidity
risk, which is connected to intolerance of depositors for the undercapitalization of banks.
Hence, scenarios 01 and 03 presuppose the existence of liquidity risk, while in the two
remaining scenarios no withdrawal of deposits is feasible, i.e. the intolerance for undercap-
italization is set to 0 and, thus, no liquidity risk exists. For details we refer to chapter 2.3.4.
Concentration of the initial shock determines how the initial shock is distributed across the
external segments. We assume for high concentration that all initial loan losses are caused
by only one external segment (idiosyncratic shock). In contrast, the low concentration
implies that all segments will be affected, even though individual intensities of the shock
for particular segments will be presupposed (limited systematic shock). Thereby, we will
consider the same affected segment for all scenarios with the high shock concentration,
and the same relative distribution of the initial shock across external segments for all
scenarios with the low concentration of the initial event, respectively, which is important
for the comparability of results, see A.2.
As described in this section, banks do not keep all external loans on their balance sheets.
One part of debts may be securitized as covered bonds and collateralized debt obligations
and be marketed to other banks and externals thereafter. The claims issued against the
CDO collateral pool are prioritized by creating different tranches of securities. We dis-
tinguish between three tranches A, B and C. Thereby tranche C is the equity or the first
loss tranche, which bears the highest default risk. We suppose for the baseline scenarios
that banks prefer high risk assets (high risk appetite of banks) with respect to their initial
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investments: They invest only in the two riskiest CDO-tranches B and C, while the CBs
and the CDO-tranche A will be purchased by externals. We determine the risk appetite
of banks with the help of parameters βCDOt with t ∈ {A,B,C} and βCB, which describe
the percentage of bank investments to the total volume of CDO and covered bonds, see
A.3.
We support the analyses by several figures, using the average results of a number of
random networks for each parameter setting. When illustrating the results, mean values
of simulation experiments are displayed in general.
To explain an example in more detail we refer to Fig. 4.5, which pictures the devel-
opment of the bank default rate in relation to the intensity of the initial shock for four
baseline scenarios. For each of them we see the results of the following procedure:
1. initialize parameters
2. generate random matrices
3. create network
4. stress the network by the initial shock with the lowest magnitude, calculate and
save results (here default rate of banks)
5. repeat step 4 stepwise increasing the intensity of the initial shock (20 times)
6. repeat steps 2-5, creating new matrices for each iteration (100 iterations)
7. aggregate results (here calculating averages) for each value of the intensity of the
initial shock
Note, that in some experiments parameters will be varied which affect the random matrices
(number of banks or probability of interbank lending links, for example). In this case the
generation of random matrices is needed for each iteration and each value of the varied
parameter(s). In such cases steps 2-4 will be repeated in step 5. Moreover, the number
of iterations and steps may vary.
Chapter 4
Systemic events
Here, we focus on two main properties of the initial shock - intensity and concentration,
which are able to characterize the type of the systemic risk according to the concept
proposed by O. De Bandt and P. Hartmann (2000), see 1.1.1.
The research of Gai and Kapadia (2010) published in [33] needs to be mentioned here,
being the most relevant previous work, where the effects of initial shocks of various mag-
nitudes have been examined by using a financial network model. Thereby, contagion in
financial systems has been modeled with the primary focus on how losses may poten-
tially spread via a complex network of direct counterparty exposures following an initial
default. Further, the knock-on effects of distress at some financial institutions, which
trigger further rounds of default has been considered analytically and numerically. The
authors assumed that the network of interbank linkages forms randomly and exogenously.
They recognized, that similar shocks could have very different consequences for a financial
system depending on whether or not the shock hits at a particular pressure point in the
network structure. Moreover, they noted that when capital buffers were eroded to critical
levels, the level of contagion risk could very rapidly increase.
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We study the impact of the initial shock dependent on how strong and concentrated
it is. We define the initial shock as default of external loans and vary the total default
rate λ to examine the impact of the initial shock magnitude. Thereby we distinguish
between two extreme cases with respect to the concentration of the initial shock: the first
one with only one real sector involved (idiosyncratic shock), and the second one with a
widely distributed (systematic) shock. Note that we only change the shock distribution
between both cases without changing the total volume of defaulted credit assets, which
in turn depends only of the intensity of the shock. The remaining parameters are cho-
sen according to the baseline scenarios, see 3.2 and are displayed in Tab. A.1 - A.3).
The relevant dynamics in the system include absorption and transmission of the initial
shock, as well as the liquidity chain reactions caused by the deposit withdrawals, which
are described in the previous chapters. To better understand the results of the simulation
experiments in the following, it is worth looking first at the final states of the asset/liabil-
ity structure of the entire financial system for two kinds of network dynamics: with and
without liquidity risk. The asset/liability structure will be graphically displayed as the
aggregate positions of the total balance sheet of the financial system and will be explained
below.
Asset/liability structure: To illustrate the impact of network dynamics on asset/liabil-
ity structure after the clearing processes are finished, the final averaged1 total assets and
liabilities of simulated financial systems are presented exemplary in Fig. 4.1 - 4.4 which
are dependent on the on magnitude of the initial shock. The first two figures represent
the total asset/liability structure in the case of an idiosyncratic shock with a high con-
fidence in the banking system (zero intolerance against short time undercapitalization),
making deposit withdrawals unlikely.2 The further two figures represent results of similar
1For each given percentage of initial default we performed 100 simulations with randomized network
structures. These figures show averages of those simulations. This statistical procedure is also applied to
almost all results presented in this thesis as mentioned in section 3.2.
2The figures picture the balance sheet positions as single lines or as areas (cumulative structure). Both
kinds of graphics contain the same information, but allow a more differentiated analysis and control of
the simulation engine.
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experiments but with the difference that withdrawal of deposits is now probable.
The magnitude of the initial shock has different effects on final asset/liability structure
for cases with and without withdrawals, which can be seen by a direct comparison of Fig.
4.1 and 4.3 or Fig. 4.2 and 4.4, respectively.
The final impact of the initial shock and according dynamics are straightforward if de-
posit withdrawals do not occur. The total assets are reduced due to the initial shock,
reducing external exposures of banks as well as the cumulated value of the CDO invest-
ments3. The asset side of the entire banking system includes then reduced external loans
and CDO-investments of banks and externals and liquidity reserves of banks (very small
here). Covered bonds are not true-sale transactions with underlying credit assets which
remain on the originator banks’ balance sheets. Thus, covered bond investments are not
considered explicitly as assets, but included in the position ”external loans”. Furthermore,
for simplicity no liquid external assets exist in this example.
The liability side consists of banks’ and external capital, of which the last is reflected in the
financial statements of banks and in the financial system as a whole in two ways: external
capital that is tied up in the investments (CB and CDO) and external deposits. Interbank
loans and bank investments are financed by banks’ equity or through the external deposits
and represent a genuine transfer of capital rather than the real capital. That is why these
positions have been considered neither on the asset nor on the liability side here.
In the example, reduction of assets is primarily accompanied by reduction of bank capital
and particularly by reduction of external deposits via transmission of losses from banks
to externals (here only a small effect at a very strong initial shock), as can be seen in Fig.
4.1.4
3In the presented case only bank investments are affected, because of the high risk appetite of banks
holding the riskiest CDO tranches.
4Remember, that bank losses will be covered by bank equity or be transmitted to depositors if bank
capital is depleted. Thus, the value of the external deposits in the system can decline for two reasons:
withdrawal and utilization to cover bank losses. This is the reason, why a decline of external deposits
exist even though withdrawal of deposits does not take place.
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Figure 4.1: Asset/liability structure after the shock absorption in relation to the intensity of the
initial shock λ with low shock concentration, high risk appetite of banks, and without liquidity
risk (NW04).
Parameter setting: see Tables A.1 to A.3 in the appendix (A.1.1).
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Figure 4.2: Cumulative asset/liability structure after the shock absorption in relation to the
intensity of the initial shock with low shock concentration, high risk appetite of banks, and
without liquidity risk (NW04).
Parameter setting: see Fig. 4.1.
If withdrawals are not possible, which corresponds to the high confidence in the bank-
ing system because of an efficient deposit protection for example, the intervention of the
central bank is not required. Hence, the central bank does not play a role in the final
cumulated balance sheet structure of the financial system, see Fig. 4.1.
The integration of liquidity risk into the contagion dynamics clearing processes leads
to the final state of the system becoming more complex. As described in section 2.3.4 in
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Figure 4.3: Asset/liability structure after the shock adsorption in relation to the intensity of
the initial shock in the scenario with low shock concentration, high risk appetite of banks and
the withdrawal risk (NW03).
Parameter setting: see Fig. 4.1.
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Figure 4.4: Cumulative assets/liabilities after the shock adsorption in relation to the intensity
of the initial shock in the scenario with low shock concentration, high risk appetite of banks and
the withdrawal risk (NW03).
Parameter setting: see Fig. 4.1.
more detail, withdrawal of deposits takes place as a reaction of depositors to the dete-
rioration of a single bank’s capital base in relation to credit risks that have been taken
by the bank. Thus, the risk adjusted capital rate of the bank should fall below a certain
threshold to trigger withdrawal of deposits. The threshold depends on the confidence in
the banking system itself, which is related to the exogenous parameter τ that determines
the lack of tolerance of depositors for the undercapitalization of banks. Withdrawal of
deposits would force the affected banks to reduce their assets. However, the volume of
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offered assets and the capitalization level of the banking system affect the unit price of
assets and thus the probable intervention of the central bank. The central bank’s inter-
vention would explain the financing capital provided by the central bank, which can be
seen on the liabilities side. It is obvious then, that the final liabilities structure in the
case of withdrawal of deposits may include some central bank positions, especially if the
initial shock is strong enough for the intervention of the central bank in order to close the
lack of liquidity in the banking system or to avoid a strong asset price decline from the
fire-sale of assets. The total balance sheet of the system comprises the following central
bank items. The asset side contains CDOs, CBs and external loans, purchased by the
central bank through fire sales. The latter two are included in the external loan position
in the figures. The liability side comprises the central bank funds for the refinancing
of banks (bank credit funds) and the direct financing of external loans (external credit
funds, which also include the invested capital in CBs) as well as the central bank capital
invested in CDOs (invested capital).
A closer look at Fig. 4.3 or Fig. 4.4 reveals a remarkable aspect at a high level of the ini-
tial shock, concerning the decrease of the central bank money in terms of loans to banks
after a phase of previous growth. This effect relates findings of the following analysis
related to external losses and must be looked at closely in this regard.
Resilience of the bank system
Fig. 4.5 demonstrates the dependence of the stability of the banking system on the
magnitude of the initial shock for the base line simulation scenarios described above.
It appears logical to assume an increase of bank defaults and bank losses with an in-
creasing initial shock.5 Moreover, the increase of defaults would be higher, in general,
if deposit withdrawals take place.6 Furthermore, in the case of diversified initial shocks
bank defaults start to increase at a significantly higher value of the shock than if shocks
5Note, that a positive correlation between bank defaults and bank losses is not always the case. In
particular, increasing equity of banks can increase bank losses while decreasing defaults of banks.
6Compare scenarios NW01 and NW02 or NW03 and NW04, for example.
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Figure 4.5: Resilience of the bank system in relation to the intensity of the initial shock.
Parameter setting: see Tables A.1 to A.3 in the appendix (A.1.1).
are more concentrated. This means that if defaults are broadly distributed, we will ob-
serve higher stability of the banking sector than in the case of more concentrated shocks
provided that the shocks are relatively low. With a further increase in the magnitude of
the shock, the banking system may become more resistant against idiosyncratic events
than against broader distributed shocks, even if it will transmit more losses to externals,
particularly if banks are weakly interconnected. Subsequently, broadly distributed exter-
nal credit defaults may rapidly lead to a complete collapse of the financial system when
a certain level of the shock is reached. This finding discloses that the resistance of the
banking system is connected to two opposite effects, which have been frequently discussed
in the literature regarding the interconnectivity of the banking system, as for example in
Nier et al. (2007): the positive effect of sharing losses across banks and the negative
impact caused by the contagion effects. A broader distribution of the initial shock implies
a lower affectedness of banks immediately after the shock. The following contagion is
thus less likely than after an idiosyncratic shock with the same magnitude. But, if the
intensity of the initial shock is high enough to trigger the contagion processes by widely
distributed shocks, the effects of the shock transmission will be tremendous because of the
greater number of banks, triggering the contagion within a very short time, and depleting
capital base of the banking system. The whole effect will be more dramatic, than after an
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idiosyncratic initial shock with a similar magnitude. That can be observed by comparing
NW01 and NW03 (with liquidity risk) or even NW02 and NW04 (without liquidity risk),
for example, where default rates of banks are higher in the cases characterized by limited
systematic shocks, NW03 and NW04, at percentage of external credit defaults λ ≈ 0.6
and λ ≈ 0.8, respectively. With this observation, we are in line with Gai and Kapaida
(2010).
Bank losses
Cumulated bank losses increase with an increasing initial shock and stay constant at a
maximum value, that corresponds to the total bank capital, see Fig. 4.6. Such complete
loss of capital in the banking system arises at smaller values of the initial shock if deposit
withdrawals happen. The straight line representing the initial loss, refers to the complete
absorption of losses by bank capital in the case that no withdrawals have been triggered,
which can be seen for sufficiently low magnitudes of the initial shock. The divergence from
this line occurs at different levels of the shock for the analyzed scenarios. In the case of
low concentration of the shock, only the restriction of the total banking capital forces the
system to transmit the losses to the external sector. In this case, we obtain the highest
absorption capacity by banks, while strong idiosyncratic shocks tend to affect externals to
a higher degree (NW03-04). Further, the banking system is also better protected against
withdrawals if shocks have been broadly distributed, as long as the intensity if the initial
event is relatively low. However, at a high magnitude of the shock, withdrawals will create
higher losses and thus transmission of them to externals after a strong systematic shock
compared to an idiosyncratic shock with the same intensity, as demonstrated below.
External losses
Generally, external losses may increase with increasing initial shock. But, it is also possible
that losses are zero or small if the risk appetite of banks 7 is high and the initial shock is
7High risk appetite of banks implies low investment risk of the externals and probably no affectedness
of them by the initial shock directly.
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Figure 4.6: Cumulated bank losses in relation to the intensity of the initial shock.
Parameter setting: see Fig. 4.5.
small enough compared to the equity base of banks, especially if the initial event is widely
spread across banks or banks are highly interconnected. Furthermore, for relatively small
shocks, external losses are smaller if the shock has a broader spread, which can be seen
by comparing the scenarios NW 03 and NW 01 or NW 04 and NW 02 in Fig. 4.7. This
effect is explained by better absorption of losses by the banking system. For higher widely
spread shocks, we can see a very strong increase of the external losses, which can becomes
higher than in the case of an idiosyncratic shock with a same intensity.
Moreover, if withdrawals are possible, the external losses curve sharply increases at a
certain value of the shock and decreases again from a higher degree of intensity of the
shock. This curve shape relates to the case with low concentrated initial shock (NW 03)
in the example presented in Fig. 4.7. We use the term ”overshooting” to designate the
range of the shock characterized by extraordinary high losses, which can be obtained in
Fig. 4.7 for values of shock intensity between λ ≈ 0.07 and λ ≈ 0.08.
However, low concentration of the initial shock is not a necessary condition for such
overshooting but makes this phenomenon more likely, which can be seen in Fig. 4.8, that
presents the results for idiosyncratic and systematic initial events for several levels of bank
capitalization.
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Figure 4.7: External losses in relation to the intensity of the initial shock. NW 03 shows an
overshoot.
Parameter setting: see Fig. 4.5.
To understand the curve shape in the ”overshooting range”, we highlight the scenarios
NW03 and NW04, which only differ with respect to liquidity risk reflected in withdrawal of
deposits. Look at the development of the default rate in the banking system in the range
between 0.07 and 0.08, presented in Fig. 4.5. The value λ = 0.07 means that 7% of loans to
different external segments has been wiped out initially. As result, approximately 40% of
banks go bankrupt if withdrawal risk does not exist (NW04), while λ ≈ 0.08 corresponds
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Figure 4.8: External losses in relation to the intensity of the initial shock in scenarios NW01
and NW03 with high (left) respectively low (right) concentration of the initial shock and deposit
withdrawal risk.
Parameter setting: see Tables A.1 to A.3 in the appendix (A.1.1).
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to the total collapse of the banking system even without withdrawals, meaning that all
withdrawals in NW03 occur after the banking system collapsed due to the initial shock.
This is because withdrawals start only after the (first) solvency chain reaction triggered
by the initial shock has finished. The realized losses from the following fire sales will be
transported to the remaining depositors. That is why the external losses are higher than
in the case without liquidity risk.
The overshooting phase is then characterized by high degrees of affectedness of the banking
system by the initial shock, which is, however, not high enough to trigger an immediate
total collapse of the banking system. Two opposite effects play an essential role in the
development of the external losses in this range. On the one hand, externals save parts of
their capital withdrawing deposits. On the other hand, such actions generate further losses
to banks and destabilize the entire system. External losses increase with an increasing
amount of bank losses, which are transmitted to the external sector. With a further
increase of the initial shock, withdrawals will be triggered earlier and on a larger scale,
reducing the loss of deposits for their owner. The interplay of these effects leads to
fluctuations or humps of the external losses, which can be clearly seen in Fig. 4.11
in the lower left part, that presents the results of an random simulation experiment.8
Combination of two opposing effects (saving of external funds by withdrawal of deposits,
and higher transfer of losses to externals due to the increase of bank losses) provides
the alternate phases of upwards and downwards developments of external losses. Such
fluctuations are irregular and depend on the network structure to a high degree. For
sufficiently high shocks the curve shapes become more similar for all experiments showing
a hump in the ”overshooting range”. The aggregated result of a number of simulation
experiments shows then a moderate increase of the external losses at the beginning of
8Fig. 4.10 show in an exemplary way the results for a single simulation run (with only one random
network) NW03 for a better understanding of the network dynamics. The figures can be well used to
consider single effects and the relationship between the losses to banks and externals and the development
of withdrawals, for example. But, the results as whole depend significantly on the network structure. That
is why a number of simulation scenarios will be used in general, and averaged results will be presented
and analysed.
83
the range in which withdrawals occur, because of the compensating fluctuations (shifted
humps) for different scenarios. At the end, the last hump is clearly visible even in the
aggregated curve in Fig. 4.9 to the right, for example.
To the right of the overshooting range, all deposits will be withdrawn with a highest
possible grade, after the total collapse of the system, minimizing the losses to externals.
External losses increase then constantly with increase of the magnitude of the initial
event, which is demonstrated in Fig. 4.10. Remember that the volume of the deposits
which are withdrawn from a weak bank, with immediate effect, is determined as the
difference between the current risk assets of the bank and the maximum risk assets that
conform to the regulatory framework: dwi = RAi − eiγr, as presented in section 2.3.4.
Furthermore, external depositors and other banks withdraw their deposits in proportion
to their shares of the weak bank’s refinancing. In this way the amount of withdrawn
deposits is positively dependent on the remaining risk weighted assets of the weak bank
and negatively dependent on the bank’s equity. Both values are negatively dependent on
the initial shock. If the initial shock is high enough, to the degree that the total equity
of the financial system is exhausted even before withdrawals could happen, the amount
of the withdrawn deposits depends only on the risk assets by formula. It decreases with
an increasing intensity of the initial shock and relates to the increasing external losses in
Fig. 4.10, lower right.
The pronounced growth of external losses at the beginning of the overshooting range can
be explained as follows. The advantages for well capitalized banks, generated by profits
from the purchase of assets at a price less than their face value, improve their own capital
base reducing the deposit withdrawal risk and enabling these banks to purchase additional
further assets.9 Thereby, the necessary finance will be raised by central bank funding and
not least by withdrawn deposits from seriously weakened banks. Thus, the better capital-
ized banks are able to use the freed up liquidity in this manner. However, at some point
9A real devaluation of assets is not assumed in the model – losses to sellers will be considered as buyer
revenue.
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Figure 4.9: External losses in relation to the intensity of the initial shock in scenarios NW01
and NW03 with high (left) respectively low (right) concentration of the initial shock and deposit
withdrawal risk.
Parameter setting: see Tables A.1 to A.3 in the appendix (A.1.1).
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Figure 4.10: Development of losses and bank defaults in relation to the magnitude of the initial
shock λ with low concentration of the shock and deposit withdrawal risk( NW03) - results at
the end of a single simulation run for each value of λ.
Parameter setting: see Tables A.1 to A.3 in the appendix (A.1.1).
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Parameter setting: see Fig. 4.10.
of the dynamics, contagion in terms of solvency chain reactions will strongly affect even
such initially lucky banks and trigger withdrawal of deposits from them. Because of the
already severely weakened banking system and thus by absence of the absorption capacity
for oversupplied assets due to capital requirements, the rapid drop in prices of the assets
to be sold would consequently lead to losses to banks. Furthermore, because of the almost
nonexistent or scarce interbank lending in the progress of the crisis, transmission of losses
to externals may be very high and increasing with the growth of the initial shock. The
effects responsible for the decrease or downward correction of the external losses in the
right half of the overshooting range can be described as follows. The increasing initial
shock deteriorates equity of banks, increasing external losses through transmission of bank
losses, but forces the externals to rescue more deposits by withdrawal. In addition, the
earlier intervention of the central bank becomes more likely, because of scarce banking
resources available for oversupplied assets. External losses would decrease once again,
when the positive effect (rescue of deposits) outweigh the negative impact (loss transmis-
sion). This decrease is substantially related to the increasing withdrawal of deposits in
Fig. 4.10. From a certain degree of shock intensity, which is enough to completely destroy
the banking system even without withdrawals, external losses increase again, but much
more moderately than in the overshooting phase.
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In order to underpin the argumentation above, the development of the (averaged) external
losses and withdrawal of external deposits has been pictured in Fig. 4.11. It can be clearly
seen, that withdrawal of deposits and external losses develop in opposite directions in the
’overshooting phase’. Moreover, the additional consideration of the final liability structure
as in Fig. 4.4, reveals the following in the overshooting zone: the shape of the central
bank lending curve is similar to the shape of the external loss curve. The mentioned slopes
are in accordance with both effects described above: lower withdrawals correspond to the
higher central bank funds due to the higher fire sale interbank trading. The correction
zone of the overshooting phase is characterised by increasing withdrawals but decreasing
external losses, accompanied by increasing purchase of external debts by the central bank.
Conclusion
We showed that a banking system is more resistant against systematic initial events
than against the idiosyncratic shocks with the same magnitude in total, provided that
the shocks are relatively low. With a further increase of the shock magnitude, a bank-
ing system may become more resistant against idiosyncratic events than against broader
distributed shocks, transmitting more losses to externals, especially if banks are weakly
interconnected. Resistance of a banking system is connected to two opposite effects: the
positive one by sharing losses across banks, and the negative one that is connected to
contagion. Liquidity risk aggravates the crisis and may rapidly crash the whole system,
causing significantly higher costs. Moreover, in the case of a moderate shock and liquid-
ity risk related to withdrawal of deposits, losses incurred by banks after an idiosyncratic
initial event are generally significantly higher than after a systematic shock of the same
magnitude. Furthermore, underestimation of systemic risk, particularly in the early stages
of crises, may cause significantly higher losses for depositors. The fire-sale trading within
the banking system is able to deepen a banking crisis and raise its costs.
Chapter 5
Risk-taking capability
In this chapter we focus on the initial equity level of banks and its impact on the ability of
the banking system to withstand shocks. Further, we investigate the influence of the risk
appetite of banks with regard to their risk preferences concerning credit risk investments.
5.1 Bank capitalization
Here we are assuming the same initial capitalization level for all banks, γi = γ. Further,
we are using the risk adjusted calculation for the equity ratio as described in 2.3.2. From
this point of view, capital ratios calculated as a percentage of bank capital to total credit
risk assets of bank must be computed specifically for each bank in the presented model
and depend on the individual asset structure. It should be pointed out here that the
mentioned subjects will not only be discussed in this section but will continue to play a
role in the following chapters. In particular, we will examine targeting capitalization for
systemic important institutions and impact of risk adjusted capital in comparison with
lump sum capital requirements.
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Figure 5.1: Resilience of the bank system in relation to the capitalization of banks γ.
Parameter setting: see Tables A.1 to A.3 in the appendix (A.1.1).
The analysis here is based on the comparative experiments using the base line scenarios
presented in Section 3.2 with variable initial equity rate of banks γ. Thereby, we quantify
the equity ratio as a percentage of banks capital to its risk-weighted assets calculated
as described in Section 2.2.1. We study the influence of bank capitalization when banks
are affected by a more or less diversified initial shock, taking in consideration the risk of
deposit withdrawals. We begin with the analysis of the impact on the banking system’s
stability by considering bank defaults.
Resilience of the banking system
Given that the number of bank defaults generally slows down with increasing equity rates.
It is of little concern that bank capitalization is an important factor influencing the sta-
bility of banking systems. An interesting point here is that with decreasing equity, bank
defaults occur much earlier but rise slower if the concentration of the initial shock is higher
(see Fig. 5.1). The other aspect is that the increase in bank defaults is always higher if
withdrawals of deposits happen. You can see this in Fig. 5.1 by comparing NW01 with
NW02 or NW03 with NW04, for example.
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Figure 5.2: Cumulated bank losses in relation to the capitalization of banks.
Parameter setting: see Fig. 5.1.
Bank losses
If the liquidity risk does not exist, the development of the cumulated bank loss is straight-
forward depending on the initial equity rate: the losses to banks increase with increasing
equity rate until the initial shock can be totally absorbed by the banking capital. How-
ever, the dependence of bank losses on bank capitalization will be changed by withdrawal
of deposits. So, bank losses increase above the value predetermined by the initial shock
and begin to decrease after a certain level of equity (see Fig. 5.2). Cumulated bank losses
decrease then until there are no deposit withdrawals, and remain constant at the level of
the initial shock. The increasing slope corresponds to the increase of equity and presents
therefore the loss restriction through the capital limit. The starting point for reversing
the trend is given by the slowdown of deposit withdrawals corresponding to the increasing
equity rate of banks. Further, without liquidity risk there is no visible impact of the shock
properties on bank losses in total for the given parameter settings. But, if withdrawals
happen the maximum of the losses incurred by banks in the case of an idiosyncratic initial
event are significant higher than in the case of a systematic shock of the same magnitude.
The argumentation for this finding is based on the behavior of depositors, who begin to
withdraw their deposits, when the capital level of any bank falls under a certain level.
This occurs in the case of an idiosyncratic shock at a significantly higher level of the initial
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Figure 5.3: External losses in relation to the capitalization of banks.
Parameter setting: see Fig. 5.1.
capital and with severe implications for banks as can be seen in Fig. 5.2) for NW 01.
External losses
The influence of bank equity in order to guarantee the security of deposits seems to be
quite straightforward. A high equity ratio of banks should have a positive impact on
externals, because more losses can be covered by banks and the likelihood of withdrawals
is smaller. In the majority of cases, this presumption is likely to be true. However, when
withdrawal risk exists, it can be seen that external losses depend on the (risk-adjusted)
capital ratio of banks in a non-monotonous way. The downward trend of external losses
with increasing capital will be interrupted at some relatively small equity ratio level by
the phase of a sharp increase while the bank capitalization level continues to rise (see Fig.
5.3).
In the simulations presented here this phenomenon can be observed in scenarios NW01
and NW 03, where withdrawals are possible, that is, in the range where the shock with a
given magnitude leads to an almost total collapse of the banking system. The argumen-
tation here is very close to the description of the dynamics in chapter 4 with regard to the
”overshooting range” and has to be only broadly outlined at this point. With increasing
equity rate more and more banks may be spared from the total loss of their equity after
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Figure 5.4: External deposits, losses and withdrawals in relation to the bank capitalization in
the case of low concentration of the shock, high risk appetite of banks and deposit withdrawals
(NW03).
Parameter setting: see Fig. 5.1.
the absorption of the initial shock, and some of them even remain well capitalized. More
banks would avoid withdrawal of their deposits firstly and could be even able to purchase
the fire-sale assets, gaining short-time profits from such acquisitions. At the same time,
other banks on the sales side would consequently sustain losses, which would have to be
transmitted because of the low or even absence of remaining equity. Eventually, the pre-
viously strong banks would be affected by the contagion, deposit withdrawal and massive
equity losses.These losses arise from the fire-sale of recently acquired assets at very low
prices due to the lack of demand.1
The final result of the described process deals with the massive transmission of losses to
externals, which would be higher than at a lower initial bank capitalization. It is obvious,
that this phenomenon is in line with the similar finding we analyzed in the previous section
dealing with the initial shock magnitude. The initially hesitant reaction of depositors is
responsible for their higher losses here.
The implications of the process just described here can also be seen in Fig. 5.4. In addi-
1Remember, that the demand for assets depends on the bank capitalization because of the regulatory
capital requirements.
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tion, Fig. A.1 shows in an exemplary way the results for a single simulation scenario for
each parameter setting using the same network. The phase of increasing external losses
corresponds to decreasing deposit withdrawal. After a certain threshold, further increase
of the equity rate weakens the deposit withdrawal rate, which first leads to increasing
losses to externals. But then, lower withdrawals diminish the contagion. Further increase
of capital improves the resistance of banks and reduces losses to externals. The inverse
relationship between bank equity and external losses is then restored again. If the equity
rate is high enough, further increase of initial bank capital does not have any influence on
the losses to externals, because losses to banks can be fully covered by their equity and no
loss transmission takes place.2 The existence of such ”overshooting range” is more likely,
if the initial shock is more diversified, but also possible in other cases, which can be seen
in Fig. 4.8. Moreover, the level of bank equity, where this phenomenon can be obtained,
depends on the intensity of the initial shock: the higher the shock, the higher the bank
capitalization level should be to see the described ”overshooting”.
Conclusion
It could be shown that bank equity normally has positive effects on resilience of the
banking system and external losses. But if loan losses are able to trigger the nearly
total default of the bank system, a moderate increase of the equity rate may lead to
higher losses to external customers because of deposit withdrawals. Much more effective
recapitalization of banks is necessary in this case to stabilize the banking system and to
reduce the risk of further external losses happening.
5.2 Risk appetite of banks
Risk appetite of banks in the ABN-Model is determined by risk preferences of the bank-
2Note, that the initial external deposits decrease with increasing equity, because of the consequently
increasing bank capital together with a constant volume of assets, that needs to be financed.
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ing sector with respect to their initial investments. As described above, banks do not
keep all external credit assets. One part of debts may be securitized as covered bonds
and collateralized debt obligations and marketed to other banks and externals thereafter.
The claims issued against the CDO collateral pool are prioritized by creating different
tranches of securities, see 2.2.5. As presented there, the risk appetite of banks is deter-
mined by exogenous parameters βCDOt with t ∈ {A,B,C} and βCB, as a percentage of
bank investments to the total volume of the securities in the entire system. Hence, the
increase of the risk appetite of banks can be simply permuted by increasing βCDOC and
decreasing βCB, for example. Because all generated assets must be initially purchased by
only banks and externals, low risk appetite of banks would mean high risk appetite of
externals and vice versa. The baseline scenarios assume relatively high risk preferences
of banks: banks invest only in the two highest risk tranches of CDOs, whereas externals
purchase CB and shares of the lowest risk CDO tranche (A), see table A.3.
However, by varying the mentioned β-parameters not only the risk content of banks
investments will be changed in the model, but also the allocation of the amount of in-
vestments between banks and externals can be influenced. To avoid such unwelcome
side-effects, we slightly adjust the model with regard to the initial allocation of the in-
vestments in order to neutralize the effect of the external deposits and to separate the
pure risk appetite effect. We do not determine βCDOC and β
CB exogenously, but calculate
them in dependence on the current risk preferences, which can be high or low, but also in
dependence on the total volume of each tranche, and on the percentage of investments ϑ
carried out by banks. In the case of low risk preferences, for example, banks will initially
hold a ϑ %- stake in total CB and CDO, optimizing their portfolio to be as low-risk as
possible. As a consequence, we modify the base-line examples NW01-NW04 for high and
low risk appetite of banks, so that the amount of investments remains at the predefined
level for both, banks and externals, regardless of the risk allocation between them. In the
example to be analyzed now, the allocation of the investments is given by equal amounts
of investment for both sectors, ϑ = 0.5, with the difference that banks prefer the most
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risky tranches in the case of them having a high risk appetite (HR) and CB and CDOs
with a risk as low as possible in the opposite ”low risk”- case (LR). For the given pa-
rameter setting, the following values have been calculated and used in discussed examples:
Bank shares CB Tranche A Tranche B Tranche C
βCB βCDOA β
CDO
B β
CDO
C
LR (low risk) 1 0.74 0 0
HR (high risk) 0 0.26 1 1
Table 5.1: Investment risk parameters: βCDOt as percentage of interbank investments to the
total volume of investments for each tranche of CDO ∀t = {A,B,C} and βCB for investments
in covered bonds (CB).
The results of these experiments are shown in Figures 5.5 to Fig. 5.11 for increasing
magnitude of the initial shock represented by an increasing external credit default rate,
and in Figures 5.6 to Fig. 5.12 for an increasing equity rate of banks. The differences
between the scenarios with a focus on risk appetite of banks will be discussed in the
following section. For an explanation of the curve shapes we would like to refer to chapter
4 and section 5.1, where the impacts of initial shocks and capitalization of banks are
discussed.
Resilience of the bank system
Figures 5.5 and 5.6 present results for eight simulation experiments based on the base
line scenarios for the two opposite risk preferences of banks as described above. With
respect to the risk appetite of banks, its negative influence on the stability of the banking
systems might be generally expected. Therefore, it is of little relevance that bank defaults
are generally higher for higher risk appetite banks. Nevertheless, a remarkable reverse of
this impact in the presence of withdrawals should be noticed here, especially when banks
are differently affected by the initial shock. In such a case the bank default rate can be
higher at lower risk appetite, as can be seen using the scenarios NW01 LR with NW01 HR
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Figure 5.5: Bank defaults in relation to the intensity of the initial shock λ in scenarios with
high (left) and low (right) concentration of shocks.
Parameter setting is similar to the base-line scenarios with the exception of the investment risk
parameters. The later are specified in Tab. 5.1 for high (HR) and low risk (LR) of banks,
respectively. For the remaining parameters please refer to the appendix (A.1.1).
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Figure 5.6: Bank defaults in relation to the capitalization of banks γ in scenarios with high
(left) and low (right) shock concentration.
Parameter setting: see Fig. 5.5.
by comparing the full red line, representing the higher risk appetite, against the dashed
green line with dots for the lower risk appetite of banks, see Fig.5.5 and Fig.5.6 on the
left. We will intensively discuss this phenomenon with regard to the bank losses.
Bank losses
Generally, the cumulated bank loss is higher for higher risk appetite banks, which can be
explained by two effects. Higher risk appetite of banks implies their stronger affectedness
by the initial shock, firstly, and corresponds to the higher shock absorption due to the
risk adjusted capital, secondly.
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Figure 5.7: Cumulated bank losses in relation to the intensity of the initial shock in scenarios
with high (left) and low (right) concentration of shocks.
Parameter setting: see Fig. 5.5.
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Figure 5.8: Cumulated bank losses in relation to the capitalization of banks in scenarios with
high (left) and low (right) concentration of shocks.
Parameter setting: see Fig. 5.6.
Nevertheless, for moderate 3 idiosyncratic shocks, higher bank losses can be obtained for
lower risk appetite of banks if withdrawal risk exists, as can be seen in Fig. 5.7 and Fig.
5.8 on the left. This phenomenon can be explained by a faster collapse of the banking
system caused by withdrawal of deposits in the example NW01 LR because of the lower
absolute capital level. Now let’s look at this impact in greater detail. For the small shock
values which are not strong enough to trigger withdrawals, higher losses for riskier banks
are obvious, because of high risk assets, which are affected by the initial shock firstly. For
higher magnitudes of the idiosyncratic initial shock, the higher capital buffer of riskier
3with respect to the bank capitalization level
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banks could mitigate the negative effect of withdrawal of deposits. Note, that if the shock
is idiosyncratic, only part of high-risk assets will be affected by the shock. Thus, riskier
banks could possess a higher capital buffer even after the shock absorption, especially
when banks are well capitalized initially (above the regulatory requirements). By this,
(absolutely) better capitalized and initially less affected banks are more likely to remain
more stable in the case of higher risk initially, on condition that the initial shock has
been highly concentrated. In this case we see, that some a-priori more risky tranches of
CDO no longer cause the losses to banks if their underlying assets are not affected ini-
tially.4 However, because of the relatively high capital requirements for all a-priori high
risk assets, the corresponding banks would have much more equity buffer to withstand
the shocks and losses from contagion and even to buy the fire-sale assets. Some banks
could even make profits out of the fire-sales, buying assets at reduced prices from badly
affected banks if withdrawals take place. Thus, the negative impact of deposit withdrawal
could be smaller if banks were more inclined to high risk activity, a-priori.
Intensity of deposit withdrawals in both cases can be observed in Fig. 5.9, where the
decrease of external deposits and the increase of withdrawals with increasing initial shock
are steeper for lower risk appetite of banks. Furthermore, the higher external losses can
be observed in this case, which are higher not only because of the riskier external invest-
ments, but also because of the higher loss transmission from the banking sector, due to
the lower capitalization of the banking system and higher impact of the liquidity risk.
Moreover, the higher capitalization of banks leads to higher prices for fire-sale assets due
to the higher demand, in particular, as long as not too many banks are affected initially.
As a consequence, lower losses to selling banks or even profits of better capitalized banks
would be obtained by the favorable purchase of the assets. Furthermore, the idiosyncratic
shock causes higher transmission of losses to externals, especially if banks are weakly
4Loans to the real estate segment and accordingly CDO based on real estate credit risks, for example,
could be strongly affected, while other investments remain relatively intact, even with respect to high
risky tranches, if the crisis is confined to the only real estate segment. Banks which hold strongly affected
credits and securities will be more shocked, than those that do not.
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Figure 5.9: Development of external deposits and losses in relation to the intensity of the initial
shock in the case of the high concentration of shocks and liquidity risk (NW01), modified by
low (left) and high (right) risk appetite of banks.
Parameter setting: see Fig. 5.5.
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Figure 5.10: Development of external deposits and losses in relation to the capitalization of
banks in the case of the high concentration of shocks and liquidity risk (NW01), modified by
low (left) and high (right) risk appetite of banks.
Parameter setting: see Fig. 5.6.
interconnected. These effects would reduce the negative impact of withdrawals and the
number of defaulted banks. This also explains why we obtain this phenomenon more
clearly if withdrawals are possible as well as the concentration of shocks and the initial
equity rate are relatively high. 5
5Lower external deposits in Figures 5.9 and 5.10 in the high risk scenarios correspond to the higher
equity and thus the lower refinancing of banks via external deposits. This effect is too small to be
considered here in greater detail.
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Figure 5.11: Cumulated external losses in relation to the intensity of the initial shock in sce-
narios with high (left) and low (right) concentration of shocks.
Parameter setting: see Fig. 5.5.
Note, that even if the banking system is less stable for values of the initial shock less than
7% in the case of NW01 LR compared to NW01 HR, cumulated bank losses are higher
only in part of this range. On the left side, for small shocks, where neither withdrawals
nor contagion play any role, the lower bank losses in the case of lower risk appetite are
connected to the lower losses from investments. On the right side of the intervals, bank
losses are limited by the total equity of banks, which is higher in the case of banks’ higher
risk appetite.
External losses
At this point, it is advisable to take a glance at the losses to externals for the same
scenarios. Generally, the higher risk appetite of banks corresponds to lower losses to ex-
ternals, because the predominantly lower-risk investments of the external segment, which
can be seen in Fig. 5.11 and Fig. 5.12. 6 In the case without liquidity risk, the difference
between low and high risk of banks increases with increasing capitalization of banks until
no transmission of losses to them occur, while the external losses decrease. The impact
of bank capitalization on externals is higher if banks face higher risks, which is at a trivial
level. However, the existence of liquidity risk can change this claim: the increasing equity
6Remember, that a higher risk appetite of banks corresponds, ceteris paribus, to a lower risk appetite
of externals by model, because the asset structure remains unchanged.
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rate scales down the impact of the risk appetite, which is significantly higher than in
the case without withdrawal of deposits for low levels of bank capital. This can be seen
by comparing results for scenarios NW03 LR with NW03 HR or NW01 LR with NW01
HR. In any case, the low risk appetite of banks could prevent losses to externals after a
systemic initial shock. We can see that in Fig. 5.11 and Fig. 5.12 on the right hand side
before and after the smooth red line crosses the green line. This finding is connected to the
claim, that the banking system remains more stable for low risk appetite of banks until
some magnitude of the systemic shock or bank capital ratio is reached. The explanation
is the higher potential of contagion, which occurs earlier with decreasing equity rate when
banks are higher risk takers and broadly affected by the shock: A lower magnitude of the
initial shock is sufficient to trigger the withdrawal process in the case of higher risk banks
if the initial shock is highly diversified. Hence, the banking system is collapsing faster
than in the similar case with a lower bank risk. We can learn from this case, that even if
banks assume the main risks arising from credit investments, externals may suffer higher
losses than by taking more risks initially. This observation underlines the importance
of the right mechanisms preventing the loss of trust in the banking system during the
financial turmoil.
Conclusion
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Figure 5.12: Cumulated external losses vs. capitalization of banks in scenarios with high (left)
and low (right) concentration of shocks.
Parameter setting: see Fig. 5.6.
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While the higher risk investment is connected to higher losses to banks, in general, we
could show the inverse relationship for moderate idiosyncratic shocks if withdrawal risk
exists: the higher absolute capitalization of riskier banks may be able to prevent defaults
and partially losses to banks by reducing the deposit withdrawals.
The moderate intensity of the initial shock, compared to the bank capitalization, is an
important condition for this phenomenon: If the banking system is affected too strongly
initially, the advantage of less affected banks would rapidly become eroded by the follow-
ing contagion dynamics and deposit withdrawal processes. Furthermore, the described
benefit could also disappear if risk adjusted capital requirements are not differentiated
enough.7
Generally, we observed lower losses to externals if banks hold more risky assets, espe-
cially if withdrawals can be prevented. But in the case that withdrawals occur, higher
risk of banks may lead to higher losses to external deposits for a moderate magnitude of
the initial shock, especially if it is widely distributed across the bank sector. We explained
this finding by a stronger withdrawal effect in the case of more risky banks.
We should recognize, of course, that the described advantage of riskier banks is the
property of an ’illusionary’ system stability, which could be quickly destroyed by fur-
ther dynamics or shocks in the system. This is one of the curious phenomena, which
is important to remember and needs to be known before drawing any conclusions from
empirical data. Otherwise, a distorted perception of stabilizing bank properties could be
derived from empirical analysis of the financial crisis and lead to an incorrect assessment
of the systemic risk and misguided political and economical decisions. The existence of
more such phenomena together with problems of data quality and data completeness in
the world of the complex financial systems should not be underestimated.
7It would be interesting to see the effects of conditions that the underlying pools of asset backed
securities are extremely mixed, banks are more homogeneous in terms of diversification of credit risk
assets or extremely interconnected, which can be seen as a topic for further investigation.
102 CHAPTER 5. RISK-TAKING CAPABILITY
The very nature of the banking business is to assume risks, which should be undertaken
in a responsible manner. We have shown that contagion effects and especially withdrawal
of deposits could lead to high losses to non-financial segments, even if banks are willing to
accept greater risks, even if the granting of credit remains unchanged and only the reallo-
cation of risks between bank and externals has been obtained. Thus, we all should have a
natural interest in warning banks against taking on too much risk, especially because in
the real world, the risk would not be exogenously given, but could be additionally created
by banks through the irresponsible lending, for example. So not only the allocation of
risk should be considered but also the incentives for high risk generation must be an issue
of the management, limitation and monitoring of systemic risks.
Chapter 6
Network structure
The topic of this chapter is the impact of network properties on financial stability. The
most prominent question in the related literature concerns the degree of connectivity
and heterogeneity of the banking system. Although the issue has been analyzed several
times, it is yet to be finally clarified. Instead, the contradictory statements raise further
questions about the interplay of the connectivity and other network properties and their
collective relevance and influence on dynamics and the resistance of the financial systems
to shocks. Differences between the results of related studies exist due to the differences
in network structures, contagion mechanisms and further dynamic processes or determi-
nation of shocks. These differences emphasize the importance of data collection in the
financial sector, since the possibility and extent of contagion depend obviously not only
on model specification but also on the precise structure of the network. Moreover, further
efforts in the direction of empirical and theoretical studies are necessary, to understand
and to explain the ”financial contagion” processes.
In this chapter, firstly we provide a brief overview of previous findings from the most
relevant literature related to this thesis. Thereafter, we will present and discuss our own
research results. Thereby, analyzing the impact of various network properties and their
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interaction in terms of financial stability, contagion effects and distribution of losses in
the system. Amongst others, we investigate to what extent the results discussed in the
literature hold in the simulation experiments by using the asset based approach, presented
in chapter 2.
Section 6.2 analyzes the impact of network interconnectivity. In section 6.3 we take a
look at the bank size by varying the network size using the randomly distributed external
credit exposures and interbank lending links. In section 6.4 more heterogeneous network
structures such as core-periphery networks will be discussed.
6.1 Previous results
The connection between the structure of the financial system and systemic risk or con-
tagion processes is one of the most interesting questions in modern financial network
research. As earlier theoretical works Allen and Gale (2000) [4] and Freixas et al. (2000)
[28] should be mentioned at this point as important contributions to the analysis of conta-
gion in financial systems through credit interlinkages among banks. The aforementioned
papers provide interesting insights analyzing very simple networks with a small number
of banks. For example, they showed that network structures, in which all banks are com-
pletely interconnected, are much more stable than network structures, in which banks
are partially interconnected. Further, the authors demonstrate that disconnected net-
work structures with separate internal clusters are more vulnerable to contagion than
perfectly interconnected networks, while at the same time such structures would avert a
total collapse of the interbank network through their separation. One further insight of
the mentioned work is that in some structures the possibility of contagion depends on the
parameter settings in the models.
The evidence from the financial crisis that started in 2007 has amazingly shown that
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the breakdown of a relatively small segment can not only spread to other segments but
also push the system into great financial and economic distress. Moreover, this event may
have a worldwide impact due to the integration of capital markets. Some of the post-crisis
literature has tried to identify conditions under which an increase of network density is
not beneficial, i.e. does not reduce systemic risk. In several works it has been pointed out
that the relationship between connectivity and systemic risk is not monotone.
In the following sections we give the review of the post-financial crisis literature which
addresses the issue of network structures and their impact on the systemic risk. We
present the literature in a topically organized structure, according to the importance for
the analyses in this dissertation.
We begin with the works focusing specifically on the degree of connectivity and its impact
depending on the initial level of interconnectedness of banking systems and magnitude of
the initial event.
Nier et al. (2007) in [53] and Battiston et al. (2009) in [6] showed that for different levels
of connectivity systemic risk can increase or decrease with a further increase of connec-
tivity, but they found the opposite results in terms of the pattern of the interdependence
between the level of connectivity and the fragility of the banking system. Nier et al.
(2007) simulated contagion from the initial shock caused by a single bank failure using an
Erdo¨s-Re´nyi random network and showed that, when the initial connectivity is low, an
increase in connectivity increases the risk of contagion, but when connectivity is already
high, a further increase in connectivity tends to help dissipate losses across the system
which renders it more resilient to contagion. Furthermore, they pictured this nonlinear
relationship between contagion and connectivity, showing the dependence between the
number of interbank lending links and the number of bank defaults, as a non-monotonic
M-shaped curve. The authors explained this result by the action of two opposing effects
with the following interpretation: ”When the level of connectivity is low, an increase in
the number of links increases the chance of contagious defaults. However, when connec-
tivity is already high, a further increase in the number of links increases the capacity of
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the system to withstand shocks.”, Nier et al. in [53].
Also Battiston et al. (2009) in [6] investigate the effect of the network connectivity on
the probability of individual defaults of financial institutions and identified two compet-
ing effects of increasing connectivity. Contrary to Nier et al. the authors found that the
relationship between connectivity and systemic risk decreases if the degree of connectivity
is (relatively) low and increases when it becomes high.
Acemoglu et al. (2015) have arrived at the conclusion that only given a sufficiently low
magnitude and a small number of negative shocks, a more equal distribution of interbank
liabilities leads to a less fragile financial system. So the complete financial network, in
which the liabilities of each institution are equally held by all other banks, seems to be
the least susceptible to contagion defaults. The intuition provided in the literature is that
a more equal distribution of interbank liabilities guarantees the sharing of losses among
more counterparties. In the presence of relatively small shocks, the excess liquidity of the
non-distressed banks can be utilized preventing further failures of banks, see [1]. More-
over, Acemoglu et al. (2015) suggested that, in the presence of large shocks, interbank
liabilities facilitate financial contagion and create a more fragile system; more financial
interconnections are no longer a guarantee for stability. Which means that, when the
magnitude or the number of negative shocks crosses certain thresholds, the types of fi-
nancial networks that are most prone to contagious failures change dramatically. The
implication is that, with large negative shocks, the excess liquidity of the banking system
may no longer be sufficient to absorb the losses. In such a case, less interbank connections
protect the rest of the system, see [1].
Some papers are dedicated to the impact of connectivity on the banking system sta-
bility, depending on its capitalization level and the credit risk diversification of banks.
Nier et al. (2007) studied the interplay between connectivity and net worth in terms of
banking system resilience and found ”a negative nonlinear relationship between contagion
and the level of bank capitalization: in undercapitalized networks, increasing connectivity
increases the risk of contagion whatever the initial level of connectivity is”. The authors
6.1 Previous results 107
showed that these effects interact with the level of capital in the sense that ”...for less
capitalized systems, an increase in connectivity tends to be associated with an increase in
contagious defaults, while for better capitalized systems connectivity tends to work as a
shock absorber, dissipating the effect of the shock across a larger number of banks, each
able to withstand the shock”, see [53].
Cont and Moussa (2010) in [13] studied a specific case of powerlaw network based on
a scalefree simulation. The authors noted thereby a similar direction of the results to
Nier et al. (2007): ”in well-capitalized networks, increasing connectivity is found to in-
crease significantly contagion up to a certain threshold above which a further increase in
connectivity leads to a decrease in the extent of contagion. However, in undercapitalized
networks, increasing connectivity makes the network more prone to contagion whatever the
initial level of connectivity is.” Further, Cont and Moussa (2010) have found in [13] that
contagion is very sensitive to the network structure properties and especially to the level
of connectivity and concentration. They observed a trade-off phenomenon in the network
between increasing the potential channels for the propagation of financial distress and
the stabilizing benefit of risk sharing when connectivity increases. Moreover, the authors
underlined that more heterogeneous networks in terms of heterogeneity in degrees and
exposures are more resilient to contagion.
Similar results were found by Hofmann de Quadros et al. (2014) in [37], who analyzed
various types of interbank networks being considered in a differentiated manner according
to the concentration of debts and credits for their resilience to contagion. Thereby they
tested the effect of connectivity in conjunction with variation in concentration of links.
The results suggested that more connected networks with high concentration of credits
are more resilient to contagion than other types of networks analyzed.
In contrast, Gai, Haldane and Kapadia (2011) presented a network model of interbank
lending in [32]. They illustrate how greater complexity and concentration in the financial
network may amplify this fragility.
Battiston et al. (2012) in [7] explored the mechanisms that, following the default of an
agent, may lead to an increase of systemic risk when connectivity increases. The authors
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construct a network of borrowing/lending relationships among financial institutions based
on their balance sheets. They investigate how the size of the default cascade is affected by
the initial distribution of robustness and by the level of risk diversification in the network.
As a result of this study, the effect of diversification is not unique. The precise outcome
depends crucially on the allocation of assets and liabilities across agents and the exposure
structure. It could be shown that credit risk diversification has ambiguous results, espe-
cially in the presence of credit runs. The authors underlined that the benefit of sharing
initial losses is counterbalanced by the fact that banks are more exposed to credit runs
when the number of their counterparties increases.
In many works the authors show that the possibility for contagion depends on the precise
structure of the analyzed network.
G. Iori et al. (2007) explored the network of interconnections among banks in the Italian
overnight market by using data from the European electronic online market for inter-
bank deposits (e-MID) and by applying several metrics derived from computer science
and physics, uncovered a number of microstructure characteristics in [39]. The data set
to be analyzed has been composed of banks operating in the Italian market for which
the complete record of transactions was available. The authors characterized the banking
system as highly heterogeneous with large banks borrowing from a high number of small
creditors.
Bech and Atalay (2008) analyzed the structure of the federal funds market in [8] and
represented it as a network, using a transaction-level data set (1997-2006). They also
found out, that the considered network is sparse and disassortative. Moreover, the authors
observed the small-bank large-bank dichotomy of the federal funds market, with small
banks lending funds generally to larger banks. This phenomenon reflects that smaller
banks, rather than transacting with each other, typically use a small set of money center
banks as intermediaries, according to Craig and von Peter (2014) in [15].
Some of the related literature of the past few years addresses the question of core-periphery
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networks, which are able to fit the described properties of real networks in a very good
way. For the references and descriptions of most related literature we refer to section 6.4.2.
One further question concerning the network properties is, whether the bank size is typi-
cally an important driver of systemic risk measures.
Lengnick et al. (2013) analyzed the impact of interbank lending on the stability of the
financial sector via an agent-based computational economic (ACE) model that covers the
monetary side of transactions among households, firms and banks. The authors showed
that the banking sector is more stable if it is composed of equally sized banks. By con-
trast, the existence of large banks creates endogenous instability. As a consequence, the
authors recommended that the regulatory policy should be more restrictive for large banks
compared to the smaller institutions, see [44].
In [66] Varotto and Zhao (2014) analyzed systemic risk for US and European banks from
2004 to 2012. They recognized that common systemic risk indicators are primarily driven
by bank size and draw attention to the fact that smaller banks may still pose considerable
systemic threats. To confirm this statement, the authors mentioned the Northern Rock
bank, which had been facing several liquidity problems as a result of the credit squeeze
which started in 2007 and was finally put under state control. Furthermore, they showed
that the ranking of most systemically important banks based on the ’too big- too fail’ -
approach enables them to identify, 9 months before the Lehman default, the most systemi-
cally important US banks that later either defaulted and/or were acquired by competitors
or received the largest government sponsored rescue packages. Moreover, several studies
show that different systemic risk indicators do not necessarily give consistent conclusions.
It is particularly true concerning the different points in time that correspond to different
phases of the same crisis or different types of crises. Furthermore, the results seem to be
strongly dependent on characteristics of the financial network being studied. Varotto and
Zhao (2014) showed for example in [66] that characteristics of a banks balance sheet can
help to forecast its systemic importance. The authors noted that the systemic risk of the
US and European banks appears to be driven by different factors.
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However, it became the subject of a controversial debate, whether the bank size is suitable
to identify the systemic important institutes and which systemic risk indicators fit better.
The critical response to this is that large banks could create more systemic risk, even
without being individually riskier. Laeven et al. (2014) try to provide an economic foun-
dation for the debate on bank size, as well as on activities and complexity of large banks,
using data from 52 countries in [42]. The authors focused on the question, whether there
is evidence that large banks are riskier or create more systemic risk than small banks.
Laeven et al. (2014) noted for example, that failures of large banks tend to be more
disruptive to the financial system than failures of small banks. Anyway, large banks were
in the epicenter of the current financial crisis, triggered by the collapse of the Lehman
Brothers investment bank in September 2008. Their distress caused substantial damage
to the real economy and continued to fuel the downward spiral. Empirical analysis by
Laeven et al. (2014) showed that large banks may have a more fragile business model,
with higher leverage and more market-based activities, than small banks. The authors
summarized ”...large banks, on average, create more individual and systemic risk than
smaller banks, especially when they have insufficient capital or unstable funding (fewer
deposits), which are both common features of large banks. Additionally, large banks create
more systemic risk (but, interestingly, not more individual risk) when they engage more
in market based activities as measured by the share of noninterest income in total income
or the share of loans in assets; or are more organizationally complex.” More specifically,
Laeven et al. (2014) ask which characteristics of large banks, like size per se, lower capital,
less-stable funding, more market-based activities, or higher complexity, determine more
risk. Thereby, the authors focus on two dimensions of bank risk: individual bank risk,
measured through the banks stock performance during the 2007 - 08 financial crisis; and
the banks systemic risk contribution in the sense of how much the bank contributes to
system-wide distress. The authors noted that ”...systemic risk contributions differ from
individual bank risk, because they are driven also by correlations in returns between the
bank and the financial system, and by bank size. It is the measure of bank risk most
relevant to systemic risk (macro-prudential) concerns.” In the light of the empirical ex-
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aminations made by Laeven et al. (2014) bank size per se seems to be substantial for the
individual as well as for the systemic risk.
With respect to the individual risk, the economic effects of size, capital, and funding
on bank risk are substantial due to the analysis mentioned. Systemic risk analyzed by
Laeven et al. (2014) can be roughly described as the externalities of bank distress onto
the rest of the financial system or the real economy. It can be narrowed down through
an SRISK measure, provided by Brownlees and Engle (2012) in [11]. This systemic risk
measure is defined as a bank’s contribution to the deterioration of the capitalization of
the financial system as a whole during a crisis. It captures the expected capital shortage
of a firm given its degree of leverage and Marginal Expected Shortfall (MES), which is
the expected loss an equity investor in a financial firm would experience if the overall
market declined substantially. Using SRISK as systemic risk measure, the authors found
that bank size and especially organizational complexity are significant for systemic risk
of financial institutions, see [11].
In the following, the results of the analysis of different network properties will be pre-
sented and discussed. We begin with the investigation of network connectivity and bank
capitalization.
6.2 Connectivity
6.2.1 Simple analytical approach
To illustrate the contagion mechanism and the interplay of the effects connected to the
increasing connectivity, we develop a simple model, reflecting a shock propagation process
in homogeneous networks, firstly. This simple way is helpful to understand the dynamics
reflected in the M-curve, demonstrated by Nier et al. (2007) in [53].
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Similar approaches already exist. One of the first and best known is the a simple model of
May and Arinaminpathy (2010) in [49], which uses analytic approximations. This work is
certainly an essential component contributing to the understanding of the earlier numer-
ical work on the propagation of shocks in banking networks as by Nier et al. (2007). We
are aiming at the same objectives, highlighting network interactions, but using an even
simpler approximation. We derive the general conditions for propagation of shocks in
the homogeneous networks without limitation on the parameters. Using such a simplified
approach we analyze the interdependency between failures of banks and their interconnec-
tivity. We compare the results with the findings made by Nier et al. (2007). In particular,
we look at the existence of the M-curve in the analytical experiments.
The algorithm is based on the network, characterized by similar properties as the model
of Nier et al.: number of homogenous nodes N , probability pi,j = p that bank i has lent
to another bank j assumed to be equal across all (ordered) pairs (i, j), external credit
exposure ci = c and external deposits di = d , equity rate γi = γ and interbank loans
ii = i = βc and interbank deposits li = l. Because of the homogeneous network structure
i = l holds for all banks. The number of direct (bank) lenders or depositors is given then
by m = (N − 1)p for any bank. Further, the initial equity ei is equal for all banks and
given by e = γ(c+ i).
The contagion process in the simple model is characterized by the assumption that each
of the affected banks can be the only ones concerned. This would be for example the
case if all branches of the contagion trees reflecting the shock propagation are disjunct,
as shown in Fig. 6.1 for m = 3.
The initial shock is an idiosyncratic shock hitting one of the banks in the system. It is
related to the banks external credit assets. The magnitude of the shock is given by an
percentage of external loans, s = λc.
Similar to the model of Nier et al., this initial loss is firstly absorbed by the banks net
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Figure 6.1: Propagation of defaults in the simple model (contagion tree).
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worth e, then by its interbank liabilities l and last by its external deposits d. If the eq-
uity of the affected bank is not sufficient enough to absorb the initial shock, s ≥ e, or
λc ≥ γ(c + i), the affected bank defaults and the remaining loss (s − e) will be trans-
mitted to its creditor banks through the interbank liabilities if s − e ≤ l. And, in case
these liabilities are not sufficient to absorb the shock, s− e > l, the residual loss s− e− l
will be born by external depositors. Hence the shock transmission to the lender banks is
given by sr = min{s− e, l}. Because of the perfect homogeneity by assumption, we will
see that in each level of the shock transmission, all banks concerned by the propagation
of the loss either default or survive, being able to cover the shock by equity.
Now, we can derive the necessary and sufficient conditions for the failure of banks for
each level as follows.
The failure of the initially affected bank, or the zero level default (D > 0) happens, if
and only if s ≥ γ(c+ i), where D is number of defaulted banks.
D > 0 ⇐⇒ λc ≥ γ(c+ βc) ⇔ λ ≥ γ(1 + β) (6.1)
Contagion, or the first level default, means that the lender banks of the initially affected
bank go bankrupt after the transmission of the residual loss to them. Hence, the necessary
and sufficient condition for contagion depends not only of the shock s and the bank equity
e, but also on the volume of the interbank liabilities determined by l = βc for each bank,
which restrict the loss transmission as mentioned above.
The total transmission of the residual loss to the lender banks is only possible, if the
residual loss sr does not exceed the interbank lending volume to the defaulted bank.
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More formally,
sr =
 s− γ(c+ i), if s− γ(c+ i) ≤ ll, otherwise
=
 λc− γ(c+ βc), if λc− γ(c+ βc) ≤ βcβc, otherwise ⇒
sr =
 (λ− γ(1 + β))c, if λ− γ(1 + β) ≤ ββc, otherwise (6.2)
Hence, the condition that the contagion takes place or the first level default (D > 1)
happens is defined as:
D > 1 ⇐⇒
 λ ≥ γ(1 + β)(1 +m), if λ− γ(1 + β) ≤ ββ ≥ γ(1 + β)(m), otherwise
where D is the number of defaulted banks and m gives the number of lender banks of the
initially stressed bank.
In general, the necessary and sufficient condition for (K+1) - level default
(D >
∑K
k=0m
k) is given by
D >
K∑
k=0
mk, if
 λ ≥ γ(1 + β)
∑K
k=0m
k, λ ≤ β + γ(1 + β)
β ≥ γ(1 + β)∑Kk=1mk, otherwise (6.3)
where D is the number of defaulted banks and m gives the number of lender banks of the
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initially stressed bank and K is the level of the shock transmission.
The derivation of 6.3 can be presented as follows:
Assume λ− γ(1 + β) ≤ β.
It follows from 6.2 that, the residual loss can be completely transmitted to the lender
banks. The contagion of the direct lenders (first level contagion) occurs only if their
capital is not enough to absorb the transmitted loss:
D > 1 ⇐⇒ λc︸︷︷︸
initial
shock
− γ(c+ βc)︸ ︷︷ ︸
absorbed
shock
≥ γ(c+ βc)m︸ ︷︷ ︸
absorption
potential
⇐⇒ λ ≥ γ(1 + β)(1 +m)
The contagion of the second level lenders occurs only if their capital is not enough to
absorb the remaining transmitted loss:
D > 2 ⇐⇒ λc︸︷︷︸
initial
shock
− (γ(c+ βc) + γ(c+ βc)m)︸ ︷︷ ︸
absorbed
shock
≥ γ(c+ βc)m2︸ ︷︷ ︸
absorption
potential
⇐⇒ λ ≥ γ(1+β)
2∑
k=0
mk
Generally, if λ− γ(1 + β) ≤ β we have the equivalence:
D > K ⇐⇒ λ ≥ γ(1 + β)
K∑
k=0
mk, q.e.d.
Assume λ− γ(1 + β) > β.
It follows from 6.2 that, the residual loss transmitted to the lender banks is restricted by
the amount of their deposits. The contagion of the ’second-level’-lenders occurs only if
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their capital is not enough to countervail this transmitted loss:
D > 1 ⇐⇒ βc︸︷︷︸
restricted
transmission
ofloss
≥ γ(c+ βc)m︸ ︷︷ ︸
absorption
potential
⇐⇒ β ≥ γ(1 + β)m
The contagion of the second level lenders occurs only if their capital is not enough to
absorb the remaining transmitted loss:
D > 2 ⇐⇒ βc︸︷︷︸
initial
shock
− γ(c+ βc)m︸ ︷︷ ︸
absorbed
shock
≥ γ(c+ βc)m2︸ ︷︷ ︸
absorption
potential
⇐⇒ β ≥ γ(1 + β)
2∑
k=1
mk
Generally, if λ− γ(1 + β) > β we have the equivalence:
D > K ⇐⇒ β ≥ γ(1 + β)
K∑
k=1
mk, q.e.d.
6.2.2 Results in simple models
Nier et al. (2007) investigated the effect of connectivity and banking capital on the
resilience of the banking system. The results from this experiment are illustrated in
Fig. 6.2, see [53]. In the chart, the number of bank defaults resulting from simulations
is pictured, where the Erdo¨s-Re´nyi probability (ERP) p increases, banks become more
connected on average. The blue line and the blue range represent networks with net
worth equal to 1% of total assets, whereas, the red and yellow represent networks with
net worth equal to 3% and 7% of total assets, respectively.
The authors obtained the dependence between the number of interbank lending links,
determined by ERP, and the number of bank defaults as a non-monotonic M-shaped curve,
described by the authors as ”First, for very low levels of connectivity (p close to zero), an
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increase in connectivity reduces system resilience, since connectivity increases the chance
of shock transmission. For higher levels of connectivity, increases in connectivity may
decrease or increase system resilience. But when connectivity is sufficiently high, further
increases in connectivity unambiguously decrease contagion as the shock absorption effect
starts to dominate and the initial shock is spread over more and more banks, each able to
withstand the shock received”.
Figure 6.2: Interdependence between bank defaults and connectivity in the network model of
Nier et.al.
Source: [53].
Now, we use the ’simple model’, introduced above, putting the same parameters as in the
experiment of Nier et. al in the model with 25 banks and 20% of interbank assets to total
assets (β = 25% as percentage of interbank assets to external assets), where the initial
shock applied to one of the banks is calibrated to wipe out all external assets of the bank.
The according result is pictured in Fig. 6.3. Even if the amplitudes of the results of the
simple model are higher, the curves match well the results of the mentioned simulation
experiments of Nier et. al. The difference in the amplitude is not surprising according to
the assumption of perfect homogeneity in the ’simple model’, which does not hold in the
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Figure 6.3: Interdependence between bank defaults and connectivity in the simple model with
parameter setting similar to the experiment of Nier et. al.
same way in the referenced model.
Both graphs picture two opposing effects of increasing interbank connections: increasing
propagation of the shocks and increasing potential of the shock-absorption, where each of
these two mechanisms dominate over different ranges, generating an M-shaped graph.
However, from our point of view, the first increase of bank defaults for very low levels
of connectivity has to be ignored, because p close to zero reflects for small N that the
initially affected bank does not have any interbank lending links, which is a rather unreal-
istic assumption and is a contradiction to the terms of a perfect homogeneity in the simple
model. More interesting is that the increases in connectivity would decrease or increase
system resilience over different ranges. Variation of the number of banks and so of the
magnitude of the initial shock in relation to the constant external assets in total discloses
a further interesting point. The shape of the curves reflect the interdependence between
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connectivity and resilience of nearly homogenous banking systems does not necessarily
have to be an M-shaped graph. We would called them rather ’irregular Sawtooth-waved
graphs’. The number of waves, their amplitudes and periods are depending on the param-
eters of the network and the magnitude of the initial shock. The M-shaped graph pictures
only one particular case. This can be seen in Fig. 6.4. Further, we found counterexam-
ples to the claim that the increases in connectivity unambiguously decrease contagion
when the connectivity is already sufficiently high, as the shock absorption effect starts to
dominate and the initial shock is spread over more and more banks. Instead, we would
argue that the decreasing contagion for higher levels of connectivity can be only obtained
if the magnitude of the shock or shock transmission is sufficiently low, so that the shock
absorption effect is able to dominate at least at the full interconnectedness of the system.
Otherwise, even at very highly interconnected networks, further increases of interbank
lending links would increase the vulnerability of the banking system and contagion can
not be prevented by the further increase in connectivity.
Because of the restriction of the shock transmission by interbank lending, the condition
for the prevention of the contagion by interconnectedness is dependent not only on the
magnitude of the initial shock λ, but also on the intensity of interbank lending and the
capitalization of banks, as can be seen below.
We derived the ’no-contagion’- condition for the simple model as follows, assuming that the
remaining shock cannot by completely transmitted to the lender banks, λ−γ(1 +β) > β.
In this case we obtain the equivalence:
D = 1 ⇐⇒ β < γ(1 + β)m,
where m = (N − 1)p.
Hence, the threshold (minimum) probability of interbank lending p¯ < 1, that is necessary
to prevent contagion, is given by p¯ = β
γ(1+β)(N−1) with the following properties for N ≥ 2,
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Figure 6.4: Interdependence between bank defaults and connectivity in the simple model for
various numbers of banks and percentage of interbank lending of total assets: 20% (on the left)
and 40% (on the right).
which increases in β and decreases in γ:
∂p¯
∂β
=
1
γ(1 + β)2(N − 1) > 0,
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∂p¯
∂γ
= − β
γ2(1 + β)(N − 1) < 0.
Furthermore, p¯ does not make sense for β ≥ γ(1 + β)(N − 1) contradicting the assump-
tion p¯ < 1, which follows from p¯ = β
γ(1+β)(N−1) .
6.2.3 Simulation results
Here we analyze the impact of network connectivity in more complex networks, using the
ABN-model. Furthermore, we try to separate the impact of this network property from
other possible effects. For this purpose we construct some examples based on a strong
idiosyncratic shock, where only one external segment causes the initial event. Further-
more, the mentioned external segment is characterized by a relatively small circle of lender
banks close to it via their active credit relations. Moreover, we assume that the loans
affected by the shock are not securitized. In order to determine the contagion effect, we
firstly assume that no withdrawal of deposits is possible. To investigate the impact of the
connectivity level within the banking system, we vary the interbank lending probability
pc, described in 2.2.5, leaving the other parameters unchanged. Note that due to the
initial credit netting in the model, pc ≤ 0.5, where pc = 0.5 corresponds to the total
interconnectedness of the banking system.
The way in which bank and external losses may be affected by the increasing connec-
tivity for different levels of bank capitalization needs to be investigated, as well as the
banking system resilience. We begin with the analysis of the vulnerability of the banking
system in terms of the default rate of banks after the initial event and the contagion
dynamics followed afterwards.
Resilience of the bank system
The results of the described simulation are pictured in Fig. 6.5. The default rate graphs
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provide no uniform conclusions for different levels of bank capitalization. It can rather be
stated that the impact of an increasing connectivity depends not only on the initial level
of the interbank lending probability, but also on the capital ratio and the magnitude of
the initial shock, which can be seen in the graph on the left hand side. In undercapital-
ized banking systems (with regard to the initial shock), increasing connectivity makes the
network more susceptible to contagion irrespective of the already existing connectivity
degree. However, given a sufficiently high level of bank capitalization with respect to
the power of the initial shock, an increase in the interbank lending connectivity has a
negative impact on the resilience of the banking system only for low interbank lending
connectivity and a positive effect if the connectivity is already sufficiently high. In the
exercise presented in Fig. 6.5 this positive effect can be observed only if the capital ratio
γ = 8% .
These results are in accordance with results obtained by Cont and Moussa (2010) in
[13]. They are also partially in line with considerations of Nier et al. in [53]. In particu-
lar, we have seen in the simulation analyses that the banking system can be stabilized by
increasing interconnectedness of banks. But, even at various shock intensities and bank
capitalization levels we have never seen such strong decreases of defaults as displayed via
M-shaped graph by Nier et al. or by the simple model presented above. This reflects the
fact that the networks constructed by the ABN-model are more heterogeneous and the
initial events affect not only one but many banks simultaneously. The increase or decrease
of the contagion does not start and end so abruptly with a further increase in connectivity
as in the case of just one initially defaulting bank in a homogeneous system, where all
lender banks connected to the insolvent bank usually fail or survive immediately. This
would also explain that in more heterogenous systems no ’sawtooth pattern’ would be
observed.
Bank losses
In view of the impact of connectivity on bank losses a clear picture emerges: Bank losses
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Figure 6.5: Impact of interbank credit probability pc on bank defaults in the case of a strong
idiosyncratic shock: with equity rate γ = 3% (left) and different bank capitalization levels γ
(right).
Parameter setting: see Tables A.4 to A.6 in the appendix (A.1.2).
increase with increasing interbank lending linkage until the full absorption of losses by
banks’ equity has been reached or the maximum possible shock absorption by bank capital
has been achieved. Thereafter, bank losses remain constant with further increase of the
connectivity.
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Figure 6.6: Impact of interbank credit probability on bank losses in the case of a strong id-
iosyncratic shock: with equity rate γ = 3% (left) and different bank capitalization levels (right).
Parameter setting: see Fig. 6.5.
External losses
As mentioned above, we assume in the simulation experiments presented here, that the
loans affected by the shock are not securitized, meaning that the securitization ratio of
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the external segment caused the initial shock qss = 0. In this case, the non-bank segments
make a loss only if the initial shock is not fully absorbed by banks. Fig. 6.7 shows the
results of the experiments. An increase in the interbank lending connectivity seems always
to be beneficial for externals, in terms of the affectedness of the external segments through
the transmission of bank losses to external depositors. That applies to all levels of bank
capitalization and connectivity degrees: Losses to externals decrease monotonically until
the point is reached where the full absorption by banks capital is possible or the total
bank capital has been used up. These findings present an opposing picture to the view
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Figure 6.7: Impact of interbank credit probability on external losses in the case of a strong
idiosyncratic shock: with equity rate γ = 3% (left) and different bank capitalization levels
(right).
Parameter setting: see Fig. 6.5.
on bank losses, which is no surprise, as only the losses caused by the initial shock have to
be completely split between these two sectors, and no further losses occur.
It is obvious, that the increasing interbank connectivity causes the distribution of losses
among a larger number of nodes, mitigating the effects of the shock and reducing the
contagion risk for external segments. The effect will be stronger the higher the banks are
capitalized. Note that in the case of loan securitization, a certain portion of losses will
still have to be borne by the external investors, especially if they had acquired high-risk
positions (tranches). It is also obvious that banking system capitalization has a positive
impact on external losses for each level of connectivity, at least if no withdrawals of de-
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posits are allowed, which can be seen in Fig. 6.7 on the right.
We summarize the effects of interbank connectivity if liquidity risk does not exist:
• Increasing interconnectedness of the banking system increases the shock absorption
provided adequate capitalization and thus implying a higher systemic stability
of the system: Higher absorption means higher losses within the banking system and
lower losses for the externals. This effect leads to higher resilience of the banking
system with more equal allocation of losses across banks even if total bank losses
are higher.
• Increasing interconnectedness may increase contagion causing a lower systemic
stability: Higher contagion leads to more bank defaults. The extent of contagion
depends on the bank capitalization level compared to the initial shock and of the
system’s ability to prevent bank runs.
As mentioned above, there are contradictory statements in previous studies about the
context for interbank connectivity and systemic risk. Here we analyze the impact of in-
terbank connectivity by using simulation experiments allowing withdrawals of deposits.
The results are pictured in Fig. 6.8. As in the previous experiments, the example here
includes a very strong idiosyncratic shock triggered by one external sector with a very
small number of banks being stressed. The permitting of bank runs is the only difference
here to the experiments discussed above.
In the same way as before we see the different results for banking systems with different
capitalization levels: an increase in connectivity increases unfailingly the risk of contagion
for low capitalized banking systems and could have a stabilizing effect for well capital-
ized systems above a certain magnitude. Moreover, the potential danger of a ”bank run”
increases with further lending links for low levels of connectivity. For more highly inter-
connected systems, their vulnerability may decrease with increasing interconnectedness,
but only for better capitalized, less leveraged banking systems in which losses triggered
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Figure 6.8: Impacts of interbank credit probability in the case of a strong idiosyncratic shock
if withdrawals of deposits are possible for different bank capitalization levels γ.
Parameter setting: see Fig. 6.5.
by initial credit defaults and the following bank failure will be compensated by a broad
spectrum of well capitalized banks, serving as a safety net. For low capitalized banking
systems, the increasing interconnectedness poses a possible danger of reinforcing the con-
tagion, especially if withdrawals of deposits can not be prevented. Similarly, the impact
of connectivity on the aggregate losses within the banking system depends on the ini-
tial capitalization of banks. As in the previous experiment, we see in some cases, with
relatively low capitalization, that the total loss to banks increases with increasing con-
nectivity. Moreover, the higher the initial capital of banks, the higher the total loss, that
can be covered by the equity.
In regard to losses to external (non-bank) depositors we can see, contrary to the exer-
cise above, that only for high levels of bank equity, increasing connectivity has a positive
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impact, while in low capitalized systems external depositors face higher losses from bank
failures if the connectivity increases. The reason for this is obvious: in low capitalized
systems increasing connectivity increases the risk of bank defaults because of the higher
risk of infection, generating greater uncertainty among investors in the banking system
and, hence, a corresponding deduction of liquidity. This process triggers other dynamics,
which generate more losses to banks, partly transmitted to the external segments.
The interplay between connectivity, capitalization and losses to banks is, then, more inter-
esting, if liquidity runs are possible. In such cases the higher bank capitalization and high
interbank connectivity could, together, prevent the runs and reduce the losses to both,
banks and external depositors. Hence, for sufficiently high interconnectedness, banks’
losses in the higher capitalized system can be lower, than in the less capitalized system
for the same connectivity level, as it can be seen in Fig. 6.8.
Conclusion
We can conclude that, in general, higher connectivity can be positive or negative for the
system resilience, depending on which of the two effects is dominant: In well-capitalized
networks, increasing connectivity may intensify the financial instability up to a certain
threshold above which a further increase in connectivity leads to an increase in the fi-
nancial system resilience. For low capitalized systems increasing connectivity would have
rather negative implications, in particular if the liquidity risk implied by bank runs exists.
With this we rather agree with Cont and Moussa (2010) and Nier et al. (2007) and have
shown that this statement holds regardless of the existence of liquidity risk. However,
if withdrawals of deposits are not possible, higher connectivity seems to be positive for
external depositors because more losses will be covered by bank equity. However, if a
bank run cannot be prevented, higher connectivity would be advantageous for external
depositors only if the capitalization of the banking system is strong enough.
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6.3 Network size
In this subsection the effect of the size of interbank networks will be analyzed. Nier et
al. (2007) studied the effect of concentration of the banking system on the resilience to
contagion by varying the number of banks in the banking sector while keeping the ag-
gregate size of banks’ external assets constant. In their experiments, the authors applied
shocks as different percentages of banks’ external assets being wiped out. The authors
showed that even for a given shock size a more concentrated banking system is more
vulnerable to systemic risk. We will verify these results by using the ABN-model. The
higher network size means here the higher number of banks which obviously corresponds
to the lower bank size on average because total sum of assets in the financial system stay
constant. This implies that a rising number of banks creates an higher granularity within
the banking system. However, banks within the network may have significant differences
in the size, especially at lower connectivity degrees between banks and externals or within
the banking system. These differences will decrease with an increasing number of banks
because of the increasing number of links if the probabilities of linkages between external
and banks and within the financial system stay constant.
As in the previous section we will look at the impact on system stability as well as on
levels of losses and sharing of losses between external depositors and banks. The following
figures show the results of selected representative simulation experiments. The according
scenarios include strong idiosyncratic shocks, but do not allow for withdrawal of deposits.
For a given equity rate of banks or a given probability of the interbank credit links, only
the size of the network will be varied in the following experiments. All other parameters
are fixed. Note, that the overall initial capital will not changed if the equity rate of banks
remains fixed.
Resilience of the banking system
Fig. 6.9 and 6.10 illustrate the dependence between the size and resilience of the banking
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Figure 6.9: Banking system resilience in relation to the capitalization of banks γ and size of
the banking segment N .
Parameter setting: see Tables A.4 to A.6 in the appendix (A.1.2).
system for different levels of initial capitalization or interbank connectivity. We obtain,
that the impact of the increasing network size depends on its initial level and other net-
work properties.
In general, a very low size of the banking system acts against the contagion. For low levels
of bank capitalization we obtain the strong increase of bank defaults with a further growth
of the network size, while for high levels of capital no impact exists, as can be seen in Fig.
6.9. Moreover, increasing connectivity would enhance the negative effect of network size
if banks are characterized by low equity rates, as pictured in 6.10 on the left. A similar
effect would be caused by the possibility of withdrawal of deposits (not illustrated here).
But, for higher capitalized and highly interconnected systems the increasing granularity,
related to the lower bank size on average, seems to have a stabilizing effect, as it can be
seen in Fig. 6.10 on the right.
To clarify the impact of contagion the results can be compared with Fig. 6.11 - 6.12, which
picture the corresponding direct default rates, defined as fractions of banks bankrupted
after the initial shock but before the contagion processes. It is obvious that immediate
default rate decrease on average with increasing size of the banking system, at least for
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Figure 6.10: Banking system resilience in relation to the interbank connectivity pc and size of
the banking segment N for low and high bank capitalization levels γ = 3% (left) and γ = 8%
(right).
Parameter setting: see Tables A.4 to A.6 in the appendix (A.1.2).
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Figure 6.11: Immediate bunkruptcies of banks in relation to the capitalization of banks and
size of the banking segment.
Parameter setting: see Fig. 6.9.
small numbers of banks, which is connected to the definition of the initial shock. This
shock is triggered by only one external sector, which is connected via credit relation to
only a small number of banks (2% in the example), but at least to one bank in the system.
In the case of five banks, one bankrupted bank represents the direct default rate of 20%.
In the case of 100 banks, two banks will be stressed by the initial shock, leading to the
maximum direct default rate of 2%. Note, that the size of the total initial shock is equal,
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Figure 6.12: Immediate bankruptcies of banks in relation to the interbank connectivity and size
of the banking segment for low and high bank capitalization levels (γ = 3% (left) and γ = 8%
(right)).
Parameter setting: see Fig. 6.10.
irrespective of the number of the affected banks. In this light, the negative effect of the
banking system’s size on the stability of the system connected to the contagion processes
seems to be more important, while the positive one seems to fit to the reported association
between the number of banks and the initial default rate. So, the decreasing default rates
with increasing number of banks for well capitalized and interconnected systems should
be understood as the effect of a low risk of contamination due to the high capital buffer
and loss sharing. The positive impact of the increasing number of banks is then only the
technical effect as mentioned above.
However, increasing the number of banks corresponds to the raising granularity and the
increase of the number of possible routes of contagion as the number of links increases. So,
we can summarize that less concentrated banking systems with a higher number and, thus,
with a lower size of banks would be more vulnerable against idiosyncratic shocks if banks
have low capitalization and low interconnectivity. For well capitalized banks or highly
interconnected systems the number of nodes does not play any significant role: if banks
have sufficient capital buffer, further possible routes of infection remain without signifi-
cance or, respectively, the highly interconnected systems suggest high contagion, that no
6.3 Network size 133
 0
 0.04
 0.08
 0.12
 0.16
 0.2  0  10
 20  30
 40  50
 60  70
 80  90
 100
 0
 10000
 20000
 30000
 40000
 
Bank Loss
Equity Rate
Number of Banks
 0
 5000
 10000
 15000
 20000
 25000
 30000
 35000
Figure 6.13: Cumulated bank losses in relation to the capitalization of banks and size of the
banking segment.
Parameter setting: see Fig. 6.9.
significant effects will be additionally obtained by increasing the granularity of the system.
Bank losses
It can be seen in Fig. 6.13 - 6.14 that the impact of the network size depends on the in-
terbank connectivity level for low as well for higher bank capitalization. Cumulated bank
losses basically increase with increasing number of banks for relatively low connectivity
degrees. In the highly connected banking networks, the number of banks plays hardly
any notable role in terms of the amount of losses covered by banks’ equity, as a result of a
strong idiosyncratic shock. In very low connected networks with a small number of nodes,
increase of the network size leads to a decrease of bank losses, because of the decline in
the average size of banks and accordingly of the capital buffer of the affected bank, while
the intensity of the shock remains equal for all simulation experiments. This is due to the
technical effect described above and should be considered as a side effect.
External losses
As total bank losses, external losses can increase or decrease with increasing numbers of
banks. We can see slightly decreasing losses to external depositors in the middle of the
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Figure 6.14: Cumulated bank losses in relation to the interbank connectivity and size of the
banking segment for low and high bank capitalization levels γ = 3% (left) and γ = 8% (right).
Parameter setting: see Fig. 6.10.
interval of bank capitalization looking at Fig. 6.15, when the size of the banking system
grows in terms of the rising number of banks. For very low and sufficiently high levels
of bank capital, the number of banks seems to have no significance on losses to be borne
by externals. In such cases the losses would be transmitted to externals to the highest
degree or, respectively, would be almost completely covered by banks’ equity. Further-
more, external losses generally decrease with increasing number of banks for relatively
low connectivity degrees, as can be seen in Fig. 6.16. This finding could be explained by
higher number of links between banks, which increase the loss absorption capacity of the
banking system. A relatively strong increase of external losses for low levels of connec-
tivity and relatively small network size is connected to the side effect already obtained in
connection with default rate and losses to banks.
Such a non-monotonic relationship between the number of banks and the impact on the
entire system can be traced back to two opposing effects: a negative relationship between
the size of the banking system and the average bank size, measured by the balance sheet
totals of banks and accordingly the capital buffer of the affected bank, firstly, and a
positive relationship between the size of the banking system and the absolute number of
interbank lending links, secondly. Smaller banks exhibit lower absolute amounts of equity
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Figure 6.15: Cumulated external losses in relation to the capitalization of banks and size of the
banking segment.
Parameter setting: see Fig. 6.9.
relative to the initial shock. Hence, the initially stressed bank would transmit more loss
to the depositors and to the externals. By contrast, the increasing numbers of interbank
credit links reinforces the transfer of losses to other banks, so that the externals would be
less affected. For very concentrated banking systems the first effect (lower equity capital
base) outweighs the second, but it is becomes less important in favor of the second effect
(higher loss transmission) for higher numbers of banks.
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Figure 6.16: Cumulated external losses in relation to the interbank connectivity and size of the
banking segment for low and high bank capitalization levels (γ = 3% (left) and γ = 8% (right)).
Parameter setting: see Fig. 6.10.
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Conclusion
It can be concluded that the size as well as the connectivity degree of the banking system
could play a significant role, especially if the capitalization level of banks is relatively low
compared to the initial shock, so that the transmission of the shock from the initially
affected bank(s) takes place. Furthermore, the capitalization of the banking system is
highly significant to the way in which an increasing number of banks affects the system
stability and the loss distribution between banks and external segments. In this way, the
increasing number of banks (provided that external credit amounts and thus the initial
shock remain unchanged) does not induce a clear effect. Moreover, a combined effect of
increasing network size has been observed. The first part of the effect is similar to the
impact of increasing connectivity, playing a negative role for the resistance of banking
systems to shocks in the case of lower capitalized banking systems and stabilizing well
capitalized systems by further spreading of the loss. The second part is based on the
increasing network granularity due to the decrease of the average balance sheet total with
increasing number of banks, leading to higher losses to externals due to higher shock
transmission, especially when banks have low capitalization and low interconnectivity.
The total effect of the increasing number of banks is then the result of the interaction of
both the aforementioned drivers.
This finding, however, disputes the general claim of Nier et al., that a more concentrated
banking system is more vulnerable to systemic risk.
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6.4 Heterogeneity
In this section we introduce the extended core periphery concept, including semi-periphery
in addition to common core and periphery as an integral part of the financial network. We
focus on the impact of the heterogeneity on the stability of the total system in general,
but also on the vulnerability of core and periphery banks, as well as of semi-periphery
banks in particular.
6.4.1 Motivation
The network of liabilities between individual financial institutions has been frequently
mentioned as an aspect of the banking system which might play an important role in
identifying and evaluating contagion risks in order to assess the financial stability. ”The
network structure has two important implications for policy makers. First, the network
structure is ultimately determined by deeper market forces that need to be unravelled in
order to anticipate monetary policy responses. Secondly, the actual distribution of links
between banks affects the stability of the systems and the possible contagion after large
shocks”, van Lelyveld and in ’t Veld (2012) in [65]. Unfortunately the interbank networks
are not fully researched. Nevertheless, it is generally agreed that the structure and size
of linkages is of significant importance for financial stability. The leading method to
derive the network structure using the available information on each banks total interbank
lending is an approach known as maximum entropy. One of the main assumptions thereby
is that banks diversify their exposures by spreading their lending and borrowing across
all other active banks. As a result of the use of this method, quite homogeneous network
structures have been observed.
In fact, with the support of intensive debate among experts and empirical studies it can
be stated that the network structure of interbank exposure is highly heterogeneous and
interbank networks are sparse. In reality, only a small percentage of potential bilateral
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linkages are in active use. ”If tiering is not the result of random processes but of purposeful
behavior, there must be economic reasons why the banking system organizes itself around
a core of money center banks”, Craig and von Peter (2014) in [15].
The fact that banks do not spread their borrowing and lending across the entire sys-
tem can be explained by the circumstance that establishing and maintaining network
linkages is associated with costs in terms of information processing, risk management
and creditworthiness checks. In addition to these costs, side considerations, operating
earnings as well as individual risk and business strategy, too, play a decisive role in the
interbank activity often characterized by disassortative relationships describing a graph
(or network) in which nodes of low degree are more likely to connect with nodes of high de-
gree. Less-connected banks are more likely to trade with well-connected banks than with
other less-connected banks. The number of counterparties per bank follows a fat-tailed
distribution, with most banks having few counterparties and a small number having many.
This property is a characteristic of core-periphery networks, where multiple core banks
intermediate between the peripheral banks, which in turn do not or rarely interact with
each other.
6.4.2 Core-periphery networks in the literature
The most popular notion of core-periphery (CP) structure was introduced by Borgatti
and Everett (1999) in [9], who proposed an algorithm for detecting both discrete and
continuous versions of CP structure in weighted, undirected graphs.
Fricke and Lux (2012, 2015) have applied this CP framework to data of the electronic
market for interbank deposits ”e-MID”, which is basically used for short-term (overnight)
liquidity trading, see [29]. The authors found that the structure of the networks derived
from these data can be reliably determined by a CP model. Applying an asymmetric
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version of the CP framework, they found that banks’ roles as borrowers and lenders in
the money market can be very different.
Iman van Lelyveld and Daan in ’t Veld (2012) followed these analyses in [65], using data
for the Netherlands and also found a significant CP structure.
Using regulatory data, Tellez (2013) analyzed the network of exposures between Aus-
tralian authorized deposit-taking institutions like banks, credit unions and building soci-
eties in [62]. The author mapped the network of large bilateral exposures between financial
institutions and analyzed its basic features using the tools of network theory. He found
that many of the features of the Australian network are consistent with those of finan-
cial networks in other countries. In particular, most institutions in the network are only
linked to a small number of other institutions, while a few, typically larger, institutions
are linked to a large number of other institutions. Despite the network complexity, the
author underlines the low density, of even the comprehensive version, of the Australian
banking system network. Despite the fact, that only about 5% of all possible pairs of
nodes have direct links between them, the indirect interconnectivity tends to be signif-
icantly higher. In the case of the Australian banking system about 30 percent of bank
pairs are indirectly connected. Furthermore, financial networks tend to have a low density
as they are generally comprised of a few well-connected institutions and a large number
of sparsely connected institutions, see [62].
The last point can be seen, amongst others, in studies of German, Italian and Swiss
interbank markets, which report ratios of actual connections to all possible connections
(degrees) smaller than 1.5%. These results seem to be connected with a very large number
of small credit institutions and the presence of a few larger banks, which play the role of
intermediary institutions, see Fricke and Lux (2015) in [29], Craig and von Peter (2010,
2014) in [14], [15]. However, it should be taken into consideration, that the mentioned
studies are based only on one part of interbank exposure. Mostly money market records
have been taken into account or even large exposure statistics.
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Craig and von Peter (2010) employed a German set of comprehensive banking statistics
on large loans and concentrated exposures compiled by the Evidenzzentrale der Deutschen
Bundesbank. The statistics include quarterly reported data of financial institutions lo-
cated in Germany about each counterparty to whom they have extended credit for the
amount of at least EUR 1.5 million or 10% of their liable capital, see [14]. On the basis of
this data Craig and von Peter analyzed the German interbank network after consolidating
banks by ownership at group level, excluding cross-border linkages. The resulting network
of the German banking system, which is one of the largest in the world, is characterized
by sparsity with a density on the order of 0.41 % of possible links that suggests the pres-
ence of a discernible structure. Even after the consolidation, the set of about 1800 active
banks, on average, comprises, 40 private credit banks (Kreditbanken), 400 savings banks
(Sparkassen), 1150 credit unions (Kreditgenossenschaften), and 200 special purpose banks.
In [15] Craig and von Peter (2014) provided evidence that interbank markets are tiered
rather than flat, in the sense that most banks do not lend to each other directly but
through money center banks acting as intermediaries. Using Bundesbank data on bi-
lateral interbank exposures the authors found strong evidence of tiering in the German
banking system. They captured the concept of tiering by developing a core-periphery
model, and devised a procedure for fitting the model to real-world networks. Fitting
the tiered structure to the German interbank network the authors realized that there are
plenty of banks which borrow from, and lend to the others. But many of them do not play
an essential role in the interbank market. Such banks simply transform their maturity
profile by taking and placing funds in different maturities, often with a single counterparty
at the core, for example. According to this finding, the authors specify the definition of
the core as a strong refinement of the concept of intermediation. Therefore, by their
definition, the core includes only those intermediaries that borrow from, and lend to the
periphery and play an essential role in the market. By building on intermediation and
by using the model of tiering Craig and von Peter identify a tighter core in the German
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banking network, comprising only 2 % of banks in the network (see Fig. 6.17). However,
the authors underline the importance of the existence of a core, which is more important
than the exact size of the core.
Note, that banks which intermediate but are not in the core could be considered as
semi-periphery in the core-periphery concept, presented in this work.
Figure 6.17: The tiered structure of the German interbank network.
Source: Craig and von Peter (2014), [15].
In [5], Anand, Craig and von Peter (2015) proposed the minimum-density solution as an
efficient alternative to the well known maximum entropy method for estimating counter-
party exposures. The authors combined information-theoretic arguments with economic
incentives to produce more realistic interbank networks that preserve some characteristic
features of the original interbank markets. They mentioned that the minimum-density-
method loads the most probable links with the largest exposures consistent with the
total lending and borrowing of each bank, yielding networks with minimum density. The
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authors observed that in a stress-testing context, the minimum density solution overesti-
mates contagion, whereas maximum entropy underestimates it. In this way, both methods
can be used meaningfully side by side defining a useful range for the damage of systemic
stress when counterpart exposures are unknown.
Using an elementary dynamic model of the interbank market, Lux (2014, 2015) introduced
an approach that shows how a CP structure might emerge from a different theoretical
perspective in [45].
In [38] van Lelyveld et al. (2014) tried to find the economic explanation for the existence of
CP structures in the financial markets and showed that such a network structure can form
endogenously. They identified the instability of the core periphery network, where agents
are homogeneous because of the large benefits of core banks from intermediating between
periphery banks and incentives for periphery banks to enter the core. The authors showed
that, for sufficiently large differences between big and small banks, it becomes beneficial
for large banks to have direct lending relationships with all other large banks in the core,
such that the CP network becomes stable. Moreover, the authors succeeded in reproduc-
ing the observed CP structure in the Dutch interbank market by modeling.
Despite the importance of the interbank exposure data for financial regulation, it is still
impossible to analyze total interbank exposure even on a country basis, containing all
kinds of debts and financial products which include credit risk. The interconnectivity in
a real banking system would be presumedly substantially higher, than can be observed.
In this section, we try to use the knowledge achieved from empirical studies and study the
impact of the heterogeneity of banks by applying the discussed properties of real bank-
ing systems in the simulation model. Here, we design simulation experiments tailored to
different levels of connectivity. For further analysis of the connectivity impact we refer to
section 6.2.
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6.4.3 A three-tiered banking system
Here we introduce the extended core periphery concept, including semi-periphery in ad-
dition to the core and periphery of the banking network. Based on the definition of the
core as a strong refinement of the concept of intermediation, introduced by Craig and
von Peter (2010) in [14], we expand the common core periphery concept described in the
previous part of the section by adding a semi-periphery as an integral part of the financial
network, including banks that are more or less randomly linked to all other banks in the
system. The percentage of such semi-peripherical banks is flexible in the model. So, in the
case of ”zero” we deal with a classical core-periphery structure. From our point of view,
this ”extended” concept should be more appropriate to simulate the financial network
structures which are more complex than ones with a poor core-periphery structure.
One example is the view of the large bilateral exposures between financial institutions
of the Australian Banking System in a simplified and in a more complicated form, stud-
ied by Tellez (2013) in [62]. A simplified presentation of the banking system excluding
the credit unions and building societies is shown in Fig. 6.18, where banks are presented
as nodes, and large exposures between borrowing banks and lending banks are pictured
as links between nodes. The greater the number of links related to a given node, the
closer the node is to the centre of the network. The links indicate the possible paths of
contagion in the case of financial distress of the borrower. The author points out the fact
that ”. . . the major banks, which are placed at the centre of the graph, are linked to many
other banks in the network. In contrast, most of the foreign and smaller Australian-owned
banks are linked to only a few other banks. Also, the smaller Australian-owned banks tend
to be more connected with other Australian-owned banks, while the foreign-owned banks
tend to be more connected with other foreign-owned banks and the major banks.”, Tellez
(2013) in [62].
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Figure 6.18: Australian banking system, excluding credit unions and building societies.
Source: Tellez (2012) in [62], Reserve Bank of Australia, Bulletin June Quarter 2013
Fig. 6.19 graphically displays the Australian banking system including the credit unions
and building societies, which is further complicated compared to the interbank network
presented above. As the author noted, the major banks remain highly connected to other
institutions, but some smaller institutions become highly connected as well. Moreover, the
major banks tend to be more interconnected with foreign banks and smaller Australian-
owned banks tend to be more interconnected with credit unions and building societies, as
Fig. 6.19 demonstrates. In the context of our concept the major banks would represent
the core; the major part of the foreign banks, credit unions and building societies, which
are lowly interconnected would build the periphery, and the smaller Australian-owned
banks together with the remaining banks would constitute the part of the semi-periphery.
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Figure 6.19: Australian banking system including credit unions and building societies.
Source: Tellez (2012) in [62], Reserve Bank of Australia, Bulletin June Quarter 2013
Interconnectedness within the bank group and connectivity to other banks as well as
external and interbank exposure are the group specific properties which we use for dis-
tinction between core, periphery and semi-periphery. With regard to external exposure,
core banks exhibit higher external credit volume on average than each of the periphery
and the semi-periphery banks. Periphery banks have the smallest external exposure on
average. This external exposure difference is exogenously given in the model. In terms of
interbank linkages, core banks are extremely interconnected, highly connected with the
periphery and also connected with other banks, while periphery banks are disconnected
within the periphery, highly interconnected with the core banks and also linked to other,
semi-periphery banks. The values of in- and out-degrees and further connectivity param-
eter for each bank group are endogenous and depend, among other factors, on the size of
each group in the network. As a result of external exposure differences and specific inter-
bank linkage properties of the mentioned bank groups, significant differences in interbank
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exposure especially between core and periphery will be observed. More formal definitions
of core, periphery and semi-periphery are presented in section 2.3.5.
Taking into account the multi-linkage network structure of the ABN-model, in which
any two banks can be connected via multiple links, we developed an algorithm to recon-
struct the random network to the (extended) core periphery network with the described
characteristics under the condition that other properties of the network, like number of
active links and external credit volume, remain unchanged. This condition is necessary in
order to separate the effects of the network structure and to make the results of simulation
experiments comparable. For details, we refer to section 2.3.5.
The main steps of the core-periphery formation procedure can be summarized as follows:
1. redistribute external assets between banks in the network to get bank groups with
different size on average after the initial asset allocation (a suitable method here be-
cause of the random distribution of the assets between banks in the model initially)
2. determine relationships between banks by changing the initial random matrices for
credit and investment linkages Rcb and R
i
b according to the predefined characteristics
of bank groups.
The presented procedure requires the following exogenous parameters, which will be
stressed in the simulation analyses:
• ψ1 and ψ2 - fractions of core and periphery banks,
• ξ - percentage of external assets to be reallocated from periphery to the core banks.
As result of the mentioned procedure the new network structure is obtained, as shown
stepwise in the example in Fig. 6.20 to Fig. 6.22, where 30% of banks (with indices
6.4 Heterogeneity 147
71-100) belong to the periphery and 10% (indices 1-10) of banks are the part of the core.
On the left hand side the initial lending relationships according to the random matrix
Rcb are pictured, while the figure on the right side shows the new structure for interbank
credit links. It can be seen, that the relationships within the periphery do not exist any
more, while the core is higher interconnected and more intensively linked to the periphery.
The structure of the semi-periphery remains nearly untouched.1 Fig. 6.21 pictures the
redistribution of the external credit exposure from periphery to core banks.2 Fig. 6.22
shows weighted lending links after the core-periphery formation process described above.
It is obvious that core banks have significantly higher refinancing needs due to their higher
volume of external credit exposure, which should be covered by other banks’ resources
connected to them via lending links and by external deposits.
6.4.4 Simulation results
In this section we study the impact of the network structure in terms of heterogeneity of
banks with respect to the individual interbank lending preferences and the initial amount
of external debts. We conduct our research on potential effects of the network structure
on the resilience of the banking system. To separate single effects we analyse the dif-
ferences between the core and the periphery in the complete core-periphery network as
defined above, as well as in the networks in which the core periphery properties have been
implemented in part. We define three groups of simulation experiments to separate the
core-periphery properties. The first group provides only the differences in the size of the
1”Nearly” untouched because only some links of the semi-periphery have been redistributed to the
core to make it completely interconnected. See more in the description of the core formation procedure
in section 2.3.5.
2Different credit volumes of external segments as well as their different connectivity degrees to banks
are quite well pronounced in the presented network to demonstrate a heterogeneity of the network struc-
ture . Segment one, for example, is connected to many banks but characterized by a relatively small
credit volume in total, while segment six is the largest borrower, but its claims relate to a relatively
small number of banks. The first of both segments can be understood as a private borrower market,
while the later can be compared with the shipping market, for example. It can be clearly seen that the
implemented redistribution of external assets changes neither the external credit volume nor the number
of connected banks in total or for each segment.
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Figure 6.20: Example: Interbank lending relationships in a random network (left) and in the
derived core-periphery network (right).
Parameter setting: N = 100, pc = 0.1, ψ1 = 0.1 and ψ2 = 0.3.
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Figure 6.21: Example: External lending in a random network (left) and in the derived core-
periphery network (right).
Source: N = 100, pc = 0.1, pi = 0.1, ψ1 = 0.1 and ψ2 = 0.3 , ξ = 0.5. For the remaining
parameters please refer to Tables A.1 to A.3 in the appendix (A.1.1).
external credit exposure between core and periphery banks (exposure difference). The
second group considers only the difference in the connectivity (structural difference). The
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Figure 6.22: Example: Final (wighted) interbank lending structure.
Parameter setting: see Fig. 6.21.
third type includes both these characteristics (core-periphery network).
We illustrate the selected simulation results graphically considering an idiosyncratic initial
shock (single external segment default) for various levels of banks capitalization. We
assume that 10% of banks belong to the core, while 50% are part of the periphery, and
80% of external debts of the periphery are redistributed to core banks: ψ1 = 0.1, ψ2 = 0.5
and ξ = 0.8.
The results of the mentioned simulation experiments are pictured in Fig. 6.23. In addition,
two further constellations with the same risk parameter setting will be considered here: a
random and a homogeneous (and completely interconnected) network. It is obvious that
the difference in the external credit amount between core and periphery banks shows a
significantly positive influence on the stability of the system for low capital levels compared
to the random network, while for higher equity rates, negative effects can be obtained.
We explain these effects by a higher heterogeneity degree of the network if substantial
exposure differences between banks exist. The increase of the heterogeneity in the banking
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system displays the following properties: higher stability of the system for substantially
higher shocks or lower capitalization of banks, i.e. the total collapse of the system becomes
less likely; higher susceptibility for less dramatic shocks or better capital endowment of
the banking system – bankruptcies of banks are more likely than in less heterogeneous
systems. This can be clearly seen when comparing the green line presenting the completely
homogeneous network structure with other lines in Fig. 6.23.
Similar findings had been made by Eboli (2013) in [22], where the author investigated the
relation between the shape of financial networks and the share of defaulting agents. Eboli
(2013) characterized the first and the final contagion thresholds as the value of the small-
est shock inducing at least one default and the value of the smallest shock inducing the
total systemic collapse, respectively. He demonstrated that the first and the final thresh-
olds coincide in complete networks, which can be also seen in Fig. 6.23 with regard to the
equity ratio, considering the homogeneous network presented by the green line. However,
the differences in default rates of a core-periphery network and the random network are
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Figure 6.23: Impact of network structure on the banking system stability in the case of idiosyn-
cratic shocks, high risk appetite of banks and absence of liquidity risk (τ = 0).
Parameter setting: ψ1 = 0.1, ψ2 = 0.5, ξ = 0.8 if exposure difference exists (ξ = 0 otherwise),
ζ = 0.1. For the remaining parameters please refer to Tables A.1 to A.3 in the appendix A.1.1.
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significantly less pronounced than such differences between a core-periphery network and
the homogeneous network because of the already quite heterogenous structure of the ran-
dom network in the model. Although the implementation of the core-periphery properties
in the random but heterogenous network enhances its heterogeneity, the effects are less
impressive.
Let us take a look at networks, in which only structural differences with regard to the
interbank links exist, and this without any systematic differences in external lending ex-
posure between the core and peripheral banks with ξ = 0 (Fig. 6.23, pink line). A positive
impact of such structural differences on the resilience of banks compared to the random
networks (black line) can be observed for less capitalized systems, even if this effect is
smaller than the effect of the difference in the external lending exposure (blue line). Core-
periphery differences in the interbank linkage structure cause a higher concentration of
interbank claims and investments compared to the random network, which will be shown
below in Fig. 6.31, increasing the heterogeneity of the network, which explains the ob-
tained result. For better capitalized banks only small negative effects of pure structural
differences compared to the random network have been observed.
From the acquired results it can be inferred that core periphery linkage structure tends
to have positive impact on the systemic stability of low capitalized systems without sub-
stantial increase of the systemic risk in better capitalized systems, while higher concen-
tration of the external exposure may stabilize lower capitalized networks but tends to
make higher capitalized systems more vulnerable against shocks. The total impact of the
core-periphery network properties consists of the partially opposite effects and tends to
be rather positive for core banks if the external difference is pronounced. Otherwise the
negative effect of contagion and riskier exposure structure could predominate, in partic-
ular for lower equity ratios or higher shocks.
To analyze the impact on the vulnerability of core, periphery and semi-periphery banks,
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let us look at the following results. Fig. 6.24 - 6.25 show final and immediate default
rates, respectively, as results of various bank capitalization for scenarios with liquidity
risk (on the left) and without possibility of deposit withdrawals (on the right). It can be
seen that the existence of the core periphery structure and so the higher heterogeneity
can be significant for the individual bank clusters: core, periphery and semi-periphery.
Furthermore, we can see that resistance of banks significantly depends not only on network
properties of the banking system but also on its capitalization level or magnitude of the
initial shock: core banks are generally better off if significant exposure differences exist.
If there are only differences in the interbank linkage structure between the core and
the periphery, core banks are significantly more vulnerable than periphery banks in low
capitalized banking systems. This vulnerability corresponds to the higher contagion risk of
significantly higher connected core banks on the one hand, and higher connectivity of core
banks via investment links on the other. This can be obtained by the immediate default
rates of banks for the same scenarios as before, pictured in 6.25, which demonstrates the
default rates of banks before contagion takes place. Even without contagion, core banks
become bankrupt more often than other if capitalization of the system is sufficiently low.
This effect could disappear if banks tend to invest in less risky assets.
The high connectivity of core banks via investment links increases the default risk of core
banks as long as increasing investments increase the degree of risk of their assets and
sufficient level of capital adequacy is not ensured. The negative effect of increasing high-
risk investments become smaller or disappears with enhanced capital requirements. In
such a case investments will stabilize the shareholder banks against moderate idiosyncratic
shocks due to the higher (risk adjusted) capital requirements, since the riskier banks are
significantly better capitalized in absolute terms. In the case of substantially higher
shocks or a lower capitalization level, riskier assets tend to cause higher default rates
of core banks compared to other banks because of a higher affectedness by the initial
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distress. We demonstrate this effect in Figures 6.26 and 6.27. The higher risk of banks is
connected to the exclusive investments of banks in the most risky CDO-Tranches B and
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Figure 6.24: Bank defaults in CP-networks with different properties in the case of idiosyncratic
shocks, high risk appetite of banks with or without liquidity risk related to withdrawal of deposits
(WD with τ = 0.1 (left) or no WD with τ = 0 (right)).
Parameter setting: ψ1 = 0.1, ψ2 = 0.5, ξ = 0.8 if exposure difference exists and ξ = 0 otherwise,
ζ = 0.1. For the remaining parameters please refer to Tables A.1 to A.3 in the appendix A.1.1.
154 CHAPTER 6. NETWORK STRUCTURE
C and in the case of the lower risk banks solely hold CB and the CDO Tranche A, see
Tab. 6.1.
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Figure 6.25: Immediate bank defaults in CP-networks in the case of idiosyncratic shocks, high
risk appetite of banks with or without liquidity risk related to withdrawal of deposits (WD with
τ = 0.1 left or no WD with τ = 0 right).
Parameter setting: see Fig. 6.24.
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Bank shares of investments CB Tranche A Tranche B Tranche C
βCB, βCDOt (t ∈ T ) βCB βCDOA βCDOB βCDOC
Low risk of banks 1 1 0 0
High risk of banks 0 0 1 1
Table 6.1: Tranche-specific (CB and CDO) parameters and their benchmark values specified
for modified scenarios (connectivity experiments).
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Figure 6.26: Resilience of banks in relation to the core-periphery exposure difference related to
ξ in the case of idiosyncratic shocks without liquidity risk (absence of withdrawal of deposits,
τ = 0) with higher (left) and lower risk of banks (right).
Parameter setting: ψ1 = 0.1, ψ2 = 0.5, ζ = 0.1, γ = 3%. For the remaining parameters please
refer to Tables A.1 and A.2 in the appendix A.1.1.
For very low differences in external exposure, core banks tend to fail more often than other
banks in the system with low capitalization, regardless of risk level of their investments,
 0
 20
 40
 60
 80
 100
 0  0.1  0.2  0.3  0.4  0.5  0.6  0.7  0.8  0.9
de
fa
ul
t r
at
e
fraction of redistributed external loans
Immediate Bank Defaults vs. Core-Periphery Difference
Total Core Periphery Other
 0
 20
 40
 60
 80
 100
 0  0.1  0.2  0.3  0.4  0.5  0.6  0.7  0.8  0.9
de
fa
ul
t r
at
e
fraction of redistributed external loans
Immediate Bank Defaults vs. Core-Periphery Difference
Total Core Periphery Other
Figure 6.27: Direct defaults of banks (before contagion) in relation to the core-periphery expo-
sure difference related to ξ in the case of idiosyncratic shocks without liquidity risk (absence of
withdrawal of deposits, τ = 0) with higher (left) and lower risk of banks (right).
Parameter setting: ψ1 = 0.1, ψ2 = 0.5, ζ = 0.1, γ = 0.03. For the remaining parameters please
refer to Tables A.1 and A.2 in the appendix A.1.1.
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which can be explained above all by higher contagion of core banks via interbank lending
links. It can be also seen, that even before contagion processes start, default rates of core
banks are higher if bank investments are sufficiently risky (Fig. 6.27 on the left). Even
higher differences in bank default rates between a core and a periphery can be observed
with lower capital rate (Fig. 6.25 middle right). For a lower risk of banks or high capital
levels, the difference in immediate default rates between core banks and others is very
small or none at all, as shown in Fig. 6.27 on the right. Please note, that a relatively
low equity quote is assumed for these simulation experiments. In such a case defaults of
the core banks decrease with increasing difference in external credit exposure between the
core and the periphery, as illustrated in Fig. 6.26.
The figures above indicate a considerable importance in the difference between the core
and periphery regarding the amount of the external credit exposure. We would like to
take a closer look at this property of core-periphery networks. The understanding of its
impact is not a trivial matter, because of the externalities connected to the distribution of
the loans to externals among banks. First of all, we would like to emphasise the changes
in the network structure connected to an increase of external loans in the core as a result
of redistribution of them from the periphery.
Increasing redistribution of the external lending exposure from the periphery to core banks
implies the following changes in the system:
1. Increasing / decreasing external lending by the core / periphery and thus increasing
concentration of the external credit exposure will be expected, which can be seen in
Fig. 6.28.
2. Increasing / decreasing origination of CBs and CDOs by core / periphery banks,
as a result of changes in the external lending exposure and related securitization of
loans by banks. This is determined by formula [2.10], explained in section 2.2.5.
3. Decreasing interbank lending of core banks and an increasing interbank lending of
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other banks to the core because of increasing refinancing needs of core banks, which
is determined by formula [2.7] in section 2.2.5. As a result, increasing concentration
of the interbank lending is expected if there are not structural differences related to
the connectivity degrees of banks. Increasing interbank lending of a small number of
banks connected to the core will be observed. But decreasing concentration can be
expected if structural differences exist, because of the high connectivity of the core
via lending links. Higher connectivity of the core implies broader diversification of
lender banks connected to the core banks and smaller weighting of these connections.
Remember, that all initial interbank loans to any bank are at the same amounts
for all its lenders by the model assumption related to formula [2.10]. The higher
the refinancing needs of core banks, the higher the share of interbank loans which
are more broadly distributed among banks. In both cases interbank loans of core
banks decrease on average with exposure difference to the periphery banks if the
total amount of lending is fixed. This is explained by decreasing refinancing needs of
other banks in the system. Interbank lending of periphery banks increases instead.
However, in the case of higher connectivity of the core, decreasing interbank lending
of core banks tends to reduce the differences between banks and so the concentration
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Figure 6.28: Loans to the external sector in bank balances on average of the peer-group (core,
periphery, semi-periphery or other and the banking system as whole) via core-periphery exposure
difference related to ξ. Similar results in both cases: with structural difference (left) and without
structural difference (right).
Parameter setting: ψ1 = 0.1, ψ2 = 0.5, ζ = 0.1. For the remaining parameters please refer to
Tables A.1 to A.3 in the appendix A.1.1.
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Figure 6.29: Interbank loans in bank balances on average of the peer-group (core, periphery,
semi-periphery or other and the banking system as whole) in relation to the core-periphery ex-
posure difference related to ξ in the case of the structural difference (left) and without structural
difference (right).
Parameter setting: see Fig. 6.28.
of the interbank lending. Fig. 6.29 left shows the relation between the average
interbank loans and the fraction of external loans redistributed from the periphery
to the core if structural differences and therefore the higher connectivity of core
banks exist. The graph on the right demonstrates the results of similar experiments,
given that there are not structural differences between the bank clusters - all banks
are interconnected with the same probability. Even if interbank loans of core banks
decrease with the external exposure difference between the core and the periphery
again here, the concentration of interbank lending increases because of the increasing
heterogeneity of banks related to interbank lending.
4. Decreasing investments of core banks in assets, that are originated by other banks
and increasing investments of other banks, which are shown in Fig. 6.30 and fol-
low the similar argumentation as above with regard to the increasing amount of
securitized external loans instead of refinancing needs of core banks. As a result,
decreasing concentration of interbank investments would be expected if structural
differences exist.
To illustrate the relationship between the allocation of external credit exposure in the
system and heterogeneity of the network we will add some further analyses. We use the
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Herfindahl index (also known as Herfindahl – Hirschman Index, or HHI) as an indicator
of the economical concentration among banks to support the explanation of the impact of
the core periphery properties on the financial system stability. We focus on the interbank
and external loans, respectively, and their distribution between banks:
HHIe =
∑
i∈N (c
e
i )
2
(
∑
i∈N c
e
i )
2
and HHIb =
∑
i∈N (c
b
i)
2
(
∑
i∈N c
b
i)
2
,
where ei and bi are the external and interbank loans of bank i = 1, . . . , N in the network,
respectively, and N is the number of banks.
We adopt the normalized Herfindahl index, which ranges from 1/N to one and is computed
as
HHI∗e =
(HHIe − 1/N)
1− 1/N and HHI
∗
b =
(HHIb − 1/N)
1− 1/N
for external and interbank loans, respectively.
Fig. 6.31 shows the concentration of external and interbank lending depending on the
exposure difference between the core and the periphery determined by ξ. It is obvious
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Figure 6.30: Interbank investments in bank balances on average of the peer-group (core, periph-
ery, semi-periphery or other and the banking system as whole) in relation to the core-periphery
exposure difference related to ξ in the case of the structural difference (left) and without struc-
tural difference (right).
Parameter setting: see Fig. 6.28.
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that the concentration of the external lending HHI∗e increases with increasing external
exposure difference, regardless of the existence of differences in the interbank relation-
ships in the system. However, the concentration of the interbank lending HHI∗b increases
with increasing exposure concentration only if interbank lending links are randomly dis-
tributed, while in the case of a core-periphery network the concentration of the interbank
lending decreases. As we discussed above, if all banks are interconnected with the same
probability and core banks grow with respect to their external lending, which induces
their refinancing needs, the interbank lending of banks which are connected to the core
and subsequently the concentration of the interbank lending increases. In a typical core-
periphery network, core banks are more strongly connected than other banks. Increasing
refinancing needs of core banks will also increase the amount of interbank loans to core
banks, which will be more widely distributed among banks in the system than previous
levels of loans to periphery banks. The effect is stronger the larger the redistributed
external credit exposure from the periphery to the core is. Hence, the concentration of
the interbank lending will decrease with an increasing difference between the core and
periphery in core periphery-networks.
We now want to show the impact of the growing external exposure difference between
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Figure 6.31: Normalized Herfindahl – Hirschman Index for various levels of external exposure
difference between core and periphery banks, related to ξ = 0 to ξ = 0.9: HHI∗e (left) and
HHI∗b (right).
Parameter setting: see Fig. 6.28.
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the core and the periphery on the resilience of the banks. As before this difference is
expressed as a fraction of external loans ξ which is redistributed from periphery banks
to the core. We vary ξ between 0 and 0.9 and fix the core and periphery fractions by
ψ1 = 0.1, ψ2 = 0.5 to study the impact on resilience of banking systems with different
levels of capitalization with the equity rate of banks γ = 8% or γ = 4%.
Fig. 6.32 presents the results of these simulation experiments, showing the relation be-
tween the difference in the external lending exposure and bank defaults in the clusters.
Without loss of generality, we will focus on cases where liquidity risk does not exist. As
before, we will look at a typical core-periphery network structure characterized by a highly
interconnected core and a disconnected periphery, plotted in (a) and (b), as well as at the
banking systems with randomly distributed interbank linkages in (c) and (d). Plots (a)
and (c) show average default rates for lower capitalized banking systems, while (b) and
(d) picture results of the same experiments but for better capitalized banks.
As before, we can see different effects for lower and better capitalized banking systems.
Moreover, we can observe different consequences of the external credit exposure allocation
for single banking groups and also the effects on the total system stability, which can be
positive or negative.
In Fig. 6.32 (a), which shows simulation results for a low equity rate and structural
differences between the core and periphery, we observe higher defaults of core banks
compared to the periphery and semi-periphery if differences in external lending are suf-
ficiently small. We have already considered this effect above and explained it by risky
investments and higher contagion risk of core banks via interbank lending links, which
have significantly negative effects on the resilience of core banks in the case of low capital
requirements. For low equity rates, increasing external lending of core banks will improve
their resilience, which is connected to their decreasing interbank lending reducing the risk
of contagion (Fig. 6.32 (a) and (c)). For higher equity rates, contagion is not significant
and structural differences have a small positive effect on the resilience of core banks be-
162 CHAPTER 6. NETWORK STRUCTURE
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
de
fa
ul
t r
at
e
(a) (b)
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
fraction of redistributed external loans
(c)
all banks
core
periphery
other
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
(d)
Figure 6.32: Resilience of the bank groups (core, periphery, semi-periphery or other and the
banking system as whole) against idiosyncratic shocks without liquidity risk (absence of with-
drawal of deposits, τ = 0) in relation to the core-periphery exposure difference related to ξ: (a)
structural difference, γ = 4%; (b) structural difference, γ = 8%; (c) no structural difference,
γ = 4%; (d) no structural difference, γ = 8%.
Parameter setting: ψ1 = 0.1, ψ2 = 0.5, ζ = 0.1. For the remaining parameters please refer to
Tables A.1 to A.3 in the appendix A.1.1.
cause of more interbank loans, which serve to increase the required equity of banks but
stay safe after the shocks. But one can also see that the advantage of core banks slightly
decreases with an increasing external exposure difference, which can be explained by a
decreasing interbank lending of core banks, see Fig. 6.32 (b) and (d).
Increasing differences in the external exposure have smaller, but mostly opposite impacts
on the resilience of the periphery banks. However, the high vulnerability of core banks
may weaken the periphery by contagion and a rise in the total defaults in the banking
system, as can be seen in Fig. 6.32 (d). The total effect on the systemic stability will be
negative, if contagion effects outweigh the advantages of the periphery banks in terms of
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being initially less affected by the external credit defaults. And vice versa, increasing vul-
nerability of core banks may positively affect the resilience of the total financial system,
reducing the total default rate of banks. We observed again that, if the contagion risk is
low, banks with higher interbank loans are more stable. If the contagion risk is high, this
advantage disappears.
Remark: In addition to the analyses discussed above, we also studied the impact of
systematic initial shocks using the same network characteristics as before. Generally, we
did not find such pronounced effects as in the case of idiosyncratic shocks.
Conclusion: We can summarize that more heterogeneity in banking systems has sta-
bilizing effects on low capitalized systems and may have a negative effect on the banking
stability if banks are better capitalized or shocks are sufficiently small. A core periph-
ery structure presents two major differences compared to the random network. Firstly,
the external credit exposure is more concentrated: core banks do more or larger lending
deals. Secondly, the interbank lending is generally more concentrated in complete (includ-
ing structural differences) core-periphery networks compared to the random or incomplete
(without structural differences) networks because of the intermediary role of core banks.
But the concentration of the interbank lending is decreasing with increasing exposure
differences between core and periphery if structural differences with regard to the inter-
bank relationships exist. These properties may have different impacts on the systemic
stability and on the resilience of single bank groups, depending on the capitalization level
of the banking system or intensity and concentration of the initial shock. Furthermore,
core banks tend to be more stable, while periphery banks are more prone to shocks in
core-periphery networks if significant differences between the core and periphery exist.
Chapter 7
Loss of confidence and liquidity risk
The present chapter primarily has its focus on the effects of loss of confidence in the
banking system, defined by an increase of creditor and depositor intolerance for under-
capitalization of banks. The impact of deposit withdrawal in conjunction with the initial
shock properties as well as with the capitalization of banks and their risk appetite has
been already analyzed in Chapters 4 and 5, respectively. Chapter 6 has treated the with-
drawal risk in connection with such banking system properties like network structure and
connectivity. Because of the close link between confidence, regulatory capital (minimum
requirements) and bank equity level in order to trigger deposit withdrawal, we will con-
sider the interplay of these factors in Chapter 8. Furthermore, we will turn to look at how
the discovered effects will be influenced by the willingness of the central bank to support
the banking system in Chapter 9.
7.1 Confidence in banks
One of the important properties of the financial network environment is the confidence
in the banking system. A coherent, effective and transparent set of laws which ensure
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the respect of property rights and the operation of a functioning bankruptcy regime, as
well as certainty and effectiveness of safeguards and guarantees are of key importance for
investor and creditor protections and thus for the confidence in the banking system.
Numerous papers have established that countries with better functioning legal institu-
tions and effective protection of investor and creditor rights enjoy better developed and
more stable financial markets. According to the widespread belief in academic and polit-
ical circles, the depth of the 2007-09 financial crisis, its longevity and its impacts on the
real economy resulted from an erosion of confidence, see [21].
E. Perotti and E. Feijen (2005) addressed the question of investor protection in [26]
and demonstrated that, under weak regulatory institutions, financial liberalization, which
should free financial institutions from direct political control and lead to better access of
firms to finance, is often followed by financial crises. The authors explained this conclusion
by poor investor rights, which may induce ex post incentives to default for firms requiring
more external finance and would cause investors to refuse new project financing or to exit
from ongoing projects after an external shock.
A.J. Galindo and A. Micco (2007) focused on creditor protection in [34] and studied the
relationship between creditor protection and the response of credit to external shocks
by using a panel constructed gathering information between 1990 and 2004 for a broad
set of countries. The authors detected empirical support for the idea that weak creditor
protection makes credit markets more volatile, which means that poor creditor protections
induce an overreaction of credit markets to exogenous shocks. They showed, for example,
that in countries with a common law tradition, characterized by high creditor protection
and good contract enforcement, the elasticity of credit to external shocks is half of that
in other economies.
M. Dailami and P. Masson (2009) underlined the connection between the willingness of
investors to allocate assets to equities, and their risk appetite and confidence in [16]. The
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authors postulated four dimensions of investor confidence: market volatility, market per-
formance, macroeconomic news, and government responses. According to them, investor
psychology is strongly influenced by volatility in the marketplace, which signals uncer-
tainty and risk aversion. Moreover, investor confidence is related to the performance of
their investments, as measured by wealth creation or destruction. Furthermore, investors
typically look at current economic fundamentals and predictions concerning the future
state of the economy and pay close attention to the stance of government policy makers
and continually assess the credibility of their responses, see [16].
The mentioned studies underpin that the occurrence or even the reasonable possibility
of a financial crisis will naturally lead to contraction in credit and willingness to invest.
However, this effect is not in the scope of the present work.
The main focus of the present research is creditor confidence in banks in connection
to the deposit withdrawal risk and the question, how the regulatory requirements and
central bank policy maintain financial stability and confidence in banks.
7.2 Liquidity risk
The financial crisis, that began in 2007, was in essence a collapse in confidence, as sum-
marized by Stefan Ingves during the 15th Annual Convention of the Global Association
of Risk Professionals in New York (2014) 1. Starting from the real estate market in the
USA, the financial turmoil spread rapidly beyond the United State’s borders. Shortly
after the outbreak of the crisis, the interbank market froze nearly completely. Banks
stopped giving short-term loans on the interbank market activating a further spiral of
liquidity problems.
1see ”Restoring confidence in banks” in ”Keynote address to the 15th Annual Convention of the Global
Association of Risk Professionals” in New York, 4 March 2014.
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At this point, it would be appropriate to define the term ”liquidity”. In accordance
with M. Dailami and P. Masson (2009), the term liquidity has two principal meanings:
one of them is the global liquidity measure capturing the volume of funds available for in-
vestment. Another meaning is the ease and quickness with which assets can be converted
to cash. Liquidity in this sense has decreased dramatically for all except government se-
curities during the financial crisis, which started in 2007, in contrast to the global volume
of funds, see [16]. The liquidity term in the sense of the amount of highly liquid assets is
connected to liquidity problems to be studied here.
Here, we will focus on creditor and depositor confidence, the loss of which would lead
to withdrawal of liquidity. In this way, we try to pay the necessary amount of attention to
the role of the borrowed capital here. To model the loss of confidence we use one additional
exogenous parameter ’intolerance of bank undercapitalization’, hereinafter referred to as
the ’intolerance’, that characterizes a degree of mistrust in the safeguards of the banking
system. The intolerance is connected to the undercapitalization degree of banks. Thus,
the intolerance τ is defined as a threshold for the quotient of individual bank capital ratio
γi and the regulatory capital ratio γ
r. If the equity ratio of any bank falls so that
γi
γr
≤ τ ,
externals and other banks would withdraw their funds from this undercapitalized bank.
In this way the withdrawal risk is also connected to the regulatory capital requirements,
which serve as an orientation for the depositors, thinking that the regulations define the
appropriate benchmarks and stability criteria. Please note, that banks are allowed in the
model to have a ’thin capitalization’ in the short term. There is no need to wind up the
undercapitalized banks immediately. For details on the implementation of the withdrawal
risk and the according dynamic processes we refer to the description in section 2.3.4.
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7.3 Simulation results
Impact of withdrawals for each subject of the economy is not clear because of the ac-
cumulation of several effects. On the one hand, withdrawals of deposits could prevent
externals and banks from losing their funds on deposit. But, on the other hand, with-
drawals may cause serious liquidity problems to the affected banks and their need to sell
assets. This option, in turn, allows the better capitalized banks to reap profits buying the
assets at fire-sale prices. Thereby, fire-sale prices will largely depend on the demand for
the fire-sale assets, which in turn is limited by capital restrictions. In addition, central
banks or other supporting institutions may play an important role in the price formation
process. In particular, the arrangements of the central bank for providing the suddenly
lacking liquidity or buying the excess assets may have significant implications.
In the following we investigate the impact of intolerance for bank undercapitalization
and thus of confidence in the banking system on losses to externals and banks as well
as the resilience of the banking system. In order to keep the analysis as simple as pos-
sible and to avoid a mixing of effects, we will abstain from including into the analysis
the external credit decline as a reaction on the financial turmoil. So, we will keep the
initial external credit volume constant and allow its deterioration only by the initial shock.
Resilience of the bank system
We observe, in general, that the number of defaults rises with an increasing intolerance,
provided that the intolerance is high enough to trigger withdrawal of deposits, see Fig.
7.1. The increase of bank defaults is stronger if the debtors are less tolerant. The default
curves follow a similar course as the according external loss curves. Note, that similar to
external losses, bank defaults after deposits withdrawal can not be lower than in similar
scenarios but without liquidity risk.
In addition, we note that the impact of the intolerance is highly dependent on the initial
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Figure 7.1: Resilience of the bank system in relation to the intolerance for capital gap of banks
τ and initial bank capitalization γ in the case of high concentration of shocks and high risk
appetite of banks (NW 01). The (same) results are presented taking into consideration two
different spatial perspectives.
Parameter setting: see Tables A.1 to A.3 in the appendix A.1.1.
capitalization of banks. The influence of the intolerance is particularly high for some
medium equity levels. The level of the intolerance does not play a significant role if the
initial equity is high compared to the initial shock and likewise, if the equity is very low
or the initial shock is very high, so that the banking system would collapse completely,
regardless of the level of intolerance. However, the level of the initial equity rate, which
is small enough to cause withdrawal, increases with increasing intolerance.
Bank losses:
Fig. 7.2 pictures the cumulated losses within the banking system depending on the level
of the intolerance. It can be observed that bank losses increase with increasing intoler-
ance if withdrawals can be triggered. Withdrawal of deposits depends not only on the
intolerance level, but also on the level on the initial bank capitalization as well as on the
intensity and allocation of the initial shock across the system. Furthermore, the influence
of intolerance is especially high at certain medium equity levels. Moreover, the interval of
equity in which withdrawals occur becomes broader with the intolerance becoming higher.
This result emphasizes that higher intolerance requires a higher bank capitalization level
to make the banking system more resistant against withdrawals. The following analysis
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Figure 7.2: Cumulated bank losses in relation to the intolerance for capital gap of banks τ and
initial bank capitalization γ for high concentration of shocks, high risk appetite of banks and
deposit withdrawals (NW 01). The (same) results are presented taking into consideration two
different spatial perspectives.
Parameter setting: see Fig. 7.1.
of the system resistance confirm this statement.
External losses:
As before we are using the simulation engine, implementing the risk of withdrawals after
the first absorption of the initial shock is completed. Therefore, it is not surprising that,
compared to the cases in which no withdrawals are possible (intolerance level is equal
to zero), the total external losses should be higher or remain at the same level after
withdrawals occur, see Fig. 7.3.
We observe that external losses increase with increasing intolerance, provided that the
intolerance is high enough to trigger withdrawal of deposits, and remain constant at a
sufficiently high level of intolerance (very strong bank run, total bankruptcy). We see
that this increase is slight if the intolerance is low; and it is very strong if the intolerance
is sufficiently high but not enough to trigger the total collapse of the banking system. If
banks are still well capitalized, withdrawals are averted or do not have any influence on
externals. It is also possible that withdrawals do not lead to external losses. Thereby,
the additional losses to banks, caused through fire-sales, can be completely covered by
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Figure 7.3: External losses in relation to the intolerance for capital gap of banks τ and initial
bank capitalization γ for high concentration of shocks and high risk appetite of banks with
the possibility of deposit withdrawals (NW 01). The (same) results are presented taking into
consideration two different spatial perspectives.
Parameter setting: see Fig. 7.1.
the banking system. But, at a sufficiently high level of intolerance, external losses would
increase disproportionately strongly compared to the further increase of the intolerance,
which means that a marginal loss of confidence would lead to the heavily growing losses
to the external segment, if the confidence has been already considerably damaged.
Conclusion:
If banks are still well capitalized after the shock, withdrawals are averted, whatever the
level of intolerance is. At a sufficiently high level of intolerance, in other words if the
confidence has been already considerably damaged, the negative impact of withdrawals
would increase disproportionately strongly compared to the further increase of intoler-
ance, which means that a marginal loss of confidence would lead to heavily growing losses
to banks and externals and destabilize the banking system substantially.
One interesting aspect is here, that the more rigorous the capital regulations are, the
stronger this effect will be. In contrast, central bank support could positively counteract,
stabilizing the banking system. Both mentioned effects will be discussed later. Fur-
thermore, the effects of deposit withdrawal risk can be influenced not only by capital
regulations, willingness of the central bank to support the banking system or the initial
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bank capitalization, but also by the network structure, intensity and distribution of shocks
and not least by the risk appetite of banks and externals.
Furthermore, the interval of equity values, in which withdrawals occur, grows with in-
creasing intolerance against undercapitalization of banks. This result emphasizes that
higher intolerance requires higher bank capitalization level to make the banking system
more resistant against withdrawals.
It should be mentioned here, that despite the multiplex analysis we had implemented
in the simulation engine, we believe that parameter settings and network topology have
a considerable influence on structural loss trends in the economy. It cannot be excluded,
for example, that cumulated bank losses decrease with increasing intolerance for some
parameter constellations. It could be possible that in the low interconnected system, only
some banks which are not well connected to others get affected after a strong idiosyncratic
initial shock is very concentrated. In this case, only a few banks would run into trouble,
significantly transmitting their losses to externals. Buying assets at fire-sale prices banks
would reap profits, which could be higher than the losses covered by capital of defaulted
banks. In such a hypothetical case the banking system as a whole may face lower losses
with increasing intolerance.
Chapter 8
Capital adequacy
Governments may influence the confidence of investors in many ways: through macroeco-
nomic and regulatory policy as well as through other legislative actions that can strengthen
transparency and enhance corporate financial disclosure and integrity, see [16].
Basel III has added additional safeguards as an answer to the financial crisis started
in 2007. Particularly, the revised capital requirements should help to restore confidence
in banks by attaching greater importance to core capital, which serves as a buffer for
the real economy against financial distress. Especially worthy of mention here are the
regulations in order to strengthen the quality of risk-based capital ratio and to prescribe
additional capital for institutions of systemic importance. Furthermore, the increase of
requirements on leverage has been established, characterized by the introduction of a non
risk-based leverage ratio serving as a complement and a constructive corrective to the
risk-based capital requirement. Moreover, the international standards for bank liquidity
and funding in the shape of the Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) and the Net Stable
Funding Ratio (NSFR) have been introduced.
The mentioned steps are in line with the principles of requiring higher capital for activi-
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ties of greater risk and a stable funding concept. All in all, they should serve to stabilize
the financial system by increasing transparency and by restoring and solidifying investor,
creditor and market confidence in the banking system. The mentioned structures and re-
quirements, which would increase transparency and confidence in banks, are of particular
interest in the presented work. The impact of liquidity endowment will be treated in the
subsequent chapter.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 8.1 deals with the impact of the regulatory
capital restrictions for minimum bank capitalization. Section 8.2 analyzes the implica-
tions of the more stringent capital requirements and of a capital surcharge for systemically
important banks, in particular.
8.1 Impact of the regulatory capital restrictions
As noted in the previous section, the equity level of banks depends on the willingness of
investors to provide the equity and is connected to the confidence in the banking system.
But, to a much higher degree the bank capitalization level is linked to the regulatory
minimum capital requirements.
Theoretical papers about how banks react to capital requirements often demonstrate
contradicting results because of the high sensitivity to the underlying assumptions. Not
least, for that reason, a substantial number of empirical work has tried to evaluate the
impact of capital requirements on bank behavior over the recent decades, see [36]. Var-
ious studies proved that minimum capital requirements significantly affect capital and
risk levels in banking systems. The researchers found that reactions of banks differ in
terms of adjusting their capital ratios primarily through capital or risk, or by using both
instruments. However, it should be added that the different statements are results of
analyses of various banking systems. The differences can be explained, for example, by
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different access to capital and a developed market for securitization and credit derivatives.
While in the 90s US banks seemed to adjust capital and risk assets in order to meet the
capital regulation, UK and Swiss banks seemed to exclusively adjust their capital, see
Heid, Porath and Stolz(2003) in [36], Aggarwal and Jacques (1998) in [2], Rime (2001) in
[58] and Van Roy (2005) in [60].
Heid, Porath and Stolz (2003) examined in [36] the impact of capital requirements on
capital and risk levels of German savings banks. They found evidence that banks’ re-
sponses to the regulatory requirement adjustments depended on the amount of capital
buffer, defined by the capital the bank holds in excess of the regulatory minimum. Banks
with low capital buffers tried to rebuild an appropriate capital buffer by raising capital
and simultaneously lowering risk. In contrast, banks with high capital buffers tended to
keep their buffers by simultaneously increasing both capital and risk levels.
Brei and Gambacorta (2014) analyzed how the risk-weighted regulatory capital ratio and
the Basel III leverage ratio behaves over the cycle, using a large data set for the pe-
riod 1995-2012.1 They found that both are countercyclical: it is a tighter constraint for
banks in booms and a looser constraint in recessions. Moreover, the leverage ratio, which
includes guarantees and other off-balance sheet positions, is significantly more counter-
cyclical than the risk-weighted regulatory capital ratio, see [10]. Furthermore, the authors
have shown, that exposure measures, total assets, as well as RWA are positively corre-
lated with cycle indicators. They noted that the correlation is somewhat lower during the
crisis and explained this finding by the effect of a sharp lending and investment reduction
during the crisis.
As the mentioned works demonstrate, it is indisputable that regulatory capital require-
ments influence the level of the initial bank capitalization at least in the mid-term. We
analyzed the influence of the capitalization of banking systems in section 5.1 and showed
1The leverage ratio indicates the maximum loss that can be absorbed by equity, while the risk-based
requirement refers to a banks capacity to absorb potential losses, see [10].
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its common positive impact on system stability. In order to separate the short-term effects
of the obligatory minimum capitalization of banks, like cutting back or expending new
business, from effects of the initial capitalization, we don’t adjust the initial bank capital-
ization according to the changing capital requirements in our simulation analysis. Here
we take into account only the short-term impact of capital requirements. To be exact, we
suppose that capital requirements influence the new business by capital restrictions and,
thus, the demand for assets during the fire sale process.
Furthermore, as presented in section 2.3.4, liquidity risk is connected to the regulatory
capital requirements in the model.
We are looking at impacts of the regulatory capital by varying the regulatory capital
ratio γr. We begin by analyzing the losses to external counterparts.
Resilience of the bank system and losses to banks
As shown in Fig. 8.1, cumulated bank losses increase with increasing capital require-
ments if withdrawals occur. Similarly, bank defaults increase with increasing capital re-
quirements if withdrawals happen, see Fig. 8.2. Moreover, the increase of the regulatory
capital level can substantially intensify the impact of intolerance for undercapitalization
of banks. The reasons for the observed effects are capital restrictions on new business and
an earlier start of withdrawals, which will be discussed below in relation to the losses to
externals.
External losses
In Fig. 8.3 we observe that external losses increase with increasing capital requirements
if withdrawal risk exists because of withdrawals being triggered earlier and prices for the
fire-sale assets decreasing more strongly. The first effect is connected to the condition
γi
γr
≤ τ , which determines the state when depositors withdraw their funds from the bank
i. In this way the withdrawal risk is increasing in the regulatory capital γr (see 2.3.4 for
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Figure 8.1: Cumulated bank losses in relation to the intolerance for capital gap τ and regulatory
capital λr with high concentration of the shock and risk of withdrawal of deposits.
Parameter setting: see Tables A.1 to A.3 in the appendix A.1.1.
more details) given a constant initial capital determined by γi. The second effect is linked
to the fact that stricter regulatory requirements allow solvent banks limited leeway for
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Figure 8.2: Resilience of the bank system in relation to the intolerance for capital gap τ and
regulatory capital λr with high concentration of the shock and risk of withdrawal of deposits.
Parameter setting: see Fig. 8.1.
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Figure 8.3: External losses in relation to the intolerance for capital gap τ and regulatory capital
λr with high concentration of the shock and risk of withdrawal of deposits.
Parameter setting: see Fig. 8.1.
new business which negatively affects demand for offered assets and, thus, the fire-sale
prices.
We can say, taking into account the results of the previous chapter, that similar to the
higher intolerance stricter capital requirements would lead to a higher withdrawal of
deposits and thus to higher external losses, in general. The according results are illustrated
in Fig. 8.3.
Conclusion
In this section we have looked at the impact of the tightening of regulatory capital re-
strictions followed by two short-time consequences: deceleration of new business activities
and, thus, pressure on the demand and prices for fire sale assets, firstly, and maintaining
uncertainty about appropriate capitalization of the banking system among depositors,
secondly, using the regulatory capital requirements as an orientation marker with regard
to the safety of the deposits. We can summarize that the tighter capital requirements
may increase the vulnerability of the banking system from the short time perspective
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and, even more, the losses to both, banks and externals due to the increasing liquidity
risk. Nevertheless, we recognize that at least in the medium run, banks would react by
increasing their equity base or reducing their (risk) assets, strengthening the systemic
stability.
8.2 Modifications of capital requirements and capital
surcharge
In the previous chapters we examined the (mostly positive) effect of higher capitalization
of the banking system at different points. Here we focus on the impact of the additional
capital requirements. Thereby we analyze the case that all banks are treated equally, and
the case of different allocation of the additional capital assuming that only systemically
important banks are subject to the capital surcharge. Furthermore we take a look on
the risk adjusted capital requirements compared to the ”flat” capital adequacy. The last
can be regarded as a ”prototype” of the Basel III’s Leverage Ratio which represents the
relationship between core capital and total assets. It should basically restrict the excessive
credit growth accompanied by excessive leverage.
8.2.1 Treatment of systemically important banks by Basel III
The great impact of the disruption or failure of large and internationally active finan-
cial institutions on the financial system and, even beyond, on the real economy became
obvious during the financial crisis that started in 2007. To prevent further damage to
the economies and to restore the confidence in the banking systems plentiful and costly
interventions of public sector were needed. The financial and economic costs of these in-
terventions and the increase in moral hazard associated with the behaviour of systemically
important financial institutions have required reconsideration of the regulatory require-
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ments.
The Bank of International Settlements (BIS) published new regulatory rules for com-
mercial banks in December 2010, known as Basel III (or the Third Basel Accord), with
the aim of increasing the stability of the financial sector. These guidelines, developed by
the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), strengthen capital requirements
amongst others. In addition to the increase for the core capital quota (CCQ), defined as
the minimum ratio of core equity capital that a bank has to hold in relation to its risk
weighted assets, the globally important financial institutions (G-SIBs) shall be subject to
tighter capital requirements. In particular, the ”cross-border risk” is addressed with cap-
ital surcharges on G-SIBs. The final rules for G-SIBs were published in [54] and revised
in [56].
Furthermore, in addition to the rules for G-SIBs the Basel Committee developed a set of
principles on the assessment methodology and the higher loss absorbency requirement for
domestic systemically important banks (D-SIBs) in response to the appeal by the G20
leaders. The idea is that some banks which are not significant to systemic risk from a
”cross-border” perspective, can be of prime importance with a view to their domestic
financial system stability. Moreover, the failure or distortion of any of them would likely
have significant cross-border side effects. The D-SIB framework was published in [55]
allowing for an appropriate degree of national discretion to be able to accommodate the
specific features of domestic jurisdictions. It is complimentary to the rules applied to the
G-SIB. Thereby, the focus is placed on the negative externalities created by local and
international banks at a domestic level, see [55].
The special purpose of these rules for G-SIBs is to enhance the loss absorbency on a
going concern basis of G-SIBs and reduce their probability of default. The intent is to
protect the system from the risks of spillover effects created by G-SIBs. The above-
mentioned externalities include the impact of the failure or impairment of G-SIBs that
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can trigger shocks causing widespread financial distress and damaging the real economy.
One further impact is connected to the, probably not optimal, outcomes of G-SIBs from
a systemic perspective because of the negligence of negative externalities. And not least,
the moral hazard risk created by the incentive of large and highly interconnected banks to
take on excessive levels of risk in anticipation of direct support and implicit government
guarantees should be mentioned, see [56].
According to BIS, the global systemic importance should be measured in terms of the
impact that a banks failure can have on the global financial system and wider economy,
rather than the single bank default risk. The assessment methodology for G-SIBs is based
on an indicator-based approach and comprises five broad categories which reflect the size
of banks, their interconnectedness, the lack of readily available substitutes or financial
institution infrastructure for the services they provide, their global (cross-jurisdictional)
activity and their complexity. With the exception of the size category, multiple indica-
tors in each of the categories have been identified, with each indicator equally weighted
within its category. In accordance with the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision the
quantitative indicator-based approach can be supplemented with qualitative information
that is incorporated through a framework for supervisory judgment because no approach
will perfectly measure global systemic importance across all banks, which vary widely in
their structures and activities, and therefore in the nature and degree of risks they pose
to the international financial system.
The indicators applied for assessment of G-SIBs are chosen to reflect the different as-
pects of negative externalities that could make a bank critical to the stability of the
financial system, according to [56].
1. Cross-jurisdictional activity The objective of this indicator is ”. . . to capture
banks global footprint”. Two indicators should grasp the significance of a bank with respect
to its activities outside its local jurisdiction relative to overall activity of other banks in
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the system: cross-jurisdictional claims and cross-jurisdictional liabilities. The assumption
is that the international impact of a banks distress or failure depends on its share of
cross-jurisdictional assets and debts. The greater these items, the more widespread the
spillover effects from the failure of the bank.
2. Size Size is a key measure of systemic relevance. The indicator used here is a simple
indicator as a measure of total exposures used in the Basel III leverage ratio. The idea
is that a large bank’s distress or failure is more likely to harm the financial markets or
even the global economy. The larger the bank, the more difficult its replacement therefore
the greater the probability of the disruption of the relevant financial markets. Moreover,
the impairment of a large bank is more capable of damaging confidence in the financial
system as a whole.
3. Interconnectedness A banks systemic importance is expected to be positively
related to its interconnectedness within the system. Three indicators are used to measure
interconnectedness here: intra-financial system assets, intra-financial system liabilities,
and securities outstanding.
4. Substitutability/financial institution infrastructure The systemic importance
of a bank seems to be negatively related to its degree of substitutability. Three indicators
are used to estimate substitutability/financial institution infrastructure: assets under
custody, payment activity, and underwritten transactions in debt and equity markets.The
greater a banks role in the financial infrastructure, the larger the probable disruption
following its failure. Subsequently, the cost to the failed banks customers or business
partners of substituting the relatively larger service provider or consumer is likely to be
higher.
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5. Complexity The systemic importance of a bank is expected to be positively related
to its overall complexity. Three indictors are used to measure complexity: firstly, notional
amount of over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives; secondly, Level 3 assets like complex OTC
derivatives, illiquid loans, certain structured bonds, and further typically very illiquid
assets which fair values usually can only be calculated using estimates or risk-adjusted
value ranges; finally, trading and available-for-sale securities. The idea is that the failure
of a more complex bank would cause greater costs and time needed to wind up the bank.
The impact of impairment or failure of a D-SIBs on the domestic economy should be
assessed with regard to the size, interconnectedness, substitutability/financial institution
infrastructure (including considerations related to the concentrated nature of the banking
sector) and complexity (including the additional complexities from cross-border activity)
in terms of bank-specific factors, see [55].
8.2.2 Capital Surcharges on SIBs in the ABN Model
The tighter capital requirements for SIBs can be understood as penalties for their impor-
tance to the global financial stability or stability of a country and its economy. Such an
instrument should not only actively support the robustness of the SIBs, but also reduce
incentives to increase the systemic importance, that would otherwise arise in anticipating
advantages as a result of being ’to important to fail’.
We try to adopt the principles contained in the assessment methodology for SIBs of the
BCBS that are based on the scores as described in 8.2.1. We adapt this methodology
to the features of the ABN-Model. Since we model a closed economy, cross-jurisdictional
activity does not really matter here. Moreover, only indicators which seem to be connected
to the individual or systemic risk in the given stylized network should be included. So,
for example, payments activity plays no role in the ABN-Model and therefore cannot be
regarded as an indicator. Among these considerations, five indicators will be incorporated
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in the model structure, which can be classified into four categories as follows:
Size: Large banks increased in size during the several years before the last financial
crisis. Their complexity and wide variety of market-based activities grew rapidly.
The banking systems became increasingly global and interconnected. Therefore,
it is hardly surprising that bank size is typically an important driver of systemic
risk measures. Thus, large institutions are commonly regarded as banks of systemic
importance. The larger the bank, the higher the amount of its exposure will be
expected to be stressed by the initial shock, and the greater the interbank exposure
will be, which can be affected by contagion triggered by the failure of the bank. We
define size as total assets of the bank:
i1i = ai (Size) (8.1)
Interconnectedness: The higher the bank is connected within the system, the higher
the probability of being affected by contagion and also the larger the number of
banks that could be distressed through the loss transmission from this bank. The
interconnectedness will be defined as the number of banks connected via debts or
deposits to the observed financial institution:
i2i =
N∑
j=1
Rcb[i, j] +
N∑
j=1
Rcb[j, i] (Interconnectedness) (8.2)
Substitutability (in the broadest sense): The higher the interbank exposure, the
higher the material interdependency between this and the other connected banks,
including the indirectly connected financial institutions. The total lending to the
external segments (private and commercial customers) indicates the importance of
the bank for the real economy, but it is also connected to the probable intensity by
which the initial shock may concern the bank. We define the substitutability in the
broadest sense as interbank loans and deposits on the one hand, and the external
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credit exposure on the other hand.
i3i = c
b
i + d
b
i (Substitutability(1)) (8.3)
i4i = c
e
i (Substitutability(2)) (8.4)
Complexity: Comparing two banks which are similar in size, the bank with riskier assets
will be presumably more complex and more vulnerable. The absolute amount of the
risk weighted assets (RWA) is closely linked to the intensity of the shock, which has
to be absorbed by the bank, but also to the possible loss transmission from the bank
into the system. We define the complexity as volume of the risk weighted assets:
i5i = RWAi = c˜
b
i + c˜
e
i + i˜
b
i (Complexity) (8.5)
with risk-weighted interbank loans c˜bi , risk-weighted loans to externals c˜
e
i and risk-
weighted CB and CDO-investments i˜bi , see 2.3.
For the determination of an overall score over all five criteria, we firstly determine single
scores for each criteria. Let N := {1, . . . , N} be the set of bank indices. For each
k ∈ {1, . . . , 5} let σk : N → N a permutation with the property
σk(i) < σk(j) ⇐⇒ (iki > ikj ) or (iki = ikj and i < j) ∀i, j ∈ N.
Hence, σk(i) is the position of bank i considering criteria k, only. All σk are uniquely
defined. The overall position (score) is then given by a further permutation σ : N → N
with the property
σ(i) < σ(j) ⇐⇒ (sij < 0 or (sij = 0 and i < j)) ∀i, j ∈ N,
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where the quantity sij is given by
sij :=
5∑
k=1
(σk(i)− σk(j)) . (8.6)
The permutation σ is also uniquely defined. The importance of all criteria are assumed
to be equal. However, placing greater importance to individual criteria is easily possible
by considering a weighted sum in (8.6).
The following relation will be then assumed: the lower the position σ(i), the more impor-
tant bank i is for the considered financial system. We determine the SIBs as those banks
within the first 25% positions. The set M contains the indices of the SIB banks:
M =
{
i ∈ N | σ(i) ≤ N/4}. (8.7)
As mentioned above we will analyze the impact of capital surcharges by increasing the
initial capital base of the banking system. In the previous chapters, we have already
demonstrated that the additional capital has a positive stabilizing effect and reduces
systemic risk. The question that we face now is which effects are to be expected when
the new rules impose the additional capital requirements only on the SIBs as opposed to
the uniform tightening of the initial capital ratio for all banks. To avoid unwanted side
effects in the analysis, we ensure an equal total amount of capital for the scenarios to be
compared. For this reason we implement the following algorithm.
Assume that γ˜ determines the additional capital in the financial system, so that the total
capital of the banking system is given by
Enew = E + γ˜RWA = (γ + γ˜)RWA, (8.8)
where E and γ are the initial capital of banks or capital ratio, respectively, before the
capital surcharge, while RWA =
∑N
i=1RWAi is known as the total risk wighted assets in
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the banking system from section 2.3.
Supposing the special treatment of the SIBs, we have to calculate the RWAs of the SIBs
m ∈M , M ⊂ N firstly and to determine the equity surcharge for the SIBs γ˜SIB secondly.
γ˜SIB = γ˜
RWA∑
m∈M
RWAm
(8.9)
In this way we can calculate the initial capital for each bank by
ei = (γ + γ˜i)RWAi, ∀i ∈ N (8.10)
where γ˜i = γ˜
SIB for SIBs (∀i ∈M ) and γ˜i = 0 for other banks.
When all banks are treated equally with γ˜i = γ˜ ∀i ∈ N , the application of the additional
capital would be as follows:
ei = (γ + γ˜)RWAi, ∀i ∈ N (8.11)
Simulation Experiments and Results
Using the simulation engine we study the influence of the risk adjusted bank capitaliza-
tion dependent on the sensitivity of bank capital to two different kinds of expected risk.
Thereby we compare four basic scenarios characterized by the sensitivity of banks’ capital
to the individual (IRS) and/or systemic risk (SRS) as follows:
IRS
SRS no yes
no a c
yes b d
Table 8.1: Notation of the scenarios with respect to the sensitivity of bank capitalization
to the individual and systemic risk.
Scenario ”a” represents the case where individual bank’s capital depends neither on the
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individual risk nor on the systemic risk, implying that capital requirements are propor-
tional to the volume of the bank’s risk assets as defined in section 2.2.5 by (2.13). In
that respect, it implies that the calculation of required equity is based on risk weights
which are equal to 100% for all claims with exception of the bank claims wighted by 50%
(flat-rate capital adequacy). Moreover, the equity surcharge relating to γ˜ equally applies
to all banks, as defined by (8.11).
The next two scenarios relate to the dependency on one of the two aforementioned types
of risks. Scenario ”b” represents the case of the systemic risk sensitive capitalization of
banks (SRS), which means that the (additional) capital buffer of a bank only depends on
its importance for the stability of the financial system, implying that the equity surcharge
relating to γ˜ applies only to SIBs, see (8.8) to (8.10) above. Initial capital of a bank do not
depend on its individual asset risk characteristics. Scenario ”c” denotes the case in which
the level of the initial bank capital depends on the individual asset risk characteristics
for each bank (IRS) as presented in section 2.3, while the equity surcharge relating to γ˜
equally applies to all banks in the same way: γ˜i = γ˜ ∀ i = {1, . . . , N}. However, this
scenario corresponds to the simulation experiments which we considered in the previous
sections.
In contrast, scenario ”d” is characterized by sensitivity of bank capitalization to both
individual and systemic risk (SRS&IRS).
Further, for all scenarios we assume highly heterogeneous banking systems applying the
core periphery network structure with a high difference in the external exposure between
the core and the periphery as presented in section 6.4.3.2 Furthermore, we create vari-
ous types of experiments considering strong idiosyncratic or systematic shocks, high or
low risk appetite of banks and allowing or not the withdrawal of deposits. To make the
scenarios comparable, we use the same parameters, unless the parameters specify the in-
dividual scenarios as described above. Note, that we also use the same size of shock for
all scenarios. We do not present the case of low risk appetite of banks if a systematic
2The scenarios a, b, c, d correspond then to the modes 07, 08, 15 and 16 according to the structure
in Tab. A.7.
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shock occurs, because of a very high stability of the banking system in this case for the
given parameter setting and thus indiscriminate results of various experiments. The re-
sults relevant to the following discussion are displayed graphically in Figures 8.4 to 8.8.
Tables 8.3 to 8.5 summarize the observed effects of the risk-sensitive compared to the
non-risk-sensitive capitalization of banks on the resilience of banking systems and losses
to banks and externals.
Here, a higher risk of banks is connected to the exclusive investments of banks in the most
risky CDO-Tranches B and C. In the case that lower risk banks and externals hold CBs
and each tranche of CDOs in equal shares, see Tab. 8.2.
Bank shares of investments CB Tranche A Tranche B Tranche C
βCB, βCDOt (t ∈ T ) βCB βCDOA βCDOB βCDOC
Low risk of banks 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
High risk of banks 0 0 1 1
Table 8.2: Tranche-specific (CB and CDO) parameters and their benchmark values.
Resilience of the banking system
We begin the analysis taking into consideration average default rates within banking
systems for the presented scenarios. Fig. 8.4 and 8.5 graphically illustrate the results of
the simulation experiments. Thereby the bank default rates are displayed in relation to
the equity rate γ or the magnitude of the initial shock λ for number of experiments and
100 runs for each of them. The curve slopes have already been analyzed in section 5 and
chapter 4. We focus here on the comparison of the curves. The results of the comparative
analysis are summarized in Tab. 8.3 and described below.
Low risk appetite / idiosyncratic shock: Risk sensitivity of bank capitalization raises the
default rate of banks which could be observed for sensitivity to both individual and
systemic risk. Withdrawal of deposits seems to lead to the more pronounced effects for
nearly all considered levels of bank capitalization and external shocks. With regard to the
effect of IRS we explain this finding with the following argumentation. Note, that as a
definition of the lower risk appetite in comparison to the higher risk appetite of banks we
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Figure 8.4: Bank defaults for LR (idiosyncratic shock), HR (idiosyncratic shock), HR (system-
atic shock) for scenarios (a) - lumpsum capital adequacy; (b) - SRS; (c) - IRS; (d) - SRS&IRS;
liquidity risk (left); no liquidity risk (right).
The nomenclature of scenarios is presented in appendix A.1.3. For a detailed explanation of
the curve shapes please refer to section 5.1. Parameter setting: ζ = 0.1; γ˜ = 0.02; ψ1 = 0.1,
ψ2 = 0.5, ξ = 0.2; investment parameters are presented in Table 8.2 for low (LR) and high
investment risk of banks (HR). For the remaining parameters please refer to Tables A.2, A.3
and A.4 in the appendix.
assumed that all investments will be equally purchased by banks and externals. In such a
case the average risk content of the banking investment portfolio is equal to the average
risk content of the external credits by the model, see section 2.2.5. The introduction
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Figure 8.5: Bank defaults for LR (idiosyncratic shock), HR (idiosyncratic shock), HR (system-
atic shock) for scenarios (a) - lumpsum capital adequacy; (b) - SRS; (c) - IRS; (d) - SRS&IRS;
liquidity risk (left); no liquidity risk (right).
The nomenclature of scenarios is presented in appendix A.1.3. For a detailed explanation of the
curve shapes please refer to chapter 4. Parameter setting: see Fig. 8.4.
of the risk-sensitive weighting of assets does not affect the total capital of the banking
system but of the individual banks. So banks with lower risk investments need relatively
less equity then banks with a riskier investment portfolio, see section 2.3. We did not
observe any substantial influences of IRS on the stability of the banking system in the case
of systematic initial shock with the same magnitude as the idiosyncratic shock analyzed
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Changes in bank defaults through the risk sensitivity of bank capital to the
individual risk systemic risk
withdrawal no withdrawal withdrawal no withdrawal
Low Risk ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑
Idiosyncratic Shock
High Risk ↓ ↓ ↑ ↑
Idiosyncratic Shock
High Risk ↓ ↓ ↑ ↑
Systematic Shock
Hints: association between ↑≡ c above a ↑≡ b above a
results here and and d above b and d above c
Fig. 8.4 - 8.5. and vice versa and vice versa
Table 8.3: General impact of risk-sensitive bank capitalization in relation to the non-risk-
sensitive capitalization on default rate in the banking system (↓ and ↑ mean higher or lower
default rates respectively.
here. But the effect may be somewhat positive for larger shocks, because (all) banks
with more risky CDOs would be affected more but require also more capital than other
banks in the case of the (individual) risk adjusted capital requirements. By contrast,
an idiosyncratic shock affects only a few banks but with a much stronger force, so that
not only more riskier CDO tranches are hit by the shock but also the a-priori less risk
investments. In such a case the damage caused considerably deviates from the expected
risk, which is a deciding factor in estimating the level of equity of banks. This deviation is
higher in the case of risk adjusted capital requirements on average, provided that the total
capital of the banking system remains the same, which is connected to more bankruptcies
of banks.
The deviation of the expected risk from the incurred losses shall likewise be responsible
for the negative impact of the capital requirements which are sensitive to systemic risk.
Remember, that the indicators for the systemic relevance of banks reflect the aspects
of negative externalities that could make a bank critical for the stability of the financial
system, but do not necessarily try to indicate the vulnerable banks. Note that we compare
the cases in which the total equity of the banking system is the same, so that only the
distribution of the capital surcharges matters. From the SIB-indicators, it is possible to
derive that the core-banks regarding section 6.4.3 will be mainly identified as SIBs and
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be subject to additional capital rules in the SRS case. But, it has been demonstrated
in section 6.4.4 that core banks tend to be more stable, while periphery banks are more
prone to shocks in core-periphery networks if significant differences between the core
and periphery exist, which is also the case here. Thus, the negative effect of the SRS
corresponds to the fact that the more vulnerable banks face lower capital requirements
than in the case where the capital surcharges equally concern all banks. The SIBs remain
still more stable in both cases, so that the additional capital requirements for them do
not increase the stability of the banking system, while the more vulnerable banks become
more unstable because of the lower capital.
High risk appetite / idiosyncratic shock: Risk sensitivity of bank capitalization to the in-
dividual risk (IRS) lowers the default rate of banks while systemic risk sensitivity (SRS)
produces a negative impact on the resilience of the banking system in general. Fur-
thermore, the negative effect of SRS can outweigh the positive impact of the IRS (d
-(SRS&IRS) above a-flat-rate capital adequacy) for sufficiently small levels of the initial
shock. Moreover, the positive effect of the individual risk adjusted capital (IRS) clearly
predominates the negative one related to the systemic risk sensitive capital requirements
(SRS) see Fig. 8.5 the bottom ((b)-(SRS) above (a)-flat-rate capital adequacy, but (d)-
(SRS&IRS) below (a)), which can be considered for both cases, with and without the
liquidity risk. Here we can observe the positive influence of the (individual) risk adjusted
capital requirements, characterized by a higher capital base of the banking system in the
case of an above-average risk content of the banking investments compared to the flat
capital requirements. The above-average risk weights are connected to the investments of
banks in highly risky tranches, see section 2.3, implying the higher capital requirements
for banks. The IRS-predomination for moderate shocks can be explained by a relatively
large impact of the equity in the centre range of the shocks, which can be seen exem-
plary in Fig. 8.6. The negative effect of the SRS shows its independence against the risk
appetite of banks and has been already explained above.
High risk appetite / systematic shock: As with the idiosyncratic shock, we can see a pos-
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Figure 8.6: Impact of the equity rate on the banking system stability (default rate) in relation
to the magnitude of the idiosyncratic shocks (high risk appetite of banks and absence of liquidity
risk (τ = 0).
Parameter setting: ζ = 0.1; γ˜ = 0; ψ1 = 0.1, ψ2 = 0.5, ξ = 0.2; For the remaining parameters
please refer to Tables A.2, A.3 and A.4 in the appendix. Note, that the example is only for
illustration of the equity impact. The parameters deviate from the examples above.
itive effect of IRS and a negative impact of SRS again, which are even more pronounced
than in the scenarios discussed above. As already indicated, the negative effect of the
SRS is able to outweigh the positive impact of the IRS for small and moderate levels of
shock. For sufficiently large shocks, the positive impact of IRS predominates again, which
can be considered for both cases, with and without the liquidity risk.
Bank losses
Fig. 8.7 and Fig. 8.8 show the impact of risk adjusted capital rules on cumulated bank
losses summarized in Tab. 8.4. Thereby the aggregated bank losses are displayed in
relation to the equity rate γ or the magnitude of the initial shock λ for a number of
experiments and 100 runs for each of them. For the detailed analysis of the curve slopes
we refer to section 5 and chapter 4. Here we examine the differences between the curves
to show and explain the effects of the risk sensitive capital requirements. The results of
the comparative analysis are summarized in Tab. 8.4 and described below.
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Figure 8.7: Bank losses for LR (idiosyncratic shock), HR (idiosyncratic shock), HR (systematic
shock) for scenarios (a) - lumpsum capital adequacy; (b) - SRS; (c) - IRS; (d) - SRS&IRS;
liquidity risk (left); no liquidity risk (right).
The nomenclature of scenarios is presented in appendix A.1.3. For a detailed explanation of the
curve shapes please refer to section 5.1. Parameter setting: see Fig. 8.4.
Low risk appetite / idiosyncratic shock: The simulation experiments demonstrate the only
small (negative) effect of the sensitivity of bank capitalization to the systemic risk (SRS)
for total bank losses. Simultaneously, substantially higher losses to banks can be seen in
the case of individual risk sensitivity of bank capitalization (IRS), if liquidity risk exists.
Furthermore, this difference increases with decreasing bank capitalization for sufficiently
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Figure 8.8: Bank losses for LR (idiosyncratic shock), HR (idiosyncratic shock), HR (systematic
shock) for scenarios (a) - lumpsum capital adequacy; (b) - SRS; (c) - IRS; (d) - SRS&IRS;
liquidity risk (left); no liquidity risk (right).
The nomenclature of scenarios is presented in appendix A.1.3. For a detailed explanation of the
curve shapes please refer to chapter 4. Parameter setting: see Fig. 8.4.
high capital levels and decreases once again. The same trend can be observed for the
increasing initial shocks: at very little or quite high shocks there is a slight impact and
even conversion of the negative impact of IRS (lower losses with IRS if shocks are high)
become visible. For high levels of the shock, the initial shock can be observed without
it triggering withdrawal of deposits. No effects of the risk sensitivity of the capital re-
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Changes in the bank losses through the risk sensitivity of bank capital to the
individual risk systemic risk
withdrawal no withdrawal withdrawal no withdrawal
Low Risk ↑ () () ()
Idiosyncratic Shock
High Risk ↑ ↑ () ()
Idiosyncratic Shock
High Risk ↓ () ↑ ()
Systematic Shock
Hints: association between ↑≡ c above a ↑≡ b above a
results here and and d above b and d above c
Fig. 8.9 - 8.5. and vice versa and vice versa
Table 8.4: General Impact of risk-sensitive bank capitalization in relation to the non-risk-
sensitive capitalization on bank losses in the banking system (↓ and ↑ mean higher or lower
bank losses respectively, while () implies that no clear or significant impact has been observed).
quirements for bank losses could be observed. Similarly, no impact can be seen for low
capital of banks, which has to be explained by the total collapse of the banking system
and limiting of the cumulated bank losses by the available equity. The higher losses to
banks in the case of the individual risk sensitivity of bank capitalization (IRS) relate to
the higher vulnerability of the banking system against the idiosyncratic shock and has
been addressed in the part of this section relating to resilience of the banking systems
(see above).
High risk appetite / idiosyncratic shock: No clear effect of the IRS can be obtained here
if shocks are relatively low or capital high, otherwise slightly higher losses for IRS can be
seen if shocks are high or bank capitalization low. This has to be explained by a higher
shock absorption capacity of the banking system if the requirements are sensitive to the
individual risk of the banks’ assets (see reasoning above). There is no substantial effect
of the SRS here, because of its neutrality regarding the total equity of the system and
relatively small (negative) effect on the stability of the banking system.
High risk appetite / systematic shock: The IRS seems to reduce the total losses to banks
substantially because of its positive effect on systemic stability, while the SRS can lead
to significantly higher bank losses, in particular in the somewhat moderate range of the
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initial shock or banks’ capital, especially if withdrawals occur. The latter corresponds to
the large negative effect of SRS on the banking system resilience expressed by substantially
higher default rates of banks, which we have seen above. At a higher initial shock (lower
capitalization) we can see the opposite result regarding IRS, which means that during a
serious crisis the individual risk sensitivity of bank capitalization raises the total losses to
banks, because higher bank capitalization enables more loss coverage, but defaults can not
be reduced. The SRS effects seem to be negligible for higher shocks. These findings are
consistent with the observations regarding the resilience of the banking system above. The
individual risk sensitive capital requirements are much more effective if banking systems
are hit by a wide-spread shock, at least to a certain level of the shock. For very high
shocks, a banking system collapses regardless of the capital requirements. In such a case
the bank losses with the IRS are higher than with the lumpsum capital requirements
because of the higher capital in total.
We can summarize that the capital sensitivity to the individual risk could have signifi-
cant effects on the total bank losses, especially if liquidity risk exists. But the effects are
ambiguous and depend on the risk appetite of banks and the intensity and diversification
of the initial shock or common bank capitalization level. In the middle range of shocks,
if a systematic shock affects a high risk banking system, bank losses seem to be lower
for sensitive capitalization (individual risk), while higher bank losses can be seen for id-
iosyncratic shocks, generally. For the less risky banks higher bank losses for IRS can be
observed in general. Sensitivity to the systemic risk does not show significant effects for
total bank losses but seems to be rather negative (higher losses).
External losses
Fig. 8.9 and 8.10 illustrate the simulated external losses for the scenarios mentioned
above, and Tab. 8.5 summarizes the results. The diversity of the results can be seen here
again. We describe the general findings given the different characteristics of the shock
and risk propensity of banks as follows:
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Figure 8.9: (top-down) External losses for LR (idiosyncratic shock), HR (idiosyncratic shock),
HR (systematic shock) for scenarios (a) - lumpsum capital adequacy; (b) - SRS; (c) - IRS; (d) -
SRS&IRS; liquidity risk (left); no liquidity risk (right).
The nomenclature of scenarios is presented in appendix A.1.3. For a detailed explanation of the
curve shapes please refer to section 5.1. Parameter setting: see Fig. 8.4.
Low risk appetite / idiosyncratic shock: Individual risk sensitivity of bank capitalization
(IRS) raises external losses, especially if withdrawal of deposits is allowed (c above a and
d above b). This effect becomes more pronounced with decreasing bank capitalization or
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Figure 8.10: External losses for LR (idiosyncratic shock), HR (idiosyncratic shock), HR (sys-
tematic shock) for scenarios (a) - lumpsum capital adequacy; (b) - SRS; (c) - IRS; (d) - SRS&IRS;
liquidity risk (left); no liquidity risk (right).
The nomenclature of scenarios is presented in appendix A.1.3. For a detailed explanation of the
curve shapes please refer to section 4. Parameter setting: see Fig. 8.4.
increasing external shocks, respectively. This impact relates to the higher vulnerability
of banking systems if risk adjusted capital is sensitive to the individual (a-priori) risk of
the assets, leading to higher contagion and transfer of bank losses to externals, see above.
The impact of the sensitivity of bank capitalization to the systemic risk (SRS) is rather
negative too, but very small.
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Changes in the external losses through the risk sensitivity of bank capital to the
individual risk systemic risk
withdrawal no withdrawal withdrawal no withdrawal
Low Risk ↑ () () ()
Idiosyncratic Shock
High Risk ↓ ↓ () ()
Idiosyncratic Shock
High Risk ↓ ↓ ↑ ∗ ↑
Systematic Shock
Hints: association between ↑≡ c above a ↑≡ b above a
results here and and d above b and d above c
Fig. 8.9 - 8.5. and vice versa and vice versa
* - only for middle ranges of capitalization or shocks.
Table 8.5: General impact of risk-sensitive bank capitalization in relation to the non-risk-
sensitive capitalization on external losses in the banking system (↓ and ↑ mean higher or lower
default rates respectively, while () implies that no clear or significant impact has been observed).
High risk appetite / idiosyncratic shock: A positive effect for the IRS can be obtained.
The impact of the SRS remains slightly negative (higher external losses). The positive
impact of the IRS is connected to the higher equity base of the system in total, leading
to the higher shock absorption by banks but also to the reduction of contagion within the
banking system. For details please refer to the part of this section, where the impact on
the banking system resilience is addressed.
High risk appetite / systematic shock: The positive effect of the IRS is obvious and re-
lates to the positive impact on the stability of the banking system, as discussed above,
and the higher shock absorption by banks because of the higher banking capital in total.
Coincidently, the negative impact of SRS can also be substantial for moderate values of
the shock or the banking capital, especially if withdrawals are possible. This negative im-
pact relates to the substantially higher vulnerability of the banking system with capital
requirements being sensitive to the systemic risk of banks and thus higher loss transfer
from banks to externals in comparison to the equal treatment of all banks.
It can be summarized that external losses are higher if the initial bank capitalization is
sensitive to systemic risk, even though this effect is mostly relatively small. Sensitivity
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to the individual risk is positive for the externals, at least if banks exhibit a high risk
appetite. But if banks are rather risk-averse, externals seem to face more losses which
will be transmitted to them from banks, because of the lower capitalization of banks in
absolute terms.
Conclusion:
We analyzed the impact of additional capital requirements for systemically important
banks, using the three-tiered core-periphery network concept. Thereby we studied the
impact of equity capital surcharges for selected, ’systemically important’, banks and com-
pared the validness of such additional charges with an equal increase of the capital re-
quirements for all banks to the same overall extent. We observed that the equal rise in
the equity ratio for all banks tends to stabilize the banking system more effectively than
the capital surcharges for systemically important financial institutions only, even if the
total increase of the banking capital in the system is the same. We can summarize that
diversified capital requirements would lead to a higher systemic risk in comparison to uni-
form regulations. This finding is confirmed by the experiments discussed above regardless
of the type or magnitude of the initial shock and the initial level of capitalization of banks.
Further we looked at the impact of risk adjusted capital requirements (individual risk-
sensitive bank capitalization) compared to flat capital adequacy. However, individual
risk-sensitive bank capitalization can be stabilizing or destabilizing. The total volume of
banking capital in the system seems to play an essential role here. Capital requirements
leading to a lower level of capital of the financial system as a whole tend to destabilize
the banking system in general. But even if the total capital in the system remains the
same, risk adjusted capital requirements can cause higher vulnerability of banks, affected
by a strong idiosyncratic shock. ’A-priori’ low-risk banks have less risk weighted assets
as riskier banks with the same total amount of assets, and possess thus absolutely less
equity capital as a-priori riskier banks. Risk adjusted capital requirements could make
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the banking system more vulnerable to ”unexpected” shocks compared to ’flat’ capital
requirements if banks underestimate the risk, so that the capital reduction effect, caused
by the risk sensitive requirements, is larger than the real advantages of the a-priori less
risky banks in terms of affectedness by an unexpected shock.
These results are in line with Krug et al. (2014) who studied the special treatment of SIBs
in context with the analysis of the impact of the Basel III accord on the financial stability
in [41]. The authors found that surcharges on SIBs make the regulatory framework more
complex but have a modest stabilizing impact when considered in isolation and even a
destabilizing multi-dimensional impact, see [41].
By contrast, Cont and Moussa (2010) in [13] studied the impact of capital requirements
in limiting the extent of systemic risk and default contagion in a network context. The
authors discussed targeted capital requirements and showed that targeting the creditors
of the most contagious institutions is a more effective procedure than increasing capital
ratios for all institutions in the network equally.
Chapter 9
Liquidity management
Bank liquidity and arrangement of the funding design and processes are important ob-
jects in the international standards of the banking supervision and regulation framework.
Their importance has grown significantly in recent years. Following the collapse of the
US investment bank Lehman Brothers in 2008, the loss of confidence in banks and the
banking system as a whole caused the precautionary hoarding of liquidity. In this phase
of the financial crisis, panic fire-sales of assets made interbank market liquidity disap-
pear. It became virtually impossible to obtain short-term refinancing: the interbank
market effectively came to a standstill, and the run on money market deposits tightened
the already strained liquidity situation. Genuine repurchase agreements (repo deals) and
securities-lending business as well as true sale securitization transactions became increas-
ingly difficult as a result of higher margin calls or even by lack of demand. Intervention
of central banks and governments around the world was necessary to solve the acute liq-
uidity problem of banks and to reduce the risk of domino effects. Governments offered
generous financial guarantees and injected fresh capital into the system. Central banks
increased their lending to replace the withdrawal of private lending improving the lending
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capability and financial stability, e.g. Jean-Claude Trichet (2009) 1.
Furthermore, the crisis made clear that idiosyncratic and systematic liquidity shocks re-
quire different policy responses. Because the traditional liquidity facilities available to
central banks prior to the crisis were not designed to deal with system-wide disruptions,
but with liquidity problems faced by individual institutions, central banks had to adapt
their measures to inject liquidity into the global financial system and introduced new
facilities, e.g. Lavoie et al. (2011) in [43].
Throughout the last financial crisis the role of the central bank and governmental in-
tervening actions was intensively debated and even reaches into the current times and
therefore leaves many questions still unanswered. Several studies suggest that the pro-
vision of liquidity by central banks during the crisis was successful and helped to reduce
funding pressures on financial institutions. But the actions by central banks also raise a
number of questions concerning the impact of the measures, central bank risks, their gov-
ernance structure as well as their withdrawal from the measures taken, e.g. Pikkarainen
(2010) in [57].
Central banks or other supporting institutions who play an important role for the inten-
sity and the pricing of fire sale market activities. In particular, the arrangements of the
central bank for providing the suddenly lacking liquidity and buying the excess assets may
have significant implications. Not least for this reason, the central bank is an integral part
of the asset-based network model used here and presented in chapter 2.
Effects of liquidity losses have been already analyzed in chapter 7. The focus here is
on the impact of the initial endowment of liquidity and of the liquidity provided by the
central bank in the event of a systemic distortion. This chapter is organized as follows.
In section 9.1 we analyze the impact of the initial liquidity endowment of the banking
1Clare Distinguished Lecture in Economics and Public Policy, organized by the Clare College, Uni-
versity of Cambridge in Cambridge
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system on its stability and dynamics. Thereafter we take a closer look at the role of the
central bank in section 9.2.
9.1 Liquidity endowment
As before, we are using the ABN-Model for the analysis. There are two opportunities
to manage liquid funds as a liquidity reserve or a buffer in the stylized banking network
system.
The first one is a (minimum) liquidity reserve determined by the required reserve rate ν,
as presented in section 2.3.1 and given by
mi = ν(d
b
i + d
e
i ) ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , N},
where dbi , d
e
i denote the deposits of other banks and externals, respectively.
The second is represented through the investments of banks in liquid external assets iei
determined by an exogenous parameter ζ denoting a ratio between liquid external assets
and external loans for each bank, see 2.2.5,
iei = ζc
e
i ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , N}.
We suppose ζ to be equal for all banks for simplicity.
Remember that both kinds of liquid funds can be used for the short-term liquidity man-
agement because of the ability to be liquidated at any time without loss of value by
definition. However, while the liquidity reserve is linked to customer deposits, the exter-
nal liquid assets correspond to the external credit volume of banks. Thus, banks with
relative high volume of external credit assets would face a higher absolute increase in the
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liquidity buffer at increasing ζ. This effect will be further intensified by the fact that ad-
ditional external assets should be refinanced. However, the refinancing of the additional
liquid assets is based on the external deposits in the model. Thus the increase of ζ would
also cause a modest rise in liquidity reserve but also in amount of external deposits, which
can be potentially withdrawn.
In this chapter we analyze the impact of both mentioned instruments of liquidity man-
agement. For this purpose we create a set of simulation experiments with various levels
of liquidity reserve rate ν and liquid assets to external debts ratio ζ.
To keep the effects of the central bank support and the initial liquidity endowment apart,
we assume that the injection of the additional capital by the central bank is not possible
(δ = 0, see 2.3.4). However, we will consider this additional effect separately in section
9.2.
We conducted some experiments with high risk appetite of banks and high concentration
of the initial shock. In this context, we show the impact of the liquidity reserve rate
ν and liquid assets to external debts ratio ζ for various levels of the initial shock and
capitalization of banks.2 The results of the mentioned experiments are pictured in figures
9.1 and 9.2.
Fig. 9.1 demonstrates how the liquidity buffer related to ζ (left) and the liquidity reserve
rate ν (right) affect the resilience of the banking system (on the top), the total losses to
banks (second from the top) and the external losses (second from the bottom) depending
on the initial equity rate of banks. We focus here on the impact of ν and ζ on the results.
The curve shapes are explained in Section 5. Additionally, the curves of external deposit
withdrawals are illustrated in the bottom charts.
Similarly, Fig. 9.2 shows the effects of ν and ζ depending on the magnitude of the initial
2In the base line scenario the following parameters are used ν = 0.01, ζ = 0.1. The red line on the
left is then identical to the blue line on the right.
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shock, whose impacts and curve progressions are discussed in Section 4. The figures
picture quite clear but not self-explanatory results. Contrary to the common expecta-
tion of a stabilizing effect of increasing liquidity in the banking system we obtain higher
default rates within the banking system, which are accompanied by more external and
bank losses, in general. Moreover, increasing liquidity reserves and growing liquid assets
lead to very similar effects. So, the losses seem to be always higher when more liquid
funds in the system initially exist, provided that shocks are high enough to destabilize
the banking system. Furthermore, the simulation results clearly demonstrate the more
intensive withdrawal of external deposits for higher levels of ζ or ν, pictured in figures
9.1 and 9.2 at the bottom. Let us explain the destabilizing effect of the liquidity buffer.
For that purpose we focus on the simulation results with various bank capitalization (see
9.1) described above. Additionally we take a look at the development of the total assets
and liquidity structure, pictured in Fig. 9.3 (final results) and Fig. 9.4 (initial states) for
two cases: with a low liquidity buffer (ζ = 0.1) left and a high liquidity buffer (ζ = 0.3)
right.3
Note, that the balance sheet positions pictured in Fig. 9.3 and 9.4 correspond to the
results of the simulations plotted by blue dashed lines and red lines with triangles in Fig.
9.1 left. Both cases only differ in the amount of liquid assets and external deposits at
the beginning of the simulations, which is subsequently reflected in the different initial
balance sheet totals, see Fig. 9.4. All other items stay fixed. For both cases, however,
decreasing external deposits with an increasing equity rate of banks should be noted here.
This is obvious because of the increasing capital and simultaneously sinking refinancing
needs of banks and thus their borrowed capital. The difference in the initial liquidity in
the system is reflected by the difference in the amounts of (liquid) external assets and
external deposits to the same extent. The latter because of the assumption, that liquid
assets are refinanced via external customer deposits. The positive correlation between
liquid funds, external deposits and withdrawal of them is thus not surprising. However,
3Please refer to Chapter 4 for the details on asset/liability structure and their graphical representation.
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Figure 9.1: Impact of changes in liquidity buffer depending on bank capitalization γ for different
levels of liquid investments ζ (left) and liquidity reserve ν (right) for high concentration of the
shock and high risk appetite of banks.
Parameter setting: τ = 0.1; ζ = 0.1 (right); γ˜ = 0.02 (determines additional capital, see (8.8) in
8.2.2). For the remaining parameters please refer to Tables A.2, A.3 and A.4 in the appendix.
210 CHAPTER 9. LIQUIDITY MANAGEMENT
 0
 10
 20
 30
 40
 50
 60
 70
 80
 90
 100
 0.01  0.02  0.03  0.04  0.05  0.06  0.07  0.08  0.09
B
an
k 
D
ef
au
lts
Initial Shock
Bank Defaults vs. Initial Shock
ζ=0  ζ=0.1 ζ=0.2 ζ=0.3
 0
 10
 20
 30
 40
 50
 60
 70
 80
 90
 100
 0.01  0.02  0.03  0.04  0.05  0.06  0.07  0.08  0.09
B
an
k 
D
ef
au
lts
Initial Shock
Bank Defaults vs. Initial Shock
ν=0.01 ν=0.05 ν=0.10 ν=0.15 
 0
 10000
 20000
 30000
 40000
 50000
 60000
 70000
 80000
 90000
 100000
 0.01  0.02  0.03  0.04  0.05  0.06  0.07  0.08  0.09
B
an
k 
Lo
ss
es
Initial Shock
Bank Losses vs. Initial Shock
ζ=0  ζ=0.1 ζ=0.2 ζ=0.3
 0
 10000
 20000
 30000
 40000
 50000
 60000
 70000
 80000
 90000
 100000
 0.01  0.02  0.03  0.04  0.05  0.06  0.07  0.08  0.09
B
an
k 
Lo
ss
es
Initial Shock
Bank Losses vs. Initial Shock
ν=0.01 ν=0.05 ν=0.10 ν=0.15 
 0
 10000
 20000
 30000
 40000
 50000
 60000
 70000
 80000
 90000
 100000
 0.01  0.02  0.03  0.04  0.05  0.06  0.07  0.08  0.09
E
xt
er
na
l L
os
se
s
Initial Shock
External Losses vs. Initial Shock
ζ=0  ζ=0.1 ζ=0.2 ζ=0.3
 0
 10000
 20000
 30000
 40000
 50000
 60000
 70000
 80000
 90000
 100000
 0.01  0.02  0.03  0.04  0.05  0.06  0.07  0.08  0.09
E
xt
er
na
l L
os
se
s
Initial Shock
External Losses vs. Initial Shock
ν=0.01 ν=0.05 ν=0.10 ν=0.15 
 0
 100000
 200000
 300000
 400000
 500000
 600000
 700000
 0.01  0.02  0.03  0.04  0.05  0.06  0.07  0.08  0.09
W
ith
dr
aw
n 
D
ep
os
its
Initial Shock
External withdrawal vs. Initial Shock
ζ=0  ζ=0.1 ζ=0.2 ζ=0.3
 0
 100000
 200000
 300000
 400000
 500000
 600000
 700000
 0.01  0.02  0.03  0.04  0.05  0.06  0.07  0.08  0.09
W
ith
dr
aw
n 
D
ep
os
its
Initial Shock
External withdrawal vs. Initial Shock
ν=0.01 ν=0.05 ν=0.10 ν=0.15 
Figure 9.2: Impact of changes in liquidity buffer depending on the intensity of the initial
shock λ for different levels of liquid investments ζ (left) and liquidity reserve ν (right) for high
concentration of the shock and high risk appetite of banks.
Parameter setting: see Fig. 9.1.
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Figure 9.3: Total asset and liquidity structure for scenarios with a low level (left, ζ = 0.1) and
with a high level of liquid assets (right, ζ = 0.3) for high risk appetite of banks.
Parameter setting: For the remaining parameters see Fig. 9.1.
such additional external deposits should not be an explanation for more losses and less
resistance of the system against the shocks, since the acquired liquid assets can be sold
by banks at any time at a guaranteed nominal price without loss of value by definition.
Contagion and further dynamics in the model affect the final asset/liability structure.
Thus, it is reasonable to consider it here. As you can see on the right graph in Fig. 9.3
in the case of a higher liquidity buffer, the direct financing of banks through the central
bank in the form of loans (pink line or area) is higher compared to the left graph related
to the lower liquidity buffer. Taking into account that zero liquidity gap covered by the
central bank immediately (δ = 0, see 2.3.4) is supposed in the simulations discussed here,
increasing central bank financing provides an indication that banks are becoming more
active as a buyer in the fire-sale process, financing their purchases by funds from the
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Figure 9.4: Initial total asset and liquidity structure for scenarios with a low level (left, ζ = 0.1)
and with a high level of liquid assets (right, ζ = 0.3) for high risk appetite of banks.
Parameter setting: For the remaining parameters see Fig. 9.1.
central bank as assumed in the model. The reason for this is the larger time line of the
dynamics if more liquidity in the market exists. Banks will be forced to sell smaller parts
of their risky assets at the beginning. So it is more likely that the capital endowment
of other banks allows them to buy risky assets offered for sale. Even if buyer banks
could make some profit because of low purchase prices at the beginning of the turmoil,
the acquisition of risk assets during the crisis can exacerbate the vulnerability of them
to become victims of withdrawals because of the smaller equity ratio after purchase of
additional credit risk assets. Remember, that fire-sale asset prices depend positively on
the (free) capital available in the banking system and negatively on the amount of the
offered assets at the point of sale, see section 2.3.4.The weakening of banks’ capital can
be enforced additionally by the transmission of losses from insolvent banks. Thereafter,
the amount of fire-sale assets could explode dramatically and eventually force the central
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bank to intervene. Hence, the high liquidity buffer of banks could extend the withdrawal
process and increase the total volume of withdrawn deposits.
On the contrary, a smaller initial liquidity buffer would lead to more intensive fire-sales
at the beginning of the dynamics. In consequence, the higher amount of fire-sales quickly
exceeds the capital capacity of the banking system restricted by capital requirements. The
intervention of the central bank, in terms of purchasing fire sale assets, will be triggered
earlier. Banks do not purchase fire sale assets but keep the capital buffer to absorb
the potential losses and remain more resistant to withdrawals then. Thus, the earlier
intervention of the central bank seems to be able to reduce withdrawals, even if weak
banks would face more losses from the fire sales in the earlier phase of the dynamics (fire
sale price of the central bank β is at a minimum).
Remember that liquidity withdrawals in the model are solvency risk related and would
be triggered by the capital gap of banks, which obviously cannot be reduced if banks sell
their liquid risk-free assets to close the liquidity gap without reducing their risky assets.
Note that the spreading liquidity crisis, widening gradually, poses problems for any bank,
which firstly, begin to sell their risk assets after the liquidity buffer is depleted. If the
capital capacity of the banking system is sufficiently ample to buy the offered fire sale
assets, the banking system would not lose money as a whole: the losses to sellers would
be compensated by gains of buyers. Thereby the total loss/gain depends on the price cor-
related with the ’free equity’ in the banking system in relation to the fire-sale exposure.
Such friction losses as transaction costs were not taken into account in the model. The
capital erosion of the banking system as a whole occurs if banks are not able to buy the
excess assets at appropriate prices. Hence, the volume of assets purchased by the central
bank is finally correlated to the total loss to banks and externals (the latter because of
the possible transmission of losses from banks to externals).
The described results are very stable for medium levels of bank capitalization and in-
tensity of the initial shock. For a sufficiently high magnitude of the shock, increase of the
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liquid funds may display a smaller impact on banks, corresponding to the smaller increase
of deposit withdrawals than for the more moderate shock intensities. The explanation is
related to the absence of the extension of the fire sale process discussed above, because of
a very quick initial capital depletion during the absorption of very strong initial shocks.
Conclusion
If withdrawals of deposits are solvency-based, i.e. connected to the deterioration of the
capital compared to the risk profile of banks, the high liquidity reserve or buffer do not
only not assist the stabilization process but could actually significantly complicate it
and increase losses to both: banks and externals. Withdrawal of liquidity would not be
stopped in particular, if appropriate actions to ensure adequate capitalization of banks
have not been undertaken. Furthermore, a large liquidity buffer can cause an explosion
in withdrawals, even if no impairment of liquid assets takes place and no further defaults
of commercial loans occur. Higher losses to banks as well as of the external segment are
connected to the higher fire-sale of assets, which could not be held within the banking
system (here purchased by the central bank). Evidence of this is to be seen in the growing
funds raised by the central bank to buy the new assets.
A similar argumentation applies to the impact of the liquidity reserve presented above in
Fig. 9.2, which can be skipped here.
9.2 Support by the central bank
In this section we scrutinize the role of the willingness of the central bank to support banks
that fall victim to the loss of depositor confidence and to analyze if such a ’lender of last
resort’ intervention would always produce satisfactory results. Demonstrating results of
simulation experiments we will focus on only one case, including withdrawal risk. The
effects for other simulation scenarios show a similar trend and are therefore redundant
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here. We begin with the analysis of the losses to the external counterparts.
Remember that the liquidity supporting role of the central bank has been implemented in
the ABM in two respects as described in section 2.3.4. One of two supporting activities of
the central bank in the model focuses on providing the liquidity to banks to close a part
of the individual liquidity gaps, determined as a percentage of the liquidity gap δ. The
second activity includes the intervention of the central bank in the ”fire-sale market” by
buying the excess credit assets at a specified price β.
9.2.1 Injection of liquidity
We focus on the first support activity of the central bank, providing additional liquidity.
Thereby we vary the percentage of the liquidity gap δ which will be immediately covered
by central bank money. This parameter determines the level of the central bank support
in the following analysis.
Resilience of the bank system
Fig. 9.5 provides a visual representation of some of the simulation results in three-
dimensional graphics. On the left side, the failure rate of banks is displayed in relation to
the percentage of the liquidity gap δ and the equity rate γ. On the right side, the banks’
default rate is plotted in relation to the central bank support related to δ in conjunction
with the level of the intolerance of depositors against undercapitalization of banks τ . We
have seen before that decreasing capital as well as increasing loss of confidence in the
banking system contribute to destroying its resistance against shocks. The provided sim-
ulation results demonstrate that the intervention of the central bank can create a barrier
effect against loss of confidence in the banking system related to the increasing intoler-
ance of depositors τ . We can see this effect in Fig. 9.5 on the right. Increasing τ and
so the upward movement for withdrawal of deposits corresponds to the growing default
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rate of banks. This negative development can be substantially diminished in the case of
the central bank intervention. Moreover, central bank support can eliminate the negative
impacts of withdrawals, which can be seen in Fig. 9.5 for large values of τ . Remember
that withdrawals start earlier if intolerance for undercapitalization of banks τ increases.
At high levels of τ capital level of banks is quite high at the begin of the deposit with-
drawal processes. The intervention of the central bank by closing liquidity gaps of banks
prevents the further withdrawal of deposits and defaults of banks.
Considering the development of bank bankruptcies in relation to their equity, we can say
that the intervention of the central bank can weaken or even prevent contagion, generally.
The greater support of the central bank related to the larger values of δ corresponds to the
lower equity rates at which bank defaults start to rise rapidly or the total banking system
collapses, see Fig. 9.5 (left). Increasing resistance of the banking system with increasing
central bank support is also displayed by example in Fig. 9.6 (right) for relatively high
capital. For sufficiently low equity rates we do not observe any substantial effects, see
Fig. 9.5 (left). We can summarize that the number of bank bankruptcies decreases with
increasing central bank support in general. However, the central bank support may only
achieve a significant effect if the banking system is sufficiently capitalized after the initial
shock absorption. Because otherwise, withdrawal of deposits which focus on creditwor-
thiness of banks still take place and lead to further losses to banks and the total collapse
of the financial system.
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Figure 9.5: Resilience of the banking system depending on support of the central bank δ, bank
capitalization and intolerance for high concentration of the shock and high risk appetite of banks.
Parameter setting: see Tables A.1 to A.3 in the appendix A.1.1.
Bank losses
Fig. 9.7 provides the simulation results regarding total losses to banks in accordance
with the presentation of bank defaults in 9.5. Increasing central bank support leads
to decreasing bank losses in total, as long as it is able to reduce the negative impact of
deposit withdrawals or even to prevent them, as can be seen in Fig. 9.7. Banks would face
less necessity for fire-sales and achieve higher asset prices. Thus, solvency risk tends to
decrease, stopping or limiting further withdrawals. This positive effect can be observed for
the capital rate level from 4% to 8% in the example. However, the providing of additional
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Figure 9.6: Resilience and losses within the banking system depending on support of the central
bank δ in relation to the bank capitalization for high concentration of the shock and high risk
appetite of banks.
Parameter setting: τ = 0.1; ζ = 0.1 (right); γ˜ = 0 (see section 8.2.2). For the remaining
parameters please refer to Tables A.2, A.3 and A.4 in the appendix.
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liquidity does not necessarily always help. Such support of the central bank will be less
useful for seriously undercapitalized banks after a shock because withdrawals of deposits
may occur repeatedly until banks’ capital has reached an appropriate level which can
restore the confidence of the depositors again (see more in section 2.3.4).
In better capitalized systems the intervention of the central bank could be more helpful,
especially for such banks which are less affected initially but suddenly lose a big part of
their liquidity, because weak banks have to recover their funds to close their own liquidity
gap. Further withdrawal of deposits can be prevented by the central bank in this way,
because less assets have to be sold then, which would reduce losses to banks and rescue
their own capital. Decreasing losses within the banking system with increasing central
bank support is also displayed by example in Fig. 9.6 (right) for relatively high capital.
For very well capitalized systems no effect of the willingness of the central bank to inject
liquidity can be observed in 9.7, because no withdrawals take place and the central bank
has no reason to intervene.
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Figure 9.7: Cumulated bank losses depending on support of the central bank δ, bank capital-
ization and intolerance for high concentration of the shock and high risk appetite of banks. For
a detailed explanation of the non-monotone relation between capitalization and losses within a
banking system we refer to section 5.1.
Parameter setting: see Fig. 9.5.
External losses
Let us look at Fig. 9.8 showing that external losses decrease with increasing central bank
support. These dynamics are greatly assisted by the effects of decreasing intolerance or
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increasing initial capitalization of banks, which is straightforward to understand consider-
ing our analysis of both these factors in the previous sections: both mentioned dynamics
lead to decreasing external losses, in general. It is even possible that central bank support
does not have any impact on external losses, if all losses are completely covered by banks
or withdrawal of deposits is not triggered. The positive effect of the central bank support
for externals will also nearly disappear, if banks have very low capitalization compared to
the initial shock they have been facing. Non-monotonic association between capitalization
of banks and losses to externals has been explained in 5.1.
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Figure 9.8: External losses depending on support of the central bank δ, bank capitalization
(left) and intolerance (right) for high concentration of the shock and high risk appetite of banks.
For a detailed explanation of the non-monotone relation between capitalization of banks and
losses to externals we refer to section 5.1.
Parameter setting: see Fig. 9.5.
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Additional details
At this point it may be interesting to give a deeper insight into the discussed impacts
of the central bank support on the stability of the banking system and losses to banks
and externals. In addition, we will look at the effects of the initial liquidity endowment
discussed in section 9.1 under the influence of the central bank support now. Fig. 9.9
shows the results of the experiments, where central bank support is varied for different
levels of liquidity buffers related to liquid investments ζ (left) and liquidity reserves ν
(right).
It can be seen, that support of the central bank works against the negative effects of
withdrawals, reducing the sudden lack of liquidity: decreasing bank default rates and
losses to externals and banks can be observed with increasing central bank support for all
levels of the liquidity buffers, see Fig. 9.9. Moreover, the impact of the support is higher
in the case of higher liquidity endowment compared to its lower levels, which can be seen
by the steeper curves for larger values of ζ (left) and ν (right).
The interesting point here is the change of the impact of the initial liquidity endowment,
analyzed in the previous section, that is caused by the central bank. It can be seen that
the negative impact of the large liquidity endowment can be neutralized by the central
bank if its support is intensive enough (compare results for ζ = 0 and ζ = 0.3 for exam-
ple). The impact of the high level of liquidity can become even positive (see red line with
triangles below other lines in Fig. 9.9 at sufficiently high levels of δ). But, the possible
positive effect of the liquidity endowment in such a case is significantly smaller than the
negative impact of the excess liquidity combined with a meager support of the central
bank.
The explanation of this phenomenon may be provided as follows. The destabilizing effect
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Figure 9.9: Impact of changes in liquidity buffer depending on central bank support δ (liquidity
injection) for different levels of liquid investments ζ (left) and liquidity reserve ν (right) for high
concentration of the shock and high risk appetite of banks.
Parameter setting: τ = 0.1; ζ = 0.1 (right); γ˜ = 0.02 (determines additional capital, see (8.8) in
8.2.2). For the remaining parameters please refer to Tables A.2, A.3 and A.4 in the appendix.
of the initial liquidity endowment was argued with the escalation of withdrawals after the
purchase of fire sale assets by other banks, see section 9.1. The intensive liquidity support
of the central bank acts against this escalation by covering the liquidity gap and reducing
the fire-sales substantially. Withdrawals from weak banks can not be stopped by the
described central bank activity, but losses from the liquidation of assets and contagion of
the rest of the banking system can be substantially reduced.
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Conclusion
We can summarize that in contrast to strengthening the regulatory regime, central bank
support in the sense of providing liquidity to close the sudden gaps in the banking system
acts against intolerance to the benefit of the banking systems and the external segment.
While stricter capital requirements and higher initial liquidity endowment of banks tend
to intensify withdrawal of deposits and, thus, to destabilize the system, support of the
central bank works against it, generally, but does make sense only if the banking system
has been sufficiently capitalized to withstand the initial shock. Furthermore, injection
of liquidity into the banking system during the crisis may reduce or even eliminate the
negative externalities connected to a significant expansion of the fire-sale activities within
the banking system, in particular in the case of excess liquidity buffers of banks. The main
difference between central bank support and liquidity endowment of banks is probably the
neutral impact of the first on the leverage ratio of banks, while the increase of liquidity
endowment of banks raises the level of external deposits and thus the banks’ leverage.
The latter enhances the potential for deposit withdrawals, while the central bank liquidity
injection sustainably reduces the resultant liquidity gaps and, thus, the amount of fire-sale
assets and counteracts the price pressure on the fire-sale market.
9.2.2 Purchase of assets
Now we would like to take a look at the second supporting activity of the central bank,
focussing on the intervention of the central bank in the ’fire-sale market’ purchasing the
excess credit assets. The central bank will intervene if the price of assets deteriorates
below a threshold value β. For the purpose of the analysis presented in this section we
create a number of simulation experiments with β ∈ {0.3, 0.5, 0.7, 0.95} and a variety of
other factors to underpin the stability of the results. For the presentation and discussion
of results we focus on a selection of them without loss of generality.
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The results of the mentioned experiments are pictured in figures 9.10 - 9.12. The focus
of the graphical demonstration is on the case with high risk appetite of banks and high
concentration of the initial shock and the impact of the changes of the following parameters
depending on the level of β: initial shock, bank capitalization, intolerance of depositors to
the bank undercapitalization causing withdrawals, support of the central bank injecting
additional liquidity into the banking system and interbank connectivity via credit and
investment links. The figures picture quite clear and self-explanatory results, which have
to be shortly described here.
The increase of the threshold price for fire-sale assets, at which the central bank would
purchase the assets have a positive stabilizing effect on the whole system, reducing the
losses to banks and accordingly the losses to externals transmitted from banks which are
unable to cover their losses with existing reserves. The reduction of the losses lead to
a lower default rate within the banking system and thus higher resilience of the system
against shocks and consequences of the after-shock dynamics. The positive effect of the
intervention of the central bank purchasing assets during the fire-sale period seems to be
very stable and can be observed for a very broad range of the parameters, which can be
seen in Fig. 9.10 to Fig. 9.12. In some cases with relatively low hazard for liquidity
withdrawal, the effect of β is very small and could even be negative. The last point is
explained by the lower profits of some banks in well capitalized systems not being able
to purchase cheep fire-sale assets, because of the earlier intervention of the central bank.
This effect is very small and can be ignored.
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Figure 9.10: Impact of changes in the central bank price for fire-sale assets β, depending on
bank capitalization γ (left) and intensity of the initial shock λ (right) for high concentration of
the shock and high risk appetite of banks.
Parameter setting: see Tables A.1 to A.3 in the appendix A.1.1.
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Figure 9.11: Impact of changes in the central bank price for fire-sale assets β, depending on
intolerance for undercapitalization τ (left) and liquidity support of the central bank δ (right) for
high concentration of the shock and high risk appetite of banks.
Parameter setting: see Tables A.1 to A.3 in the appendix A.1.1.
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Figure 9.12: Impact of changes in the central bank price for fire-sale assets β, depending on
interbank interconnectivity via credit (left) pc and investment links pi (right) for high concen-
tration of the shock and high risk appetite of banks.
Parameter setting: see Tables A.1 to A.3 in the appendix A.1.1.
Chapter 10
Conclusion and Outlook
In the present thesis an asset based financial network model has been developed and
presented to reproduce and analyze the interaction between banks, different economic
sectors and the central bank, whereas the stylized financial system is characterized by the
inclusion of strong idiosyncratic or systematic external shocks. The distinctive character
of the presented model is that banks are affected by the initial distress depending on their
individual asset structure. This forward-looking network model is simulation-based and
consists of three groups of nodes: banks, real economy segments and the central bank,
which are connected by various credit and investment links building a multi-layer network
structure. Furthermore, the model includes the securitization of debts distinguishing be-
tween covered bonds and collateralized debt obligations. The latter are characterized by
a number of tranches with various risk degrees and subordination. Moreover, the model
takes account of the regulatory capital and minimum liquidity requirements, as well as
the risk of deposit withdrawals and possible supportive activities by the central bank.
Applying the asset based financial network model, a number of bank and network prop-
erties have been analyzed here. It could be shown that the resilience of the financial
system and the erosion of the banks’ capital base, as well the allocation of losses between
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the banking sector and the external players greatly depend on the network characteris-
tics and shock properties, such as the magnitude and the concentration of the initial event.
In particular, it could be shown that a high capitalization level of banks has positive
effects for the stability of the system as well as for the external sector. However, in the
case of a relatively low capitalization level compared to the initial event, a moderate in-
crease in the equity rate may lead to higher losses for both, banks and externals, which
is connected to the deposit withdrawal risk and implies that a moderate increase of the
capital base has little stabilizing effect and is even able to increase contagion. Much more
effective recapitalization of banks is necessary in such a case to stabilize the banking sys-
tem.
Further, we analyzed the impact of risk appetite of banks in terms of risk preferences
of the banking sector with respect to initial credit investments. Our analyses discovered
that, even if the willingness of banks to assume higher risk from the granted credit would
be positive for the external segment and negative for banks with respect to their partic-
ipation in the initial losses in general, the negative impact of higher risk on both is also
possible, especially if liquidity risk exists.
In view of the initial shock, we focused on two of its main properties – intensity and
concentration. We showed that the resistance of the banking system is related to two
opposite effects: the positive effect by sharing losses across banks, and the negative one
caused by contagion effects. Liquidity risk aggravates the crisis and may rapidly trigger
a crash of the whole system, causing significantly higher losses. In general, the banking
system is more resistant against systemic initial events than against the idiosyncratic
shocks with the same magnitude if shocks are relatively small. At a high magnitude of
the initial shock, the banking system may be more resilient against idiosyncratic events
than against broader distributed shocks with the same intensity in total, transmitting
more losses to externals, especially if banks have low connectivity degrees. Furthermore,
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the underestimation of the systemic risk at the start of the crisis may cause significantly
higher losses for depositors. Especially fire-sale trading within the banking system is able
to deepen the banking crisis and raise its costs.
We looked at the impact of the following network properties on the financial stability:
degree of connectivity and heterogeneity of the banking system. We emphasized the fol-
lowing effects: Increasing interconnectedness of the banking system increases the shock
absorption and implicates the higher systemic stability of the system, provided that the
banking system is well capitalized in relation to the systemic event that has taken place.
Higher absorption means higher losses within the banking system and lower losses to ex-
ternals. However, increasing interconnectedness may increase contagion, causing the lower
systemic stability connected to more bank failures. The extent of contagion depends on
the bank capitalization level and of the system’s ability to prevent bank runs. We can con-
clude then that higher connectivity can be positive or negative for the systemic resilience,
depending on which of both mentioned effects predominates: In well-capitalized networks
increasing connectivity tends to strengthen the system’s resistance. For low capitalized
systems increasing connectivity would have rather more negative implications, particu-
larly when liquidity risk exists.
Furthermore, we analyzed the effect of size of the interbank networks. It could be shown
that the size of the banking system, just like the connectivity degree, could also play
a significant role for the systemic stability. Moreover, the capitalization of the banking
system highly determines the way in which an increasing number of banks acts on the
system stability and on the loss distribution between banks and external segments. In this
way, an increasing number of banks does not induce a clear effect. Further, we observed a
combined effect of the increasing network size. The first part of the effect is similar to the
impact of the increasing connectivity, playing a negative role for the resistance of banking
systems in low capitalized banking systems, and stabilizing well capitalized systems by
the broader distribution of losses. The second part is based on the increasing network
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granularity due to the decrease of the average balance sheet total with an increasing num-
ber of banks, leading to higher losses to externals due to higher shock transmission, if
banks have low levels of capitalization and interconnectivity. The total effect depends
on the network structure as well as further risk drivers like degrees of connectivity and
capitalization of banks.
Focusing on the network structure effects, we introduced the extended core periphery
concept including the semi-periphery in addition to the common core and periphery net-
work areas and analyzed the impact of this heterogeneity on the stability of the system, in
general, but also on the vulnerability of the single network areas, in particular. The core-
periphery structure studied here has two major structural differences compared to the
random network. Firstly, the external credit exposure is more concentrated: core banks
do more or larger lending deals. Secondly, the interbank lending is more heterogeneous in
structure. Thereby, the concentration of the interbank lending decreases with increasing
exposure differences between core and periphery, if structural differences with regard to
the interbank relationships exist, and increase otherwise. We showed that these properties
have different effects on system stability and on the resilience of the single bank groups.
Generally, core banks tend to be more stable, while periphery banks are more prone to
shocks in core-periphery networks if significant differences between the core and periphery
exist. Furthermore, more heterogeneity in banking systems has stabilizing effects on low
capitalized systems and may have a negative effect on the banking stability, if banks have
better capitalization or shocks are sufficiently small.
We analyzed the effects of the loss of confidence in the banking system, defined by an
increase of creditor and depositor intolerance for undercapitalization of banks. We showed
that, when banks are still well capitalized after the shock, withdrawals would not occur,
whatever the level of intolerance is. Otherwise, at some sufficiently high level of the intol-
erance, in other words if confidence has been already considerably damaged, the negative
impact of withdrawals would increase disproportionately strongly compared to the fur-
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ther increase of the intolerance, which means that a marginal loss of confidence would
lead to heavily growing losses to banks and externals and destabilize the banking system
substantially. One interesting aspect here is, that the more rigorous the capital regula-
tions are, the stronger this negative effect is. In contrast, central bank support could
positively counteract this effect, stabilizing the banking system. Furthermore, the effects
of deposit withdrawal risk can be influenced not only by capital regulations, willingness
of the central bank to support the banking system or initial bank capitalization, but also
by network structure, intensity and distribution of shocks and, not least, by risk appetite
of banks and externals, inter alia.
Further, we analyzed the influence of some properties connected to the regulatory frame-
work. We looked at the impact of tightening of the regulatory capital restrictions followed
by two short-term consequences: deceleration of new business and, thus, pressure on the
demand and prices for fire sale assets, firstly, and maintaining uncertainty about appropri-
ate capitalization of the banking system among depositors, secondly, using the regulatory
capital requirements as an orientation marker with regard to the safety of the deposits.
We can summarize that tighter capital requirements may increase the vulnerability of the
banking system from the short term perspective and, even more, the losses to both, banks
and externals due to increasing liquidity risk. Nevertheless, we recognized that at least
in the medium term, banks would react by increasing their equity base or reducing their
(risk) assets, strengthening systemic stability as a result.
Moreover, we analyzed the impact of the additional capital requirements. Thereby we
considered the case that all banks are treated equally, and the case of different allocation
of the additional capital assuming that only systemically important banks faced the cap-
ital surcharge. We observed that the equal rise in the equity ratio for all banks tends to
stabilize the banking system more effectively than the capital surcharges for systemically
important financial institutions only, even if the total increase of the banking capital in
the system is the same. We can summarize that the diversified capital requirements may
lead to a higher systemic risk in comparison with uniform regulations.
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Furthermore we looked at the risk adjusted capital requirements compared to the ’flat’
capital adequacy. We demonstrated that individual risk-sensitive bank capitalization can
be stabilizing or destabilizing. Risk adjusted capital requirements could make a banking
system more vulnerable to ’unexpected’ shocks, compared to ’flat’ capital requirements,
if the capital reduction effect, caused by the risk sensitive requirements, is larger than the
advantages of the ’a-priori’ low risk banks in terms of affectedness by an unexpected shock.
Analyzing liquidity effects, we focused on the impact of the initial liquidity endowment
and of the liquidity provided by the central bank during the crisis. We observed that, if
withdrawals of deposits are solvency-based, a high liquidity reserve or buffer do not only
not assist the stabilization process but could actually significantly complicate it and raise
losses to both: banks and externals. Withdrawal of liquidity could not be stopped in
particular, if little or no activity has been undertaken to ensure adequate capitalization of
banks. Furthermore, a large liquidity buffer can cause an explosion in withdrawals, even
if no impairment of liquid assets takes place and no further defaults of commercial loans
occur. A similar impact and reasoning can be observed for additional liquidity reserves
in such a case.
We underlined the role of the willingness of the central bank to support banks falling
victim to the loss of depositor confidence. The first of two supporting activities of the
central bank implemented in the model focuses on providing the liquidity to banks to fill
part of the individual liquidity gaps. The second activity includes the intervention of the
central bank in the fire-sale market by buying the excess credit assets.
We showed that support by the central bank providing the additional liquidity during
the crisis can reduce the bank losses and defaults and even the losses transmitted from
banks to externals. However, the effectiveness of such activities seems to depend on de-
positor confidence in the banking system as well as on the banks’ solvency. The main
difference between central bank support and the liquidity endowment of banks is likely
233
to be the neutral impact of the first on the leverage ratio of banks, while the increase
of liquidity endowment of banks raises the level of external deposits and thus the banks
leverage. The latter enhances the potential for deposit withdrawals, while central bank
liquidity injection sustainably reduces the resultant liquidity gaps and, thus, the amount
of fire-sale assets and counteracts the price pressure on the fire-sale market. The increase
in the threshold price for fire-sale assets, at which the central bank would purchase the
assets, tends to have a positive stabilizing effect on the whole system, reducing the losses
to banks and, accordingly, the losses to externals transmitted from banks. The reduction
of the losses causes a lower default rate within the banking system, diminishing negative
consequences from the after-shock dynamics.
The simulation experiments and results discussed here have shown several times, how
diverse characteristics of the network itself and its environment, as well as the properties
of the systemic event, exert influence on the dynamics within the network and thus on
systemic risk. As demonstrated, the tangible results often depend on a broad spectrum of
factors. Therefore, data quality and completeness play an important role for the empiri-
cal research of systemic risk. But this is the problem that we are facing. Unfortunately,
data of bilateral exposures in the interbank market is scarce, incomplete and often of lim-
ited quality. In addition, it must be underlined here that even if good quality data were
available, special care always has to be taken to avoid false conclusions, because of the
multiplicity and diversity of the financial systems combined with the rarity of systemic
events.
In global financial markets a solvency crisis of certain economic sectors can very quickly
turn into a solvency and liquidity crisis for many financial institutions and sovereign coun-
tries. Economic implications of the last financial crisis and of the associated monetary
policies are still not very clear. As stated previously, network structures play an important
role in analyzing financial system stability and withstanding external shocks and not least
in supporting and evaluating economical and political approaches to regulate the financial
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sector. Dynamic processes in the real system can be effected through the changes in the
market state and mostly by the implementation of regulatory policies. Such changes may
be implemented and used in a simulation engine as presented here, creating more mean-
ingful results. We are convinced that an effective monitoring and regulating of banking
systems should be based on a deep understanding of financial products and of current de-
velopments in the financial markets, transparency of bank books to the greatest possible
extent and a continuous development of sophisticated models using this knowledge and
data.
Appendix A
A.1 Parameters
A.1.1 Baseline scenarios
In Tables A.1, A.2 and A.3 we list the benchmark parameters and ranges that are used
for the simulation experiments which are based on the baseline scenarios. These scenarios
and methodology of simulation experiments are described in section 3.2. Table A.1 con-
tains the general network parameters, that mainly determine the network structure and
are unique (the same for each related node in the network). For a number of experiments
which are discussed in this work we parameterized the simulation engine by benchmark
values and vary the parameters presented in Tab. A.1 in the specified range. In Table
A.2, segment specific parameter are listed, which are separately defined for each exter-
nal segment and determine the heterogeneity of the external sector. Parameters which
are related to securitization of external loans and separately defined for CBs and each
tranche of CDOs are listed in Fig. A.3. For the description of the parameters and their
incorporation in the model we refer to chapter 2.
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Parameter Value Range
Ce total amount of external loans 1.000.000 fixed
N number of banks 25 5 to 100
pc interbank lending probability 25% 10% to 50%
pi interbank investment probability 25% 10% to 50%
γ initial equity ratio of banks 8% 0% to 20%
γr regulatory equity ratio of banks 5% 0% to 8%
η proportion of external loans, refinanced by inter-
bank deposits
50% 0% to 100%
ζ proportion of liquid assets as percentage of external
loans
0% 0% to 100%
λ external credit default rate
(magnitude of the initial shock) 3% 0.5% to 10%
β threshold price for fire-sale assets 0.5 0 to 1
ν minimum reserve rate 1% 0% to 10%
τ intolerance for capital gap of banks (with liquidity
risk)
10% 0% to 90%
τ intolerance for capital gap of banks (without liquid-
ity risk)
0%
σ support by the central bank 0% 0% to 90%
Table A.1: General network parameters with benchmark values and ranges (baseline scenarios).
Parameter Sec 1 Sec 2 Sec 3 Sec 4 Sec 5 Sec 6
αs Alpha-parameter for the
risk-distributions
1.1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2
βs Beta-parameter for the
risk-distributions
10 10 10 10 10 10
wcs Credit weight 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.3
pbs Percentage of connected
banks
1 0.8 0.5 0.3 0.2 0.1
qs Securitization ratio 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
δs Distribution of the initial
shock (high concentration)
0 0 0 0 1 0
δs Distribution of the initial
shock (low concentration)
1 1 1 1 1 1
Table A.2: Segment-specific parameters (baseline scenarios).
Parameter CB Tranche A Tranche B Tranche C
u Upper risk threshold 0.05 0.15 0.25 1
βCB, Bank shares of 0 0 1 1
βCDOt (t ∈ T ) investments
Table A.3: Tranche-specific (CB and CDO) parameters (baseline scenarios).
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A.1.2 Modified scenarios (connectivity experiments)
In Tables A.4, A.5 and A.6 we list the benchmark parameters and ranges that are used
for analyzing the impact of connectivity within banking systems. The basics of scenarios
and methodology of simulation experiments are similar to the baseline scenarios and are
described in section 3.2.
Table A.4 contains the general network parameters. In Tab. A.5 segment specific param-
eter are listed, which are separately defined for each external segment. Parameters which
are related to securitization of external loans and separately defined for CBs and each
tranche of CDOs are listed in Fig. A.6. For the description of the parameters and their
incorporation in the model we refer to chapter 2.
The scenarios are similar to the baseline scenarios (see section A.1.1). Their modification
consists of only a few parameters. It is used to eliminate the possible side effects or to
see the effects of connectivity more clearly. The smaller interbank lending and investment
probabilities pc, pi are chosen to generate more heterogeneous networks. A higher number
of banks N helps to stress pc (Tab. A.4) and obtain sensible results even for quite small
values of pc. The percentage of connected banks pbs for the external sector which will be
stressed to simulate a strong idiosyncratic shock, s = 5, is chosen at a very low level to
induce a high concentrated initial shock, pb5 = 0.02. The contagion effects could play a
more important role then. Loans given to this sector should not be securitized q5 = 0,
which is sensible in order to eliminate the effects of the contagion via investments (Tab.
A.5). The banking and the external sector have the same risk preferences: βCB = 0.5 and
βCDOt = 0.5 ∀t ∈ T (Tab. A.6) for simplicity.
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Parameter Value Range
Ce total amount of external loans 1.000.000 fixed
N number of banks 50 5 to 100
pc interbank lending probability 0.1% 10% to 50%
pi interbank investment probability 0.1% 10% to 50%
γ initial equity ratio of banks 8% 0% to 20%
γr regulatory equity ratio of banks 5% 0% to 8%
η proportion of external loans, refinanced by inter-
bank deposits
50% 0% to 100%
ζ proportion of liquid assets as percentage of external
loans
0% 0% to 100%
λ external credit default rate
(magnitude of the initial shock) 3% 0.5% to 10%
β threshold price for fire-sale assets 0.5 0 to 1
ν minimum reserve rate 1% 0% to 10%
τ intolerance for capital gap of banks (with liquidity
risk)
10% 0% to 90%
τ intolerance for capital gap of banks (without liquid-
ity risk)
0%
σ support by the central bank 0% 0% to 90%
Table A.4: General network parameters with benchmark values and ranges (connectivity ex-
periments).
Parameter Sec 1 Sec 2 Sec 3 Sec 4 Sec 5 Sec 6
αs Alpha-parameter for the
risk-distributions
1.1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2
βs Beta-parameter for the
risk-distributions
10 10 10 10 10 10
wcs Credit weight 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.3
pbs Percentage of connected
banks
1 0.8 0.5 0.3 0.02 0.1
qs Securitization ratio 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0. 0.5
δs Distribution of the initial
shock (high concentration)
0 0 0 0 1 0
Table A.5: Segment-specific parameters (connectivity experiments).
Parameter CB Tranche A Tranche B Tranche C
u Upper risk threshold 0.05 0.15 0.25 1
βCB, Bank shares of 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
βCDOt (t ∈ T ) investments
Table A.6: Tranche-specific (CB and CDO) parameters (connectivity experiments).
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A.1.3 Nomenclature for scenarios
scenario Asset Risk Core-Periphery Redistribution Systemic Risk
(mode) Adjusted Capital Structure of External Debts Adjusted Capital
(Special Treatment)
(of SIBs)
1 no no no no
2 no no no yes
3 no no yes no
4 no no yes yes
5 no yes no no
6 no yes no yes
7 no yes yes no
8 no yes yes yes
9 yes no no no
10 yes no no yes
11 yes no yes no
12 yes no yes yes
13 yes yes no no
14 yes yes no yes
15 yes yes yes no
16 yes yes yes yes
Table A.7: Structure of the scenarios, used for the analysis dealing with sensitivity of capital
requirements in chapter 8.
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A.2 Further supportive illustrations
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Figure A.1: Example: Development of losses and bank defaults at increasing capitalization of
banks with low concentration of the shock and deposit withdrawal risk( NW03).
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Figure A.2: External losses in CP-networks with different properties in the case of idiosyncratic
shocks, high risk appetite of banks with or without liquidity risk related to withdrawal of deposits
(WD with τ = 0.1 (left) or no WD with τ = 0 (right)).
Parameter setting: ψ1 = 0.1, ψ2 = 0.5, ξ = 0.2 if exposure difference exists and ξ = 0 other-
wise, ζ = 0.1. γ˜ = 0.02 (determines additional capital, see (8.8) in 8.2.2). For the remaining
parameters please refer to Tables A.2, A.3 and A.4 in the appendix.
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Figure A.3: Bank defaults in CP-networks with different properties in the case of idiosyncratic
shocks, high risk appetite of banks with or without liquidity risk related to withdrawal of deposits
(WD with τ = 0.1 (left) or no WD with τ = 0 (right)).
Parameter setting: ψ1 = 0.1, ψ2 = 0.5, ξ = 0.2 if exposure difference exists and ξ = 0 other-
wise, ζ = 0.1. γ˜ = 0.02 (determines additional capital, see (8.8) in 8.2.2). For the remaining
parameters please refer to Tables A.2, A.3 and A.4 in the appendix.
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Figure A.4: Bank defaults in CP-networks with different properties in the case of idiosyncratic
shocks, high risk appetite of banks with or without liquidity risk related to withdrawal of deposits
(WD with τ = 0.1 (left) or no WD with τ = 0 (right)).
Parameter setting: ψ1 = 0.1, ψ2 = 0.5, ξ = 0.2 if exposure difference exists and ξ = 0 other-
wise, ζ = 0.1. γ˜ = 0.02 (determines additional capital, see (8.8) in 8.2.2). For the remaining
parameters please refer to Tables A.2, A.3 and A.4 in the appendix.
244 APPENDIX A.
exposure difference WD no WD
 0
 10000
 20000
 30000
 40000
 50000
 60000
 0  0.02  0.04  0.06  0.08  0.1  0.12  0.14  0.16  0.18  0.2
B
an
k 
Lo
ss
es
Equity Ratio
Bank Losses vs. Bank Capitalization
Median 25% Quantile 75% Quantile Mean
 0
 5000
 10000
 15000
 20000
 25000
 30000
 0  0.02  0.04  0.06  0.08  0.1  0.12  0.14  0.16  0.18  0.2
B
an
k 
Lo
ss
es
Equity Ratio
Bank Losses vs. Bank Capitalization
Median 25% Quantile 75% Quantile Mean
structural difference WD no WD
 0
 10000
 20000
 30000
 40000
 50000
 60000
 0  0.02  0.04  0.06  0.08  0.1  0.12  0.14  0.16  0.18  0.2
B
an
k 
Lo
ss
es
Equity Ratio
Bank Losses vs. Bank Capitalization
Median 25% Quantile 75% Quantile Mean
 0
 5000
 10000
 15000
 20000
 25000
 30000
 0  0.02  0.04  0.06  0.08  0.1  0.12  0.14  0.16  0.18  0.2
B
an
k 
Lo
ss
es
Equity Ratio
Bank Losses vs. Bank Capitalization
Median 25% Quantile 75% Quantile Mean
exposure and structural differ-
ence
WD no WD
 0
 10000
 20000
 30000
 40000
 50000
 60000
 0  0.02  0.04  0.06  0.08  0.1  0.12  0.14  0.16  0.18  0.2
B
an
k 
Lo
ss
es
Equity Ratio
Bank Losses vs. Bank Capitalization
Median 25% Quantile 75% Quantile Mean
 0
 5000
 10000
 15000
 20000
 25000
 30000
 0  0.02  0.04  0.06  0.08  0.1  0.12  0.14  0.16  0.18  0.2
B
an
k 
Lo
ss
es
Equity Ratio
Bank Losses vs. Bank Capitalization
Median 25% Quantile 75% Quantile Mean
Figure A.5: Total bank losses in CP-networks with different properties in the case of idiosyn-
cratic shocks, high risk appetite of banks with or without liquidity risk related to withdrawal of
deposits (WD with τ = 0.1 (left) or no WD with τ = 0 (right)).
Parameter setting: ψ1 = 0.1, ψ2 = 0.5, ξ = 0.2 if exposure difference exists and ξ = 0 other-
wise, ζ = 0.1. γ˜ = 0.02 (determines additional capital, see (8.8) in 8.2.2). For the remaining
parameters please refer to Tables A.2, A.3 and A.4 in the appendix.
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A.3 Source code
Here we present the most important parts of the source code of the simulation engine.
The following source listing shows the main steps of the typical simulation used for the
analyses in this thesis. The comments on the separate steps are highlighted in green. The
terminology and names of variables are closely linked to the model description. There is
no need to explain these here. For this reason we refer at this point to chapter 2, where
the description of the model is given.
The main program structure is presented in Listing A.1. The Individual program steps like
creation of a financial system as a random network, unbalancing the system by wiping
out external credits and the subsequent dynamics in order to maintain the balance of
the system again are annotated in detail in Listings A.2 to A.4. The remaining listings
expound the dynamics which are included in Listing A.4. The solvency chain reaction
related to the absorption of banks’ losses and contagion dynamics is presented in A.5.
For the according process description refer to section 2.2.5. Withdrawal of deposits is
implemented in the source code listed in A.6. The liquidity chain reaction is shown in
A.7. The last two processes are described in section 2.3.4. The mentioned sections of the
source code are presented in a sufficiently clear and complete manner. Exceptions to this
are solely error- and self-consistency checking macros and functions, which are excluded
for the sake of simplicity.
Listing A.1: Running a simulation
1 void Szenar io : : Run( ofstream& f i l e )
2 {
3 // read out the parameter f i l e , determine the core and per iphery banks
4 ParamFile pf ( ”network . param” ) ;
5 i n t ng = ExtLost . s i z e ( ) ; //number o f i t e r a t i o n s
6 i n t i b max=( i n t )max(n∗ p s i b i g , 1 ) ; // upper core bank index
7 i n t i s m i n =( i n t )min (n∗(1− p s i s m a l l ) , ( n−1)) ; // lower per iphery bank index
8 // begin o f the s imu la t i on
9 f o r ( i n t i =0; i<m; i++) // f o r each o f m runs
10 {
11 // generate random matr i ce s
12 RandomMatrix RSB(n , s , psb ) ;
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13 RandomMatrix R (n , p ) ;
14 RandomMatrix RI (n , ip ) ;
15 // begin o f the i t e r a t i o n
16 f o r ( i n t g=0; g<ng ; g++) // f o r each o f ng i t e r a t i o n s
17 {
18 // c a l c u l a t e vary ing parameters ( depending on the s c e n a r i o d e f i n i t i o n )
19 S t r e s s ( g ,R, RI ) ;
20 // i n i t i a l i z e network parameters
21 Network N(n , s , p f ) ;
22 // i n i t i a l i z e the network
23 N. I n i t (R, RI ,RSB,gamma, nu , xi , p s i b i g , p s i s m a l l , zeta ,
24 de l ta cap , gamma srfi , rgamma srf i , mode ) ; // see L i s t . A. 2
25 // t r i g g e r the shock
26 f o r ( i n t ds =0; ds<s ; ds++)
27 {
28 double de f=wsd [ ds ] / wsd . sum ( ) ;
29 N. Externa lDe fau l t ( ds , lambda , de f ) ; // see L i s t . A. 3
30 }
31 // t r i g g e r a chain r e a c t i o n and c l ean the system
32 N. ChainReaction ( phi , tau , rgamma , de l ta , nu ) ; // see L i s t . A. 4
33 // c a l c u l a t e and save r e s u l t s
34 N. Analyse ( i b max , i s m i n ) ;
35 }
36 // end o f the i t e r a t i o n
37 }
38 // end o f the s imu la t i on
39 }
Listing A.2: Creating a network
1 void Network : : I n i t ( const BoolMatrix& R, const BoolMatrix& RI ,
2 const BoolMatrix& RSB, double gamma, double nu ,
3 double xi , double p s i b i g , double p s i s m a l l ,
4 double zeta , double de l ta cap , double gamma srfi ,
5 double rgamma srf i , i n t mode)
6 {
7 // i n i t i a l i z e i n i t i a l interbank network s t r u c t u r e
8 IntVector s r f i ( 0 ) ;
9 ND.W( ) . equ ( 1 . ,R. Get ( ) ) ;
10 f o r ( i n t i =1; i<ND.WIS ( ) . s i z e ( ) ; i++)
11 {
12 ND.WIS ( ) [ i ] . equ ( 1 . , RI . Get ( ) ) ;
13 }
14 // bu i ld core per iphery network s t r u c t u r e ( depending on the mode)
15 BuildCoreNewStep1 ( xi , p s i b i g , p s i s m a l l , FunctionB (mode ) ) ;
16 BuildCoreNewStep2 ( xi , p s i b i g , p s i s m a l l , FunctionB (mode ) ) ;
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17 // determine i n i t i a l l i n k i n g between the e x t e r n a l segments and banks
18 ND.ExtW ( ) . equ ( 1 . ,RSB. Get ( ) ) ; // debts
19 f o r ( i n t i =1; i<(ND. ExtWIS ( ) . s i z e ()−1) ; i++)// s e c u r i t i z e d debts
20 {
21 ND. ExtWIS ( ) [ i ] . equ ( 1 . ,RSB. Get ( ) ) ;
22 }
23 // determine e x t e r n a l debts
24 f o r ( i n t i =0; i<s ; i++)
25 {
26 double creditbanknum = max(ND.ExtW ( ) . ColumnSum( i ) , 1 . ) ;
27 double w = E∗SegmentWeight [ i ] / SegmentWeight . sum()/ creditbanknum ;
28 ND.ExtW ( ) . ScaleColumn ( i ,w) ;
29 }
30 // r e d i s t r i b u t e e x t e r n a l c r e d i t s ( depending on the mode)
31 Red i s t r i bu t eExt e rna lCred i t s ( xi , p s i b i g , p s i s m a l l , FunctionC (mode ) ) ;
32 // r e a l i z e s e c u r i t i z a t i o n o f e x t e r n a l debts
33 ND. MatrixCB ( ) . equ ( 1 . ,ND.ExtW ( ) ) ;
34 f o r ( i n t i =0; i<ND. NumberOfTranches ( ) ; i++)
35 {
36 ND. Tranche ( i ) . equ ( 1 . ,ND.ExtW ( ) ) ;
37 }
38 InitCBandCDO ( ) ;
39 f o r ( i n t i =0; i<ND. NumberOfTranches ( ) ; i++)
40 {
41 ND.ExtW ( ) . Subst ract (ND. Tranche ( i ) ) ;
42 }
43 f o r ( i n t i =0; i<n ; i++)
44 {
45 double creditsum = B[ i ] . ExternCredit ()−
46 B[ i ] . Ext e rnShareho lde r In t e r e s t ()−
47 B[ i ] . BankShareho lder Interes t ( ) ;
48 double creditbanknum = max(ND.W( ) . ColumnSum( i ) , 1 . ) ;
49 double w = 0 . ;
50 i f ( creditbanknum >0.)
51 {
52 w = creditsum ∗ eta /creditbanknum ; ND.W( ) . ScaleColumn ( i ,w) ;
53 }
54 }
55 // determine r i s k weights us ing the segment−s p e c i f i c beta f u n c t i o n s
56 BetaRiskWeights ( ) ;
57 // apply r i s k weights ( depending on the mode)
58 AdjustRiskWeight ( FunctionA (mode ) ) ;
59 // determine l i q u i d i t y b u f f e r ( e x t e r n a l a s s e t s ) and equ i ty
60 f o r ( i n t i =0; i<n ; i++)
61 {
62 B[ i ] . In i tExternInvestment (gamma, zeta ) ;
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63 }
64 // determine s y s t e m i c a l l y r e l e v a n t banks
65 double minscore =0. ;
66 minscore=SRFIminscore ( ) ;
67 s r f i=SRFIBanks ( minscore ) ;
68 // ad jus t i n i t i a l bank c a p i t a l ( depending on the mode)
69 A d j u s t I n i t i a l C a p i t a l (gamma, de l ta cap , s r f i , FunctionD (mode ) ) ;
70 // determine i n i t i a l e x t e r n a l d e p o s i t s and minimum l i q u i d i t y r e s e r v e s
71 f o r ( i n t i =0; i<n ; i++)
72 {
73 B[ i ] . In i tExte rnDepos i t (nu ) ;
74 }
75 // c a l c u l a t e and save i n i t i a l va lue s ( f o r f u r t h e r ana ly s e s )
76 f o r ( i n t i =0; i<n ; i++)
77 {
78 B[ i ] . C a l c u l a t e I n i t i a l s ( ) ;
79 }
80 f o r ( i n t i =0; i<s ; i++)
81 {
82 Ext [ i ] . C a l c u l a t e I n i t i a l I n v e s t m e n t ( ) ;
83 }
84 }
Listing A.3: Unbalancing the network by an external shock (relating to a certain external
segment)
1 void Network : : Externa lDe fau l t ( i n t segment , double extde f ,
2 double we ight segde f )
3 {
4 // determine proport ion o f non−per forming loans
5 double de f au l tquo t e=extde f ∗weightsegmentdef /SegmentWeight [ segment ] ;
6 // reduce ( per forming ) e x t e r n a l c r e d i t a s s e t s
7 ND.ExtW ( ) . ScaleColumn ( segment ,1.− de fau l tquo t e ) ;
8 // t r a n s f e r the l o s s e s to CDOs and CB
9 // ( depending on degree s o f subord inat ion )
10 double cdosum = 0 . ;
11 f o r ( i n t i =0; i<ND. NumberOfTranches ( ) ; i++)
12 {
13 cdosum += ND. Tranche ( i ) . ColumnSum( segment ) ;
14 }
15 double de f = cdosum∗ de fau l tquo t e ;
16 f o r ( i n t i=ND. NumberOfTranches ()−1; i>−1; i−−)
17 {
18 double cs = ND. Tranche ( i ) . ColumnSum( segment ) ;
19 double d e f f = min ( def , c s ) ;
20 i f ( de f f >0.)
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21 {
22 de f −= d e f f ;
23 double s c a l e f a c t o r = 1.− d e f f / cs ;
24 ND. Tranche ( i ) . ScaleColumn ( segment , s c a l e f a c t o r ) ;
25 }
26 }
27 // c a l c u l a t e d i r e c t l o s s e s o f e x t e r n a l s and banks
28 // ( be f o r e contag ion takes p lace )
29 ComputeIn i t ia lLoss ( ) ;
30 }
Listing A.4: Chain reactions and rebalancing of the system
1 void Network : : ChainReaction ( double tau , double rgamma ,
2 double de l ta , double nu)
3 {
4 // c r e a t e and i n i t i a l i z e v e c t o r s conta in ing i n s o l v e n t or
5 // cons id e rab ly weakened banks
6 IntVector badbanks = BadBanks ( ) ;
7 IntVector weakbanks = WeakBanks( tau , rgamma ) ;
8 // t r i g g e r chain r e a c t i o n once at l e a s t one bank bankrupts
9 // cont inu ing u n t i l the bank l o s s e s are f u l l y absorbed or t ransmit ted
10 // and depos i t withdrawals do not happen
11 whi l e ( BadBanks ( ) . s i z e ()>0)
12 {
13 badbanks = BadBanks ( ) ;
14 // transmit ( uncovered ) l o s s e s from i n s o l v e n t banks v ia l end ing l i n k s
15 // cont inu ing u n t i l bank l o s s e s are f u l l y absorbed or t ransmit ted
16 whi l e ( badbanks . s i z e ()>0)
17 {
18 ChainCreditLoss ( badbanks , phi ) ; // see L i s t . A. 5
19 weakbanks = WeakBanks(rgamma , tau ) ;
20 badbanks = BadBanks ( ) ;
21 }
22 // t r i g g e r withdrawal o f d e p o s i t s and l i q u i d i t y chain r e a c t i o n i f p o s s i b l e
23 // once at l e a s t one con s id e rab ly weakened bank e x i s t s ;
24 i f ( weakbanks . s i z e ()>0 && ( Depos i t s ( weakbanks ) !=0))
25 {
26 ChainWithdrawDeposits ( weakbanks , tau , rgamma ) ; // see L i s t . A. 6
27 ChainLiqu id i ty ( de l ta , nu , rgamma ) ; // see L i s t . A. 7
28 }
29 }
30 }
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Listing A.5: Absorption of losses
1 void Network : : ChainCreditLoss ( IntVector badbanks )
2 {
3 f o r ( i n t j =0; j<badbanks . s i z e ( ) ; j++)
4 {
5 B[ badbanks [ j ] ] . ChainReaction ( ) ;
6 }
7 }
8
9 void Bank : : ChainReaction ( )
10 {
11 double defaultsum = −Capita l ( ) ;
12 double de fau l tbank = min ( defaultsum , BankDeposit ( ) ) ;
13 double d e f a u l t e x t e r n = min ( ExternDeposit ( ) , defaultsum−defau l tbank ) ;
14 double de fau l tcbank = min ( CentralBankDeposit ( ) ,
15 defaultsum−defaultbank−d e f a u l t e x t e r n ) ;
16 ReduceBankDeposits ( de fau l tbank ) ;
17 ReduceExternalDepos its ( d e f a u l t e x t e r n ) ;
18 ReduceCBankDeposits ( de fau l tcbank ) ;
19 }
Listing A.6: Withdrawal of deposits
1 void Network : : ChainWithdrawDeposits ( IntVector weakbanks , double tau ,
2 double rgamma)
3 {
4 f o r ( i n t i =0; i<weakbanks . s i z e ( ) ; i++)
5 {
6 IntVector c r ed i to rbanks = B[ weakbanks [ i ] ] . CreditorBanks ( ) ;
7 double withdraw = B[ weakbanks [ i ] ] . WithdrawingDeposits ( tau , rgamma ) ;
8 double withdrawrate = B[ weakbanks [ i ] ] . WithdrawDeposits ( withdraw ) ;
9 i f ( withdrawrate >0.)
10 {
11 f o r ( i n t k=0; k<c r ed i to rbanks . s i z e ( ) ; k++)
12 {
13 B[ c r ed i to rbanks [ k ] ] . D e f i c i t ( ) −=
14 B[ c r ed i to rbanks [ k ] ] . BankCredit ( weakbanks [ i ])∗(1−withdrawrate )/
15 withdrawrate ;
16 }
17 }
18 }
19 }
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Listing A.7: Liquidity Chain Reaction
1 void Network : : ChainLiqu id i ty ( double de l ta , double nu , double rgamma)
2 {
3 IntVector d e f i c i t b a n k s = Def i c i tBanks ( ) ;
4 whi l e ( d e f i c i t b a n k s . s i z e ()>0)
5 {
6 double p r i c e = 0 . ;
7 // managing a l l banks ’ accounts with the c e n t r a l bank :
8 // ( a ) in case o f l i q u i d i t y gap , c l o s e the l i q u i d i t y gap by withdraw
9 // the bank ’ s d e p o s i t s from the c e n t r a l bank ( i f a v a i l a b l e ) ;
10 // (b) in case o f exc e s s l i q u i d i t y , r e turn the loans provided by the
11 // c e n t r a l bank or s u p e r f l u o u s depos i t funds with the c e n t r a l bank .
12 CBNetting ( ) ;
13 f o r ( i n t i =0; i<d e f i c i t b a n k s . s i z e ( ) ; i++)
14 // use l i q u i d i t y r e s e r v e s to c l o s e the gaps
15 {
16 B[ d e f i c i t b a n k s [ i ] ] . F i r s t R e a c t i o n L i q u i d i t y ( de l ta , nu ) ;
17 }
18 // manage banks ’ accounts with the c e n t r a l bank ( as above )
19 CBNetting ( ) ;
20 // s e l l l i q u i d a s s e t s
21 f o r ( i n t i =0; i<d e f i c i t b a n k s . s i z e ( ) ; i++)
22 {
23 i f (B[ d e f i c i t b a n k s [ i ] ] . D e f i c i t ()>0.)
24 {
25 Se l lExternInves tments ( d e f i c i t b a n k s [ i ] ) ;
26 }
27 // withdraw banks ’ own d e p o s i t s to c l o s e l i q u i d i t y gaps
28 i f ( (B[ d e f i c i t b a n k s [ i ] ] . D e f i c i t ()>0.)&&
29 (B[ d e f i c i t b a n k s [ i ] ] . BankCredit ()>1.)
30 {
31 AdjustBankCredits ( d e f i c i t b a n k s [ i ] ) ;
32 }
33 }
34 // manage banks ’ accounts with the c e n t r a l bank ( as above )
35 CBNetting ( ) ;
36 // s e l l covered bonds , CDOs and then the e x t e r n a l c r e d i t s ( i f nece s sa ry )
37 f o r ( i n t i =0; i<d e f i c i t b a n k s . s i z e ( ) ; i++)
38 {
39 i f ( (B[ d e f i c i t b a n k s [ i ] ] . D e f i c i t ()>0.) &&
40 (B[ d e f i c i t b a n k s [ i ] ] . BankInvestmentCB ()) >0 . )
41 {
42 p r i c e = Potent ia lBanks ( d e f i c i t b a n k s [ i ] , rgamma ) . sum()/
43 B[ d e f i c i t b a n k s [ i ] ] . D e f i c i t ( ) ;
44 i f ( pr i c e>beta )
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45 {
46 SellBankInvestmentCB ( d e f i c i t b a n k s [ i ] , p r i c e , rgamma ) ;
47 }
48 e l s e
49 {
50 SellBankInvestmentCB2CBank ( d e f i c i t b a n k s [ i ] , beta ) ;
51 }
52 }
53 i f ( (B[ d e f i c i t b a n k s [ i ] ] . D e f i c i t ()>0.)&&
54 (B[ d e f i c i t b a n k s [ i ] ] . BankInvestment ()−
55 B[ d e f i c i t b a n k s [ i ] ] . BankInvestmentCB () >0 . ) )
56 {
57 p r i c e = Potent ia lBanks ( d e f i c i t b a n k s [ i ] , rgamma ) . sum ( ) /
58 B[ d e f i c i t b a n k s [ i ] ] . D e f i c i t ( ) ;
59 i f ( pr i c e>beta )
60 {
61 SellBankInvestmentCDO ( d e f i c i t b a n k s [ i ] , p r i c e , rgamma ) ;
62 }
63 e l s e
64 {
65 SellBankInvestmentCDO2CBank ( d e f i c i t b a n k s [ i ] , beta ) ;
66 }
67 }
68 i f ( (B[ d e f i c i t b a n k s [ i ] ] . D e f i c i t ()>0.) &&
69 ( ( B[ d e f i c i t b a n k s [ i ] ] . ExternCredit ()−
70 B[ d e f i c i t b a n k s [ i ] ] . BankShareho lder Intere s t ()−
71 B[ d e f i c i t b a n k s [ i ] ] . Exte rnShareho lde r In t e r e s t ( ) ) >0 . ) )
72 {
73 p r i c e = Potent ia lBanks ( d e f i c i t b a n k s [ i ] , rgamma ) . sum ( ) /
74 B[ d e f i c i t b a n k s [ i ] ] . D e f i c i t ( ) ;
75 i f ( pr i c e>beta )
76 {
77 Se l lEx t e rnCred i t s ( d e f i c i t b a n k s [ i ] , p r i c e , rgamma ) ;
78 }
79 e l s e
80 {
81 Sel lExternCredits2CBank ( d e f i c i t b a n k s [ i ] , beta ) ;
82 }
83 }
84 // manage banks ’ accounts with the c e n t r a l bank ( as above )
85 CBNetting ( ) ;
86 d e f i c i t b a n k s = Def i c i tBanks ( ) ;
87 }
88 }
89 }
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